Philippine agricultural and food policies

Implications for poverty and income distribution

The Philippines has undergone a series of trade reforms since the mid-1980s that have reduced protection on nonagricultural goods. However, protection on key food items is still in effect, and this has led to high domestic food prices. Such high prices have a considerable negative effect on poverty because more than 60 percent of the consumption of poor Filipino households is for food.

The special product arguments of the World Trade Organization increase the pressure to maintain the existing high levels of food protection in the country. Special products treatment provides developing countries with the flexibility to implement tariff reduction programs over an extended period for certain self-designated products. These special product discussions are based on food security, livelihood, and rural development arguments.

This research report assesses the poverty and income distribution implications of trade reform that is focused on agriculture and major food items (rice, corn, sugar, beef, chicken, pork, processed meat products, fruits and vegetables, and processed fruits) in the Philippines. A dynamic-recursive computable general equilibrium model calibrated to the social accounting matrix for the Philippine economy for the year 2000 and a microsimulation model that uses the 2000 Family Income and Expenditure Survey are used to analyze possible policy shifts.

The simulation results indicate that trade reform in agriculture and major food items will have favorable effects on factor prices and bring about a significant reduction in consumer prices. Real household income will increase while poverty and income inequality decline. These findings therefore imply that maintaining existing trade protections on agricultureand major food items—which drive food prices up—will not solve the problem of poverty and income inequality in the Philippines.

In the year 2000 the incidence of poverty in the Philippines was 34 percent. In 2003 it declined to 30.4 percent. The incidence of poverty in rural areas is higher than that in urban areas: 48.8 percent and 18.6 percent in 2000, respectively. Over the past two decades, significant structural changes have taken place in the Philippine economy. The share of agriculture in the total gross domestic product has declined. The country has switched from being a net exporter to a net importer of agricultural products and food items. The widening trade gap in agriculture and food has made the Philippines vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market. For example, the international rice crisis in 2008 has adversely affected the domestic market for rice in the Philippines. The deterioration in the net trade position of the country in food has largely been caused by the high growth in domestic food demand relative to production. Domestic food production lags behind demand because of declining productivity. There is increasing demand for food items with higher income elasticities, and there is also increasing pressure from high population growth.

To address this growing trade gap in agriculture and food, the government has adopted a strategy to improve rice productivity. This is a step in the right direction: based on our rice productivity simulation results, higher rice productivity will increase domestic production and reduce imports of rice. Most importantly it will reduce consumer prices. Most of the benefits of improved rice productivity would go to the households in the first decile of the population, since rice has the largest share in their consumption basket relative to the rest of the household groups. There is a reduction in poverty incidence and income inequality.

However, implementation of the Philippine government’s rice productivity program is costly, inefficient, and ineffective. In 2001 the government introduced a new technology, hybrid rice. Its adoption was aggressively pursued by the government through the Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program (HRCP). Under the HRCP the production of hybrid rice seeds is supported by the government through (1) procurement of seeds at a guaranteed price, (2) distribution of the procured seeds to participating farmers at half the procurement price, and (3) payment of additional money to participating farmers to help defray their fertilizer input costs. The government has devoted significant resources, through a system of subsidies, to supporting the HRCP.

However, the results are not encouraging. The adoption rate of hybrid rice is very low. There is a high dropout rate among participating farmers, because hybrid rice seeds are so expensive and farmers have to purchase them every planting season rather than reusing them (which would result in drastically decreased yields). The massive government subsidies have distorted the ability of farmers to make an informed choice between hybrid and inbred rice varieties.

Thus instead of supporting the HRCP the government should spend its limited resources on research and development that focuses on improving the yield of inbred rice. Enhancing an inbred-based system that is adapted to farmers’ familiar practice of saving, reusing, and exchanging seeds would be a more responsive approach to improving productivity than promoting such costly technologies as hybrid rice, which has not yet achieved commercially viable levels.

Comments on this report should be sent to IFPRI-pubcomments@cgiar.org

Author: 
Cororaton, Caesar B.
Corong, Erwin L.
Published date: 
2009
Publisher: 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Series number: 
161
PDF file: 
application/pdf icon
rr161.pdf(754KB)
4 Comments

Comments by Achim Dobermann

This research report is based on the project “Poverty Implications of Special Product Treatment of Key Food Items in the Philippines,” which was undertaken by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) from March to July 2007 with research funding from the Development Research Group (Trade) of the World Bank.

Our comments refer to the following section in the Summary (and the respective chapter 2 in the full report):

However, implementation of the Philippine government’s rice productivity program is costly, inefficient, and ineffective. In 2001 the government introduced a new technology, hybrid rice. Its adoption was aggressively pursued by the government through the Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program (HRCP). Under the HRCP the production of hybrid rice seeds is supported by the government through (1) procurement of seeds at a guaranteed price, (2) distribution of the procured seeds to participating farmers at half the procurement price, and (3) payment of additional money to participating farmers to help defray their fertilizer input costs. The government has devoted significant resources, through a system of subsidies, to supporting the HRCP. However, the results are not encouraging. The adoption rate of hybrid rice is very low. There is a high dropout rate among participating farmers, because hybrid rice seeds are so expensive and farmers have to purchase them every planting season rather than reusing them (which would result in drastically decreased yields). The massive government subsidies have distorted the ability of farmers to make an informed choice between hybrid and inbred rice varieties. Thus instead of supporting the HRCP the government should spend its limited resources on research and development that focuses on improving the yield of inbred rice. Enhancing an inbred-based system that is adapted to farmers’ familiar practice of saving, reusing, and exchanging seeds would be a more responsive approach to improving productivity than promoting such costly technologies as hybrid rice, which has not yet achieved commercially viable levels.

  1. The report provides an unbalanced view of the potential of hybrid rice technology. Although we recognize that government programs such as the HRCP have faced significant initial difficulties, we see hybrid rice as one of the key technologies for re-vitalizing rice yield growth in Asia, including the Philippines. The analysis presented by the authors is incomplete, out of date, ignores lessons that have been learned and major recent developments in the hybrid rice sector, as well as the progress that is likely to be made in the near future. There is no indication that the team conducting this research has interacted in any substantial manner with organizations that could have provided credible technical expertise or more recent information on progress in hybrid rice technology. The necessary scientific rigor required for drawing wide-ranging policy conclusions is missing.

  2. The report is poorly sourced. The discussion of the impact of the HRCP in chapter 2 relies exclusively on two secondary sources, neither of which has been peer-reviewed or is recent enough. A study by C. David (2006) is cited as the main evidence to conclude that (i) the cost of this government program was very high, (ii) yield advantages were only significant in 3 out of 14 provinces during two seasons (2002 DS and 2003 WS) surveyed, (iii) adoption rates were low compared to the large investments made (including a high dropout rate), and (iv) profitability was low. As a second source, a hybrid rice fact sheet produced by the Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP) in 2007 is cited by the authors as their main source of information for describing the reasons for poor hybrid performance. We do not know why the authors would consider such a fact sheet to be a credible scientific source of information on hybrid rice.
    Parallel to the study by C. David, PhilRice commissioned STRIVE to conduct an impact assessment study during the early stages of the HRCP (summarized in a paper by Sebastian & Bordey during the 3rd National Hybrid Rice Workshop, 2005) and some monitoring has continued since then. These studies recognized that many difficulties still exist in making hybrid rice fully successful, but they provide a different picture than what David (2006) concluded. During four growing seasons in 2002-2004, average yield increases from hybrids were 8-14%, with larger yield advantages during the dry season. On average, net income of farmers growing hybrid rice rose by 23% over inbreds and even if the hybrids seeds were not subsidized the incremental rates of return were still substantial. The STRIVE-PhilRice study also pointed out that (i) farmers are still learning on how to grow hybrid rice and (ii) hybrid rice adoption is a dynamic process that also leads to sequential adoption of other best management practices. Hybrids as a higher-quality seed product provide an incentive for better management. Unfortunately, the authors of the IFPRI report were not aware of this study or chose to ignore it.

  3. We recognize that better research on hybrid rice adoption, impact, constraints and opportunities needs to be done in the near future.

  4. Financial and administrative issues of the HRCP and subsidies in particular are the focus of the critique by David (2006) and IFPRI (2009). IRRI does not advise governments on such issues, but we generally suggest refraining from subsidies to the extent possible in order to avoid distortions of the market. Subsidies or policies that involve subsidies usually do not work over the medium or long term, a fact that is probably also not disputed by the agencies involved in programs such as the HRCP. However, at an early stage of a new technology, government support is often required, provided that an exit strategy is clearly charted out. This has also been recognized early on in the Philippines. The 3rd National Hybrid Rice Workshop in the Philippines (2005) reviewed the early lessons of the HRCP and provided a number of policy recommendations for the future course. They focus on gradual de-regulation of the hybrid sector towards building a full commercial hybrid rice seed sector. This also includes measures such as gradually reducing subsidies, more self-regulation (truthful labeling) of the seed sector, public-private sector models for R&D, and private as well as cooperative models for seed production. This process will take some more time, but it is the general direction in which hybrid rice will develop. Unfortunately, the authors of the IFPRI report chose to ignore these well-known recommendations as well.

  5. The report is backward-looking in its conclusions and ignores recent developments and opportunities for technological progress. We recognize that the first generation of hybrids, developed largely during the 1990s, did not fully meet the performance expectations. Neither did IR8 when it was released in 1966. It triggered a wide public debate in the Philippines that ranged from genuine excitement about “miracle rice” to outright rejection. Do we consider IR8 to be a failure? Certainly not. It had its shortcomings that had to be overcome later on, but it was a scientific breakthrough that made the Philippines self-sufficient in rice and paved the way for several new generations of modern varieties that replaced each other during the past four decades and have fuelled growth in the rice sector since then. IRRI believes that a similar development is already ongoing in the hybrid rice sector and that one should not base sweeping conclusions about a new technology based on its first generation and the many initial problems that often occur with it. A lot of R&D has continued in the public sector and, more recently, significant investments have been made by the private sector. This will soon lead to (i) a new generation of hybrid products with significant improvements in yield and other traits and (ii) and a much broader, vibrant seed market for hybrid rice, also in the Philippines. We already see improvements in the performance of hybrids under irrigated and also rainfed lowland conditions, with many newer generation hybrids yielding 15-20% than inbred checks in multi-location yield trials. Several companies have launched or greatly expanded hybrid rice breeding programs in key countries, including the Philippines. We would have liked to share such information with the authors of the IFPRI study.

  6. The authors cite a statement from PAN-AP suggesting that gibberellic acid is a growth regulator required to synchronize the flowering of the hybrid see parents. We wish to point out that gibberellic acid is used in hybrid seed production to promote panicle extension out of the sheath, not for flowering synchronization.

  7. The report also repeats a number of common myths that are either not true or likely to be not of advantage to (Philippine) rice farmers:
    a. One is that cultivation of hybrid rice seeds requires more fertilizers than production of inbred rice. The critical indicator to use here is not the amount of fertilizer applied per hectare, but the amount of grain produced per kg fertilizer applied (partial factor productivity of nitrogen or any fertilizer). Using that measure, our studies have shown that hybrid rice is actually often slightly more fertilizer-efficient than inbred rice. However, due to its greater yield potential, hybrid rice does take up larger amounts of nutrients than an inbred rice crop grown at 15 or 20% lower yield. Incidentally, due to its greater vigor and ability to absorb soil nutrients, hybrid rice will also out-yield most modern inbred rice varieties under conditions of no fertilizer applications.
    b. A second one is the naïve notion that farmers’ familiar practice of saving, reusing, and exchanging seeds is a good management practice. This has two consequences: (i) slow variety replacement and (ii) yield losses that are associated with poor quality seed (poor germination, contamination with diseases, weed seeds etc.,). Both are among the many reasons for why rice yields have not increased at a faster pace in recent decades. Slow variety replacement is a particularly constraining issue in rice. A recently published study suggests that the average age of rice varieties grown by farmers in the Philippines is about 10-11 years (after release). Many farmers still grow varieties that were released more than 20 years ago, for example IR64. Carefully conducted studies by IRRI have shown that the attainable yield potential of modern rice varieties decreases by about 50- 75 kg/ha per year after the year of release. That is a natural loss of “fitness” or adoption to the ever changing abiotic and biotic environment. In other words, a farmer who keeps saving his/her own seed not only has yield losses due to poorer seed health (often around 0.5 t/ha), but also a loss in yield potential. Even with very good management, a variety that is 20 years old is likely to yield about 1 t/ha less than one that has been bred recently. A well-function commercial hybrid rice industry will ultimately provide farmers with a continuous supply of well-performing, adapted hybrids – a much larger number to choose from than at present. Farmers in the developed world have had that privilege for a long time. Why would it be of advantage to a smallholder farmer in the Philippines to grow poor quality seed? Public or private investments that support the production and marketing of quality seed are a cornerstone of enhancing rice productivity.

  8. The authors conclude that “massive government subsidies have distorted the ability of farmers to make an informed choice between hybrid and inbred rice varieties. Thus instead of supporting the HRCP the government should spend its limited resources on research and development that focuses on improving the yield of inbred rice.” Unfortunately, the authors fail to provide a comparative analysis of investments in hybrid vs. inbred rice to substantiate this claim. Using 2002 as the base line, the hybrid rice area increased from 28,379 ha in 2002 to 325,038 ha in 2005, with increase rates of 183%, 162% and 55% in each of these three years, respectively. This was, of course, triggered by the investments in the HRCP and one could argue that the latter has caused market distortions, but those are likely to be a temporary phenomenon. It should also be noted that a decline in hybrid rice area occurred in the Philippines in 2006 and 2007. It was largely due to lacking seed supply because the government had stopped subsidizing the seed production of hybrid seed cooperatives and the private sector seed market was not yet fully developed. As with most other technologies too, there are many reasons for why farmers do not adopt or why they disadopt. High seed cost, high labor cost (transplanting instead of direct-seeding), susceptibility to some diseases, and lack of skill to grow hybrid rice were the most commonly cited ones in a sample of 356 non-adopting farmers surveyed by PhilRice. On the other hand, 61% of adopters surveyed in 5 provinces also stated that they will continue planting hybrid rice even without a seed subsidy.

Balanced and increased investments in R&D are required for both inbred and hybrid rice if the Philippines and other countries are to meet their key food supply targets. Despite many years of research, scientists have not yet succeeded in significantly increasing the yield potential of inbred rice because biological barriers exist. Some of those may be overcome in the future, but irrespective of that, hybrid rice will also be required as a key intervention.

Contact for further information:
Dr. Achim Dobermann, Deputy Director General (Research), International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), a.dobermann@irri.org

Pro's and cons

I believe that Dr. Dobermann’s comments miss the heart of the debate, i.e. is growing hybrid rice a economically viable strategy for farmers. The answer is pretty clear, more often than not, they are not.

In my own review and study (available from Hybrid Rice in Cambodia ) it is clear that growing hybrid rice is only viable in regions where there is already much HYV growing; where traditional varieties are grown (and marketed) financial returns for hybrids will lag. Farmers in South Vietnam are actually being advised by their government to promote growing traditional varieties for export as the markets are more assured despite their lower productivity!

IRRI promoting hybrid rice seems to be enabling corporations to gain control over the value chain with all possible excesses imagined particularly transferring profit margins from farmers to companies. As a public interest, IRRI (and national rice research institutes) should refrain from assisting companies both from giving advice as well as providing breeding material.

Blaming farmers for lack of increase in productivity seems to turn the table upside down. In more than 10 years of experience in seeds and cereals in Asia, I have always been astounded how fast variety change does take place, if only higher productivity is obvious combined with other good traits.

If anything last years production data point out to how well farmers react to financial returns. Higher prices for rice do more for productivity gain than breeding.

Rick Dubbeldam

jhdubbeldam@hotmail.com

Comments by Rick Dubbeldam

I wish to provide some response to the comments made by Rick Dubbeldam.
First, there is clear evidence from studies we have recently conducted in India that a new generation of rice hybrids is emerging and that growing hybrid rice has become highly profitable to farmers and seed growers there. That is still evolving in other countries.Cambodia has had little exposure to that yet. We must look forward, towards a new generation of hybrids that is much better in performance than what may have been evaluated previously.

Second, there are many different markets for rice. By and large hybrid rice targets markets that are different from those for which more traditional varieties are preferred, including in countries such as Cambodia or Laos. Even export markets differ vastly in grain quality requirements and nobody claims that hybrids will replace all that. At present, hybrid rice area worldwide is only about 20 million ha, or roughly 13% of the global harvest area of rice. That may rise to perhaps 30 million ha in the next 10 years, but it still leaves the bulk of the world’s rice fields being grown to inbreds.

Third, IRRI’s role is to make its research outputs widely available to anyone, including the private sector. We are a non-profit organization and when working with the private sector we do it on that basis, and in a non-exclusive manner. Our main interest lies in making new germplasm, management technologies and knowledge available to farmers, including through private sector channels. For more information on how we work with the private sector, please see
http://beta.irri.org/test/j15/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&…
For hybrid rice, we have formed the Hybrid Rice Development Consortium, which includes 25 small and large seed companies from many countries as well as about 10 public sector institutions and one NGO. Hence, we do not promote specific interests of one or few multi-national seed companies. I should also point out that in India alone more than 100 seed companies are now selling hybrid rice. Hence, farmers have a wide choice, including choosing to grow hybrids or not.

Fourth, I do not blame farmers for not using newer varieties or certified, quality seed. Many good varieties with desirable traits exist and I’m convinced that most farmers would love to use those — if they were made available to them.

Fifth, the relatively large increase in rice production in 2008 was mostly due to an increase in rice area (by nearly 4 million ha), whereas global average rice yield rose only slightly. Projections for 2009 suggest that this kind of response to increased market prices is not easy to sustain. Rice area in 2009 has dropped back to even pre-2005 levels and global production is likely to be 3-4% lower than in 2008. For keeping up with the projected demand growth, average world rice yields must grow at a rate of 50-60 kg per ha each year, at least for the next 15-20 years. That is why we continue developing new, integrated management solutions that also include better rice varieties and hybrids that are adapted to changing climate, soils, biotic factors, crop rotations, and field management practices..

Authors' response to comments by Achim Dobermann

The comment by Dr. Dobermann raises several concerns regarding the discussion in our Report of rice production technologies and the Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program (HRCP). In the context of the Report, his comments address some of the background material that we present based on a literature review in order to provide context for the reported economic analysis. The focus of the analysis in the report is to evaluate in an economy-wide model the effects on economic activity and poverty of the tariffs and other trade policies of the Philippines that increase domestic prices of rice and other food products compared to their prices in international markets. Three of our simulations evaluate the effects of reducing these barriers. The model results demonstrate that reductions in trade protection will favorably affect households in lower income groups. The reductions in trade barriers for various food items lead to lower import and domestic prices of these commodities, which translate into a reduced overall consumer price index. There is an increase in demand for these commodities and for agricultural products in general which creates a demand-pull effect on agricultural output. The net effect on factor prices is positive, which improves household income. Thus, poverty and income inequality decline.

In a final model simulation we consider the effects of an exogenous 5-percent increase in productivity for rice. Again, the results are beneficial in reducing poverty. The higher productivity leads to higher rice output and lower rice imports. There is a reduction in the domestic price of rice which particularly benefits the poorer households for whom food consumption has the highest expenditure share. Our assessment of increased productivity is limited to a hypothetical exogenous productivity gain. We do not attempt in the Report to provide original research-based analysis to evaluate the specific technologies, research priorities or public/private investments that would generate the type of productivity gain whose economy-wide effects, if it were achieved, we evaluate.

In chapter 2 of the Report we provided as background an overview of Philippine agriculture, the trade policies that have been adopted, and the effects these policies have had on domestic versus international prices. Based on a review of available research literature and publically-available government fiscal reports, we also examine the support provided to agriculture through the various programs in the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (Golden and Bountiful Harvest, GMA) in rice, corn, coconut, sugar, high-value commercial crops, livestock and fisheries. Included in this overview is a discussion of the HRCP based largely on the peer-reviewed report The Philippines Hybrid Rice Program: A Case for Redesign and Scaling Down by Christina David (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2006. 1

David’s review of the HRCP provides a comparative analysis of data from three surveys: Department of Agriculture (DA), the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), and the SIKAP/Strive Foundation-Philrice study, to which Dr. Dobermann calls attention. She also provides a survey of published/peer-reviewed articles about the experiences with hybrid rice in Asia, a critical cost/benefit analysis of the HRCP, and an analysis of the hybrid seed market in the Philippines. As we point out in the Report (p. 19), and as Dr. Dobermann also notes, the provision of subsidies to promote hybrid rice in HRCP is widely recognized and discussed. Nonetheless, David finds that “accounting for direct and indirect costs of the hybrid rice program is not straightforward.” Her analysis then systematically attempts to account for these costs and provides assessments which we cite of the limited adoption rates, yield advantages, profitability, and other economic benefits from the program (see our Tables 2.21-2.25). We did not include in our summary of David’s analysis for the Report discussion she provides of the SIKAP/Strive study. In light of Dr. Dobetrmann’s comment, we replicate a table of the findings from that study below. As we summarize in the Report, David indicates that the BAS study finds there was a statistically significant difference in yields in only 3 of 14 provinces sampled. She cites (p. 38) an IRRI study (Virmani and Kumar, 2004) that determined, as given in her citation, that a one-ton per hectare yield difference “is the threshold at which hybrids become more profitable than inbred varieties as the value of the yield advantage surpass the higher costs of seeds and other inputs in hybrid rice cultivation.” Only in two provinces were the yield differences both statistically significant and exceed this threshold, as we note in the Report (p. 24). Based on data from the SIKAP/Strive survey, David finds that “in nearly all cases, however, the differences in average yields between the hybrid and inbred rice varieties were only less than a ton per hectare, the threshold at which hybrid varieties can be expected to be more profitable than inbreds” (p. 45).

Dr. Dobermann questions a second report we cite in our discussion of the HRCP. The Factsheet produced by the Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP) in 2007 is, to our knowledge, not peer reviewed. Nevertheless, it is well referenced and provides within the public policy debate a relatively balanced, broad-audience brief synopsis of modern rice breeding and its successes in Asia, recent success of hybrid rice in China, and the less successful adoption programs in Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as a summary of some problems the organization considers to “hamper continuous adoption by rice farmers.” (PAN AP, p. 3). We cite just three of these concerns in chapter 2 which correspond to the points made in David’s more comprehensive study as being among the reasons explaining the observed dropout rate from hybrid rice production in the Philippines. The pattern of participation rates merits further analysis using additional and more recent survey data.

Overall, from the review we draw the conclusions presented in the first part of the two paragraphs quoted by Dr. Dobermann (merged into a single paragraph in his quotation). Dr. Dobermann acknowledges that the HRCP has faced significant initial difficulties, that many difficulties still exist in making hybrid rice fully successful, that policies involving subsidies usually do not work over a medium or long term, and that the limited increased adoption of hybrid rice from 2002 to 2005 was in part triggered by investments in HRCP that one can argue cause market distortions. A World Bank public expenditure review (2007) and conference papers by Virmani (2002) and from the Philippine Rice Research Institute (Bordey et al. 2004) likewise discuss the difficulties faced in making hybrid rice commercially viable and socially profitable in the Philippines along lines of the discussion we provide in the Report.

In the light of the favorable effects of higher rice productivity on poverty that we have observed in our simulation results, some government subsidies may be justified to stimulate adoption of new varieties. These might focus on support to research and development, training and other extension activities. Limited support might be provided to cover the costs of learning and risks involved in trying out the hybrid technology. Sebastian and Bordey (2005), as Dr. Dobermann notes, provide an overall positive assessment of hybrid rice production opportunities. But they recognized (p. 9) that the Third National Workshop on Hybrid Rice recommended that subsidies need to be reduced over time.

Having made these observations in relation to the comments, we acknowledge Dr. Dobermann’s concern that we not overstep the scope of our study. He cites two sentences at the end of the Summary/abstract provided at the beginning of the Report that we concur are out of context. Specifically, our discussion in the Report of the HRCP including its subsides and the distortions to market decisions they may cause provides a factual basis that puts input-market considerations into context with the trade policies of tariffs and other import restrictions on which much of our analysis focuses. Our analysis in the Report does not extend to a research-based assessment of the costs-benefits of alternative research investments to increase rice productivity. Thus, the last two sentences of the Summary/abstract were poorly chosen. In the final section of the Report, titled “Summary and Policy Implications,” there are similar statements, but they are cited to specific original sources and can be evaluated by the reader in context in this section of the report itself.

Our simulation of the economic and poverty-reducing effects of improved rice production productivity demonstrate that such productivity increases are beneficial for the Philippine economy and reduce poverty. Dr. Dobermann makes a reasoned argument for the promise of hybrid rice as one path toward productivity gains, despite the difficulties to date as evaluated in the studies we cite in the Report and above. Further assessment research will be needed to ascertain the relative efficiency of alternative technologies for achieving the types of economic gains we illustrate in our higher-productivity economy-wide simulation results.

References:

Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS). 2004. Assessment of farmers’ performance in the GMA-rice program and nonprogram areas. Quezon City, Philippines: Department of Agriculture. http://www.bas.gov.ph/opac/opac.php?id=assessment

Bordey, F, J. Cabling, C. Casiwan, R. Manalili, A. Mataia and G. Redondo. 2004. “Socioeconomic Evaluation of Hybrid Rice Production in the Philippines”. Nueva Ecija, Philippines: Philippine Rice Research Institute.
http://www.cropscience.org.au/icsc2004/poster/4/4/723_bordey.htm

David, C. 2006. The Philippine Hybrid Rice Program: A Case for Redesign and Scaling Down PIDS Research Paper Series No. 2006-03. Makati City, Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). http://publication.pids.gov.ph/details.phtml?pid=4082

Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP). 2007. “Hybrid Rice in Asia: Sowing the Seeds of Dependency”. Penang, Malaysia.
http://www.panap.net/48.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=435&tx_ttnews[backPid]=11&cHash=bb5b8a0f54

Sebastian, S. and F. Bordey. 2005. “Embracing Hybrid Rice: Impacts and Future Directions”. Paper presented to SEARCA Seminar Series, Laguna, Philippines: SEARCA.
http://www.philrice.gov.ph/pub/Embracing%20Hybrid%20Rice_Impacts%20and%20Future%20Directions.pdf

Sikap/Strive Foundation and Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice). 2005. Midterm impact assessment of hybrid rice technology in the Philippines: Final Report. Nueva Ecija, Philippines: Philippine Rice Research Institute.

Virmani, S. 2002. “Progress and Issues in Development and Use of Hybrid Rice in the Tropics.” Proceedings of the 20th Session of International Rice Commission. Bangkok, Thailand. June 23-26. http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4751e/y4751e0g.htm

Virmani, S.S. and I. Kumar. 2004. Development and use of hybrid rice technology to increase rice productivity in the tropics. International Rice Research Notes 29(1):10-20.
http://www.irri.org/publications/irrn/pdfs/vol29no1/MiniRev2.pdf

The World Bank Group in the Philippines. 2007. “Philippines: Agriculture Public Expenditure Review. Technical Working Group Report 40493. Manila, Philippines: World Bank.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/08/01/000310607_20070801162900/Rendered/PDF/40493.pdf

Table 1: Results on Hybrid Rice in Selected Provinces in the Philippines:

SIKAP/Strive Foundation Survey

  Isabela Nueva Ecija Iloilo Davao del Sur Davao del Norte
Average yield
of hybrid rice (t/ha)
Wet 2002 5.6 2.0 4.0 6.7 5.8
Dry 2003 6.2 5.9 4.7 6.2 5.6
Wet 2003 5.8 5.9 5.2 5.9 4.9
Dry 2004 6.1 6.3 4.7 5.0 4.6
Yield advantage
(t/ha)
Wet 2002 0.71 -1.82 -0.79 0.76 1.53
Dry 2003 0.87 0.29 0.61 0.78 0.93
Wet 2003 0.38 0.85 0.31 -0.12 0.32
Dry 2004 0.23 0.30 0.60 -0.22 0.72
(percent)
Wet 2002 16* -48 -2 13 36*
Dry 2003 16** 5 15** 15 20*
Wet 2003 7 18** 6 -2 7
Dry 2004 4 5 15** -4 25**
*** Significant at 1%; ** at 5% ; * at 10*; and no asterisk not statistically significant
Source: As reproduced by David (2006)

Footnote

1. A detailed description of PIDS’ publications is available at http://publications.pids.gov.ph: “The Research Paper Series are the final outputs of the research staff. The Series is a formal publication meant to promote research, stimulate discussion and encourage the use of study results. Studies published under this Series have been reviewed by an internal publications review committee and by external referees. Studies are original and have not been published in any form and contain the rationale, framework, methodology, conclusions or recommendations and other relevant information”. [Back]