2011 Global Food Policy Report

Derek Headey, IFPRI

The year 2011 will be remembered for some of the most severe “natural” disasters on record. There were major natural disasters in both developed and developing countries (see “Food Security & Food Safety” map on the following pages): powerful earthquakes in Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey; major floods in Pakistan (see Box 3), Southeast Asia, and Australia; and significant droughts in the Horn of Africa and parts of the Sahel. Within this list, there is substantial diversity in terms of the severity of the shocks, in whether they were slow-moving or sudden-onset disasters, in whether the shocks were effectively one-time events or a more regular feature of the landscape, and in whether the societies affected by the disaster were relatively resilient or relatively vulnerable.

In lowland areas of the Horn of Africa, droughts and floods are frequent events, although the scale of the 2011 food emergency was somewhat unusual. The drought began with failed rains in late 2010 and mid-2011. In some parts of the Horn of Africa—particularly parts of Somalia—the drought was the worst in 60 years. Moreover, at the peak of the drought—around August 2011—more than 13 million people were in need of food assistance. The United Nations Children’s Fund reported that more than 320,000 children were suffering from severe malnutrition in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The situation in Somalia was particularly grave: 4 million people—more than half of the country’s population—were in crisis (Figure 1). Of these, 750,000 were officially declared as experiencing famine. Since mid-2011, thousands are known to have died, especially infants and small children.

Figure 1: Estimated food insecurity at the height of the Horn of Africa famine

Given the severity of this drought, and the frequency of humanitarian emergencies in the region, several troubling questions arise. Why is the region seemingly more vulnerable now than in the past, especially after decades of humanitarian and development assistance? And what steps need to be taken to improve development and relief efforts to render the peoples of the Horn more resilient to the next drought?

Box 3

After the Floods: Pakistan and Food Security

Paul Dorosh and Sohail J. Malik, IFPRI

Unusually heavy monsoon rains contributed to severe flooding in parts of Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. From July to August 2010, flood waters covered 50,000 square kilometers and affected more than 18 million people (about one-tenth of the total national population), resulting in about 2,000 flood-related deaths, loss of 500,000 livestock, and damage to or destruction of 2.2 million hectares of standing crops, 1.7 million homes, and 10,000 schools. Then, close on the heels of this disaster, the 2011 flood struck southern parts of Pakistan in August through October. Although it affected a smaller area than the 2010 flood and only about half as many people, the combined human and physical costs underscored the importance of continued improvements in disaster rehabilitation and recovery in Pakistan.1

Earlier experiences in Pakistan and other South Asian countries have shown that disaster recovery should incor-porate livelihood strategies for affected households, including

  • prioritizing social protection of the most vulnerable groups,
  • raising awareness about new programs,
  • ensuring the participation of key stakeholders (from a multisector base as well as the community) in the decisions made for each program,
  • tailoring interventions to specific needs of vulnerable groups, and
  • providing temporary work schemes.

In particular, the experience of the 1998 Bangladesh flood—where poor households had a continuing debt burden of about US$100 (equivalent to a month and half’s average consumption) even fifteen months after the flooding—highlighted the importance of private-sector borrowing in the coping strategies of the poor and the need to consider substantial transfers to these households to avoid long-term adverse effects.

While Pakistan benefited from some of the experiences of the past, delays in funding and implementation—caused in part by donor reluctance in the face of a deteriorating governance and law and order situation—plagued the response to the Pakistan 2010 floods. Thankfully, domestic wheat prices in Pakistan remained stable due to a good harvest in April 2010 and abundant private and public stocks. The Pakistani authorities processed 1.5 million flood-affected households and provided almost 900,000 households with emergency shelter. About 6 million people received food assistance in monthly rations through January 2011. The Government of Pakistan also initiated a Citizen’s Damage Compensation Program designed to give to each of the 1.5 million affected families a one-time payment of approximately US$230 (in the form of a debit card or “Watan Card”). An ex post evaluation of program effectiveness, including targeting of payments and other aspects, should yield additional useful lessons and insights for future disaster preparedness and relief and recovery in Pakistan.2

1 - P. A. Dorosh, S. J. Malik, and M. Krausova, “Rehabilitating Agriculture and Promoting Food Security Following the 2010 Pakistan Floods,” Pakistan Development Review 49, no. 3 (2010): 167–192. [Back]
2 - For more information on the 2011 floods in Pakistan, see the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Pakistan Floods 2011,” www.fao.org/emergencies/country_information/list/asia/pakistanfloods2011, accessed March 15, 2012. [Back]

Why is the Horn of Africa so Vulnerable?

Unlike some of the other disasters of 2011, the crisis in the Horn of Africa is not a one-time event. Since the Great African Famine of 1982–84, vulnerability (Figure 2) and aid dependency appear to have increased over time. In Kenya, droughts accompanied by food emergencies occurred in six of the past eight years. But what explains this disturbing trend? Is it because droughts and floods are more frequent, because people are more vulnerable, or both?

Figure 2: Number of people adversely affected by droughts in the Horn of Africa, 1970–2010

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, 2011), www.emdat.be. Notes: The estimates here are only approximate. In addition to the problems of identifying affected people, there are degrees of impact that are not recorded, as well as possible omissions in earlier periods due to less effective measurement, poor governance, and so on. Also, these data do not distinguish between pastoralist and nonpastoralist populations, particularly in Ethiopia, making it difficult to gauge the impacts of droughts in pastoralist areas specifically.” Accessed April 3, 2012. Download a larger version of Figure 2

There is not yet evidence of widespread climate change in the Somali region of Ethiopia,1 but rainfall in Kenya appears to have declined substantially, and some observers predict that climate change will soon increase drought frequency in the region.

Even so, most experts on the region see the apparent increase in food insecurity as a function of socioeconomic factors as well as climatic events. This thinking partly reflects previous research on famines and food insecurity, stemming from the seminal work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen.2 Sen hypothesized that people starve not because of aggregate food shortages, but because they cannot get access to food. But other observers argue that famine also has deeper social and political causes, such as conflict, corruption, and other forms of economic and political mismanagement.3

In the most recent crisis, most people agree that a major reason that southern Somalia alone was gripped by famine was the conflict in that region (Figure 1). The conflict has likely increased food insecurity through several channels. First, without an effective government, southern Somalia has not been able to develop the kinds of disaster risk management institutions and social safety-net programs found in other countries in the region. Second, Al Shabab has excluded the World Food Programme from the areas it controls, greatly inhibiting the supply of emergency goods and services (Box 4). And third, conflict has significantly constrained people’s mechanisms for coping with drought, such as their ability to move their herds and to engage in trade to sell off livestock and get access to affordable food supplies. Local conflict has been shown to inhibit herd mobility in various regions of Ethiopia and Kenya.4

Box 4

Humanitarian Aid: How Can We Do Better?

Steven Were Omamo, World Food Programme

Drought, conflict, and high food and fuel prices affected the lives of more than 13 million people in the Horn of Africa region—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda—in 2011. Working closely with governments and other partners, the World Food Programme (WFP) targeted 11 million people affected by the crisis. By December, employing a range of interventions, including direct food transfers, cash, and vouchers, WFP had reached almost 8 million people across the region, providing a critical lifeline to vulnerable Somalis within Somalia in particular, and also to Somali refugees fleeing to Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The bulk of WFP’s food assistance reached drought-affected populations in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. However, insecurity and poor infrastructure within Somalia prevented WFP from reaching all targeted populations.

Despite falling short of its goal, an important lesson for WFP emerged. Investments by national governments and other partners in improved land-use management and other resilience-enhancing measures ensured that populations that required food assistance during previous droughts did not need such support in 2011, in particular in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

For WFP, investments in enhanced preparedness also paid off, especially decisions to use a newly created advance-purchasing facility to acquire and pre-position food in areas likely to require food assistance. Preliminary analysis by WFP, the African Union, and other partners suggests operation of regional emergency food reserves and expanded use of weather-index insurance could further improve preparedness in situations such as the one in the Horn of Africa.1

Looking ahead, key policy challenges facing WFP and other humanitarian actors center on how to strengthen the resiliency of communities living in drought-prone areas, using humanitarian assistance to help farmers and pastoral-ists adapt to changes in weather patterns. To that end, agencies must find ways to

  • better integrate relief efforts into longer-term solutions that build resilience among communities in drought-prone areas, expanding scope for recovery and rehabilitation;
  • protect productive assets of affected populations, with a special focus on meeting the nutritional needs of the weakest members of society by providing highly nutritious supplementary food products;
  • strengthen the capacity of national governments to develop institutional arrangements and mechanisms to address crises, with an emphasis on approaches that balance short-term interventions with medium- and long-term i nvestments that address low productivity and other causes of food and nutrition insecurity; and
  • support the African Union Commission and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development in creating a process to address critical regional policy and institutional gaps, especially by more effectively linking assessment and early warning alerts with timely and effective action.

These actions can limit the negative effects of a natural or human-caused crisis, which will reduce suffering and increase the impact of humanitarian aid.

1 - For more information on the crisis in the Horn of Africa, see World Food Programme, “Horn of Africa Crisis,” www.wfp.org/crisis/horn-of-africa, accessed March 15, 2012. [Back]

Not only can conflict amplify the effects of drought, but drought can cause conflict by exacerbating competition over scarce grazing lands and water supplies. For Somalia a recent study argues that rainfall shortages push down real livestock prices (and therefore household incomes), which in turn leads to more frequent conflict as young men look for alternative forms of income.5 Unbundling the exact relationships between drought, conflict, and food insecurity is difficult, but it seems likely that conflict is both a cause and consequence of food insecurity.

Conflict is an obvious socioeconomic explanation of food insecurity in the Horn, but it is by no means the only one. Many studies of the Horn—particularly outside Somalia—have focused on the declining resilience of pastoralists and ex-pastoralists.6 Households’ resilience is chiefly a function of their assets (livestock, education, land) and their coping mechanisms (mobility, income diversification). Livestock is the largest economic sector in the Horn, and for many households, it is the most important asset and an important source of income and milk and other products for their own consumption. Given the region’s abundant land and variable rainfall, moving livestock from place to place has traditionally been an effective way of coping with drought.

Historically, however, there has been a longstanding debate on whether mobile livestock rearing is sustainable. Some early critics argued that the difficulty of managing common resources led to excessive herd build-up and boom-and-bust cycles, overgrazing and land degradation, and depletion of water resources.7 In the 1990s and 2000s, however, a growing body of evidence suggested that herd build-up in post-drought years was a rational attempt to increase overall herd resilience to subsequent droughts.8 There is also now a fairly broad consensus that pastoralism does not lead to permanent damage to rangelands.9

The age distribution in pastoralist areas is heavily tilted toward the very young, so a big push on education could have major impacts.

Yet this does not mean that the issue of the region’s “carrying capacity” is no longer relevant. Even if pastoralists’ herd management strategies are individually rational and ecologically sound, human and livestock populations have grown rapidly in many parts of the Horn, and this growth has taken place on a fixed natural resource base. In many parts of the Horn, human population growth rates have been close to 3 percent a year, and fertility rates remain high. At these rates, the population will double every 25 to 30 years.

The growing number of humans and animals seems to be increasing vulnerability in some parts of this region. For example, pastoralists reported a 50 percent decline in median herd size over 1980–98 in northern Kenya, a region where human population growth was particularly rapid and land resources relatively constrained.10 Other research suggests that the increasing competition over land in much of the region is largely a result of human population growth (partly owing to migrants from nonpastoralist areas).11

Policies and institutional factors may also be contributing to land fragmentation and reduced herd mobility. There have been significant efforts to expand irrigation in pastoralist areas, attempts to develop ranch-style livestock systems, and a consequent breakdown of community-based property right systems (through, for example, accelerated fencing of previously communal land). Underlying many of these trends are government policies and institutions that have typically done a poor job of protecting pastoralists’ property rights.

Whatever its underlying causes, loss of mobility significantly weakens pastoralists’ coping capacity. Areas with reduced mobility have been hardest hit in recent droughts in Kenya and Ethiopia. And more generally, sedentary farmers—typically ex-pastoralists—are poorer and more vulnerable than pastoralists, precisely because pastoralists can use mobility as a coping mechanism. Yet despite substantial evidence on the potential benefits of pastoralism in this kind of environment, central governments—which are often wary of mobile populations that regularly cross national borders unchecked—typically underappreciate the need for mobility.

In summary, the reasons why the region is seemingly more vulnerable are far more complex than is often understood. Yes, drought is a major factor, as is the oft-cited conflict in Somalia. Yet underlying these shocks are slower-moving stresses—such as the reduction of herd sizes and the loss of herd mobility—that have undermined the resilience of communities in the region. Identifying the deeper sources of these stresses is far from easy, but many informed observers agree that there is a vicious cycle at work related to interactions between population growth, local conflicts, land fragmentation, and reduced mobility.12

Increasing resilience in the Horn of Africa

Enhancing resilience in the Horn of Africa requires striking a balance between strengthening pastoralism—the region’s traditional and still dominant economic activity—and promoting meaningful economic diversification. As it is, the region is already more diversified than is implied by the label “pastoralist.” For example, in the Somali region of Ethiopia, almost 70 percent of households engage in livestock rearing, but a large share also produce crops (43.4 percent), firewood (17.0 percent), and charcoal (14.7 percent). A smaller number of households engage in various cottage industries such as mat making (6.3 percent), services (10.0 percent), trading (3.8 percent), and general labor or employment (2.4 percent).13 Other regions show similar or even greater degrees of diversity.14

However, the most common alternative livelihoods generate low returns. Agro-pastoralism (a sector often composed of failed pastoralists) typically pays significantly less than pastoralism, whereas irrigated farming pays somewhat more and urban livelihoods pay much more (Table 1). Table 1 masks the fact that agro-pastoralists’ rainfed farming is an extremely volatile livelihood, perhaps more so than pastoralism (since pastoralists can cope with drought through increased mobility). Moreover, the major secondary occupations of collecting and selling natural products, such as firewood and charcoal, pay the lowest of all.15 These occupations are very much a negative coping strategy since they damage the environment and can impede pastoralism by removing the shrubs upon which livestock feed.

Table 1: Well-being by livelihood type in the Somali region of Ethiopia, 2005

Livelihood type Average incomea Dietary diversity scoreb Children
immunized (%)
Adult literacy (%)
Pastoralism 217 (340) 4.3 24.4 13.7
Agro-pastoralism 97 (199) 3.4 19.6 11.4
Irrigated farming 254 (345) 3.9 35.4 12.5
Urban 1,081 (1,103) 6.8 49.4 49.9
Source: S. Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali
Region, Ethiopia, Research Report No. 57 (Sussex, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2006).
a - Income is in 2005 birr per month. Figures in parentheses reflect average income when households with zero income are excluded from the calculation.
b - Dietary diversity score is the number of different food groups consumed in the preceding 24 hours, with the indicator ranging from 0 to 13 food types.

This evidence suggests that if pastoralist economies are to diversify, they should do so by expanding irrigated farming and increasing migration to urban areas. In the short to medium run, however, the basic issue is how many new entrants these alternative livelihoods can absorb. For example, a recent analysis estimated that additional irrigation investments in arid and semi-arid lowland regions in East Africa could profitably absorb a minimum of 3.2 percent of its rural population in 2020 and a maximum of 12.6 percent, depending on assumptions about viable farm size and irrigation costs (Table 2).16 The percentage absorbed could be somewhat larger if the estimates include rainwater harvesting, which essentially offers seasonal irrigation opportunities.

Table 2: Profitably irrigable area in the arid and semi-arid lowlands of East African countries

Irrigation cost
Estimated profitable increase in
irrigated areas (hectares)
Projected rural population in 2020 (millions) Percentage of six-person rural households that could
1 irrigated hectare 0.5 irrigated hectare
Low 522,850 50.0 6.3 12.6
Medium 320,689 50.0 3.9  7.8
High 266,085 50.0 3.2  6.4
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data and methods described in D. Headey, A. S. Taffesse, and L. You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa: An Exploration into Alternative Investment Options, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01176 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012).

But there are reasons to be cautious about irrigation potential. Dryland irrigation schemes in the region have often adopted inappropriate practices or technologies that have quickly become unsustainable and unprofitable. Irrigation schemes can also restrict pastoralists’ access to key water points and dry-season grazing lands. And there are questions about how sustainable arid and semi-arid lowland irrigation is in the context of the lower rainfall predicted by climate change models, as well as about negative downstream impacts on neighboring communities.17

Improving market access and integration would allow pastoralists to buy and sell livestock before a drought rather than lose their herds to drought-induced mortality.

Migration and urbanization may seem more promising, but the main prerequisite for successful migration and urbanization is greater investment in education, since the alternative is usually low-return informal employment or crime. Currently, education outcomes in pastoralist areas are deplorable (see, for example, Figure 3 for Ethiopia). Yet there is tremendous potential for scaling up education. Improving education outcomes will not only facilitate economic diversification and migration, but also reduce fertility rates, empower women, and even improve local governance and community-based animal health and extension services. Moreover, the age distribution in pastoralist areas is heavily tilted toward the very young, so a big push on education could have major impacts even in the next 10 years or so. And the demand for education appears to have increased substantially among pastoralist communities.18

Figure 3: Literacy status in Ethiopia by pastoralist and nonpastoralist districts

Source: Author’s construction based on data from the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. Note: A woreda is a district. Download a larger version of Figure 3

The mobility and isolation of pastoralists present challenges to scaling up education, but there are ways to overcome these, such as boarding schools, distance learning, and mobile schools, all of which have strengths and weaknesses. Mobile schools, for example, are compatible with pastoralism but tend to have poor-quality teachers and limited resources. Boarding schools are potentially more attractive—and could be linked with school feeding programs and health interventions—but their promotion needs to be compatible with cultural and religious norms.

Health and nutrition interventions are also important ways of building up human capital. Although chronic malnutrition (reflected in stunted growth) is relatively low in pastoralist areas, acute malnutrition (reflected in wasting) is generally extremely high19 because of high exposure to drought and acute food shortages, as well as extremely poor access to health services (recall the low immunization rates in Table 1). Adequate health and nutrition are not only important in their own right, but also necessary for improving school attendance and performance, so a broader strategy for human capital development in the region will yield high dividends. And health interventions are at the top of pastoralists’ own development priorities.20

Although diversifying the region’s economies is pivotal, it is also important to make pastoralism more profitable and resilient for two reasons. First, diversification strategies take time to bear fruit and have limited capacity to absorb more people in the near future. Second, mobile livestock rearing has a comparative advantage in a land-abundant region with volatile rainfall. Indeed, in some ways livestock trade in the region has been doing very well. During the 1990s, Somalia’s livestock exports to Kenya doubled.21 In the 2000s, Ethiopia’s formal livestock exports rose from just US$8 million in 2004 to just over US$200 million in 2010.22 The vast majority of Ethiopia’s livestock exports—90 to 95 percent—are sourced from pastoralist areas.23 These positive trends come on the back of strong overseas demand and higher prices.

Given the Horn of Africa’s abundant land and variable rainfall, moving livestock from place to place has traditionally been an effective way of coping with drought.

But how can the livestock sector be further developed in a manner that is pro-poor? Efforts to develop pastoralism have focused on commercialization—that is, promoting greater engagement with markets—and improved drought management, but there is little evidence that commercialization interventions in the Horn have benefited the poor (partly because the evidence base is weak).24 Moreover, there are signs that inequality in pastoralist areas may be increasing. Large herders have increasingly engaged in overseas markets and coped relatively well with drought, while poor herders have often failed to sell their livestock before drought and subsequently lost most of their herds. These ex-pastoralists are therefore forced to work as hired herders or in agro-pastoralism or other low-return activities.

Improving market access and integration would allow pastoralists to buy and sell livestock before a drought rather than lose their herds to drought-induced mortality. To achieve this, road infrastructure is obviously a high priority, bearing in mind the need to keep such investments strategic and cost-effective in low-population-density areas. Information systems could be better developed to provide weather forecasts and early warnings, livestock prices, and other pertinent information for both traders and pastoralists (such as advance notice of livestock auctions). Cellular phones have been used to disseminate early warnings and price data, but more could be done to make markets more competitive. In smaller livestock markets, traders often appear to have more bargaining power than pastoralists, who can ill afford to trek unsold animals back to their grazing lands. One solution could be to establish specific market days and shift to an auction-based system.25 In theory, these relatively simple institutional changes should increase the prices received by pastoralists and even promote broader commercialization of the sector.

Changes related to trade and animal health are also needed to render the pastoralist sector more viable. Most livestock exports in the region remain informal, partly because of onerous regulations and poor customs infrastructure.26 In Ethiopia, emergency animal health interventions typically have low returns since the main constraints during drought are food and water.27 However, improving animal health in normal times remains extremely important both for protecting and building up this key household asset, and for preventing the spread of diseases and subsequent bans on livestock exports, which can impose a huge economic cost on the region.

Better management and regulation of land and water resources will also be critical. In addition to suffering from the effects of conflict over land and water, herders have felt the negative impacts of irrigation schemes, “land grabs,” and the generally poor protection of community property rights. These land policies are not only unjust, but also inefficient because they inhibit the performance of the livestock sector and interfere with the principal mechanism pastoralists use to cope with drought. This record reflects the pervasive marginalization of pastoralist communities by national governments. In recent years, though, a number of interventions and institutions have been developed to redress this marginalization,28 and significant advances have been made in resolving local conflicts, including regulation of grazing and water resources.29

Finally, the need for evidence-based strategies is an issue that pervades every aspect of development strategies in the region. Even the most experienced researchers on the Horn of Africa acknowledge the lack of information on what works and what does not. Developing evidenced-based strategies means trying out technological and institutional innovations to cope with the region’s problems—and then rigorously evaluating those innovations. Relevant ideas and technologies can be imported from extensive livestock systems elsewhere in the world, such as Africa, Australia, Central Asia and China, the Middle East, and North America. New technologies could include greater use of cellular phones for market and early warning information, satellite-based weather information on rainfall and pasture availability, index-based live-stock insurance, and improved seeds. Institutional innovations might include improved regulation of water points, creation of livestock corridors (especially where irrigation schemes are present), strategic investments in infrastructure with stronger links to livestock centers, value-chain interventions (such as fattening of livestock), mobile schools and clinics, and public–private partnerships to encourage private investment in the region. All of these schemes could help mitigate the disadvantages of distance and the vagaries of the climate, but figuring out what works and what does not will require greater experimentation and more rigorous evaluation.

Moving Forward

Major climatic shocks in the Horn of Africa are inevitable, but human vulnerability to these shocks is not. Promoting social, economic, and ecological transformation in the region could build up resilience to these shocks and mitigate the slower-moving stresses that also undermine progress in the Horn. Achieving that resilience requires investing more in both livestock and nonlivestock sectors, rapidly expanding infrastructure and human capital, making synergistic improvements in disaster risk management and development interventions, and improving governance and conflict resolution efforts. The precise instruments for achieving these outcomes are less obvious, but they must inevitably be the product of innovation, experimentation, and—not least—political commitment.

1 - S. Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia, Research Report No. 57 (Sussex, UK: Institute for Development Studies, 2006); C. Funk, A Climate Trend Analysis of Kenya: August 2010, US Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2010-3074 (Washington, DC: US Geological Survey, 2010); A. P. Williams and C. Funk, “A Westward Extension of the Warm Pool Leads to a Westward Extension of the Walker Circulation, Drying Eastern Africa,” Climate Dynamics 37, nos. 11–12 (2011): 2417–2435. [Back]
2 - A. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981). [Back]
3 - S. Devereux, “Introduction: From ‘Famines’ to ‘New Famines,’ in The New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of Globalization, ed. S. Devereux (London: Routledge, 2007).[Back]
4 - See, for example, J. G. McPeak, P. D. Little, and C. R. Doss, Risk and Social Change in an African Rural Economy: Livelihoods in Pastoralist Communities (New York: Routledge, 2011); F. Flintan, Broken Lands: Broken Lives? Causes, Processes, and Impacts of Land Fragmentation in the Rangelands of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (Nairobi: REGLAP [Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme], 2011); and Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
5 - J. F. Maystadt, A. Mabiso, and O. Ecker, “Climate Change and Civil War in Somalia: Does Drought Fuel Conflict through Livestock Price Shocks?” paper presented at the US Agency for International Development/International Food Policy Research Institute Workshop on Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa, Washington, DC, December 13–14, 2011. [Back]
6 - T. J. Lybbert, C. B. Barrett, S. Desta, and D. L. Coppock, “Stochastic Wealth Dynamics and Risk Management among a Poor Population,” Economic Journal 114, no. 498 (2004): 750–777; McPeak, Little, and Doss, Risk and Social Change in an African Rural Economy; Flintan, Broken Lands; Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
7 - I. Livingstone, “The Common Property Problem and Pastoralist Economic Behavior,” Journal of Development Studies 23, no. 1 (1986): 5–19. [Back]
8 - Lybbert et al., “Stochastic Wealth Dynamics and Risk Management among a Poor Population.” [Back]
9 - P. D. Little, R. Behnke, J. McPeak, and G. Gebru, Retrospective Assessment of Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008, Report Number 1, Pastoral Economic Growth and Development Policy Assessment, study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (London, 2010). [Back]
10 - Lybbert et al., “Stochastic Wealth Dynamics and Risk Management among a Poor Population.” [Back]
11 - Flintan, Broken Lands. [Back]
12 - Little et al., “Retrospective Assessment of Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008”; Flintan, Broken Lands; McPeak, Little, and Doss, Risk and Social Change in an African Rural Economy.
Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
13 - Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
14 - For a review, see D. Headey, A. S. Taffesse, and L. You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa: An Exploration into Alternative Investment Options, IFPRI Discussion Paper 1176 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012). [Back]
15 - Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
16 - Headey, Taffesse, and You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa. [Back]
17 - P. D. Little, Somalia: Economy without State (Bloomington, IN, USA: Indiana University Press, 2003). [Back]
18 - McPeak, Little, and Doss, Risk and Social Change in an African Rural Economy; Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
19 - Ibid. [Back]
20 - Ibid. [Back]
21 - Little, Somalia: Economy without State. [Back]
22 - Headey, Taffesse, and You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa. [Back]
23 - Little et al., “Retrospective Assessment of Pastoral Policies in Ethiopia, 1991–2008.” [Back]
24 - Y. Aklilu and A. Catley, Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of Benefits by Pastoralist Wealth Group and Policy Implications (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2010). [Back]
25 - McPeak, Little, and Doss, Risk and Social Change in an African Rural Economy. [Back]
26 - Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. [Back]
27 - Personal communication with John Graham, USAID Ethiopia. [Back]
28 - Headey, Taffesse, and You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa. [Back]
29 - J. Konyndyk, “Exploring the Links between Peacebuilding and Drought Resiliency in the Horn: Lessons from Mercy Corps’ Programs,” presentation at “Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa,” a workshop hosted by the US Agency for International Development and the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, December 13–1. [Back]