

**Power, Politics, and Performance**  
*Community Participation in South African  
Public Works Programs*

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## **Glossary**

ABLIC	Accreditation Board for Labour-Intensive Construction
ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
ANC	African National Congress
CAG	Clean and Green Programme
CBO	Community-based organization
CBPWP	Community-Based Public Works Programme
CEP	Community Employment Programme
CLO	Community Liaison Officer
CNC	Cape Nature Conservation
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSS	Central Statistical Services
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DP	Democratic Party
DPW	Department of Public Works (national)
DTPW	Department of Transport and Public Works (Western Cape)
DWAF	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
FF	Freedom Front
FWCP	Fynbos Water Conservation Programme
FWWP	Fynbos Working for Water Programme
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme
IDT	Independent Development Trust
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
NCC	National Co-ordinating Committee of the NEF
NEF	National Economic Forum
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NP	National Party
NPWP	National Public Works Programme

OHS	October Household Survey
PAC	Pan African Congress
PDC	Provincial Development Council
PIR	Poverty and Inequality Report
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSLSD	SALDRU/World Bank Project on Statistics for Living Standards and Development
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SALDRU	Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
SANCO	South African National Civics Organisation
SMME	Small, micro, and medium enterprises
WCEDF	Western Cape Economic Development Forum
WWP	Working for Water Programme

## Foreword

Community-driven development is indelible in the development landscape. It is increasingly visible in the policy design of many governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral institutions and features in important debates involving democracy, governance, institutions, and decentralization. As this research report points out, this has philosophical and instrumentalist underpinnings, with participation as both means and end. Participatory or community-driven development is advocated on the basis that, among other advantages, it can reduce information problems for development planners and beneficiaries, increase the resources available to poor people, and strengthen the capacity for collective action among poor and other marginalized societal groups.

While these arguments are persuasive, there is a need to scrutinize the benefits of participation more closely, along with the complex operational problems inherent in participatory approaches. The unique contribution of this study—which derives from IFPRI’s research programs on targeted safety net programs, policy processes, and governance—is threefold. First, it examines an innovation in public works programs designed to achieve multiple development objectives, from job creation to community empowerment; second, it uses a unique, project-level quantitative dataset and econometric analysis to uncover hard evidence of the effects of different forms of participation on key outcomes of a safety net program; and, third, it uses rich case study data to explain a range of ways in which participation can affect the outcomes of public works programs. The report also explores the complexities of institutional arrangements and policy processes involving government, the private sector, and community-based organizations representing a diverse and often conflicting set of values, identities, and interests. Such an understanding of the policy process is key to understanding why policies succeed or fail in achieving the expected results.

The study finds that community participation does lead to improved project outcomes, but it is not an easy road to travel. The authors point out that participation does not have to be all or nothing, and its best forms are likely to vary under different conditions. Different modalities exist that can capture local preferences, achieve accountability and transparency, and build capacity and local empowerment, while at the same time delivering the quality infrastructure needed by the poor. However, while the research has shown convergence between diverse program objectives, policymakers will also have to resolve trade-offs by weighing economic and social priorities. Furthermore, the research shows that policy processes do not end with policymaking—decisions must be supported by solid commitments and institutional arrangements that enable agreements to be carried out and monitored.

While many of the findings of this study are specific to the South African context, many of the issues confronted are common to the challenges of participation, community-driven development, scaling up, and policy processes encountered across the globe. The report provides research methods and insights for researchers, policymakers, and development practitioners seeking a better understanding of the relationship between governance and poverty alleviation.

Joachim von Braun  
Director General, IFPRI

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## Summary

**F**ollowing South Africa's democratic transition in 1994, the new government launched public works programs that shared four objectives: to create jobs to respond to extremely high levels of poverty and unemployment; to build or rehabilitate infrastructure in poor, underserved areas, or improve the natural environment; to provide job training that would enable workers to find postproject employment; and finally to build the capacity of communities to control their own development processes through community participation in public works projects.

The long national struggle for democracy, combined with exposure to democracy in foreign institutions and in trade unions and civic associations within South Africa, infused the country's new leadership and many of its constituencies with a broad democratic agenda—from “one person, one vote” to control of local development projects by elected community-based organizations. At the same time, South Africa's history of political conflict, including extreme racial and class polarization and violent political strife, meant that attempts to create democratic institutions would not be easily or wholly achieved. A national public works program, which distributed resources to reduce poverty while building capacity and promoting participation by local institutions, would be no exception: it involved actors who had only recently emerged from the apartheid system, under which they had experienced a vast political, economic, social, and cultural divide.

Through a study of seven public works programs implemented in Western Cape province, this report examines the benefits and challenges of pursuing community participation, together with the effects of participation on meeting the other objectives of the programs. Although aspects of South Africa's experience are unique to its political economy, the study's findings reveal insights, dilemmas, and possibilities of considerable relevance in the wider context of participatory or “community-driven” development programs, which have increasingly become integral to the development agenda throughout the world.

The extent to which public works programs achieve their objectives depends on institutions at several levels and their performance based on access to information, the incentives they face, and the requirements of a changing political, social, and economic environment. Thus this study considers key institutions, their agents, and their interrelationships in the implementation of public works projects. This coverage includes the intended and actual responsibilities of community-based committees; the advantages and disadvantages of community participation in different aspects of project selection, design, and management; the effects of community participation on project performance; and the factors that prevent community-based committees from acting in the capacity intended in policy documents. Key to understanding these constraints is the relationship of community organizations to other project-level actors in government and the private sector, and the changes in professional identity, institutional practices, and local politics necessary for communities to receive the type of opportunities envisioned.

The report integrates quantitative and qualitative data from a survey of 101 public works projects with in-depth qualitative data from eight project-level case studies. The quantitative

analysis examines the outcomes of different forms of participation on job creation, labor intensity, efficiency in transferring income to the poor, and other variables. It finds that, even after accounting for the endogeneity of participation, de facto participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the share of the project budget spent on labor, the log number of days of work created, and the log number of training days undertaken. It increases women's share of employment and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local unskilled wages. It also reduces the cost of creating employment and of transferring income to the poor. The magnitudes of these impacts are sizeable and robust to a variety of model specifications and the inclusion of other covariates.

The case studies indicate the ways in which different forms of participation added value to projects by enabling beneficiary communities to influence the choices of priority assets and project design features, which increased safety and convenience and affected the number of jobs created in the short and long terms. They also demonstrated the importance of regular communication with communities to build a sense of local ownership, increasing cooperation and the maintenance of assets. The case studies also show how community participation introduces politics, conflict, and lengthier decisionmaking processes—as well as how lack of participation can result in even more conflict and delays further down the line, when time becomes more expensive.

The study finds a wide gap between ideas for community-driven projects embodied in national government programs and the beliefs and practices of professional public and private providers at provincial and local levels. Although consensus on the importance of community participation has been voiced, there is also profound ambivalence about it, as well as widely different ideas about what it means and where it is appropriate. Community-based committees were involved in some way in almost all the projects, but their roles were often limited to community and worker liaison functions. Private-sector and local government project managers excluded community participation from management tasks because of their views on efficiency and specialization; their lack of identification with the programs' capacity-building and empowerment objectives, which were set at the national level; and ambiguities about the roles of different stakeholders. Community committee members often did not have sufficient skills and were not trained.

One policy implication might be to reduce the role of communities to opportunities for communication and some consultation. Local government, if downwardly accountable to poor constituents, could manage public works projects. An alternative policy implication is that government should increase its commitment to improving structures and processes for community participation for the value that it adds. Participation does not have to be all or nothing, and its best forms are likely to vary under different circumstances. Where trade-offs between the achievement of different program objectives are required, these must be weighed in light of national and local priorities. If participation and local empowerment remain important objectives, policymakers and program designers must creatively explore institutional arrangements and methods for increasing local capacities. But new policy proposals alone are unlikely to effect significant change. This would require involving influential government, private-sector, and community stakeholders in the process; identifying common ground; and securing the commitment necessary for agreements to be carried out and monitored. Politics, conflicts of interest, struggles over resources, and processes of consultation and consensus-building are part of the landscape of community-driven development. If participatory development is to remain on South Africa's development agenda, all actors must commit to realizing this objective, including generating sufficient resources, creativity, and patience to see the process through.



## CHAPTER 1

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### Introduction

You see we consultants are used to the conventional way of working. We design, there's a contractor that is responsible, they are the communities or the beneficiaries—they know nothing what is happening to the funds . . . They are just asked to work and get salaries at the end of the day and leave. Now this situation is a new situation that needs both parties, communities and the consultants, to make a joint effort to educate each other about the new process because the whole process is new to us. The whole process is new also to the community because they were not involved before. They were not participating, so they want to participate.

Consulting engineer for the Thembaletu roads project

**B**etween 1994 and 1995, six new public works programs were initiated by the new South African national government, mainly administered by newly elected and transforming provincial level governments. A seventh program was continued that had begun prior to the 1994 election.<sup>1</sup> These programs shared four objectives: First, to create jobs for the poor and unemployed; second, to build or rehabilitate infrastructure, or to improve the natural environment; third, to provide job training that would enable workers to find post-project employment; fourth, to build the capacity of communities to exert more control over their own development processes, through strengthening local institutions and community participation in public works projects. The nature and objectives of public works programs in South Africa were shaped by three corresponding considerations: the high level of unemployment in South Africa;<sup>2</sup> the backlog in infrastructure such as roads, water, and sanitation systems in black rural and urban areas; and the new government's development philosophy that stressed sustainability and democracy. Through a study of these seven programs as implemented in South Africa's Western Cape province, this report examines the benefits and challenges of attempting to achieve the fourth objective—community participation—and the effects of participation on the programs' ability to meet their other objectives.

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<sup>1</sup>The six programs were: The Clean and Green (CAG) and the Community Based Public Works (CBPWP), developed and financed by the National Department of Public Works (DPW); the Community Employment Programme (CBPWP/CEP), part of the CBPWP administered by the Independent Development Trust (IDT); the Transport Projects (Trans), funded by the national Department of Transport; the Working for Water Programme (WWP) of the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). The seventh program was the intersectoral nongovernmental National Economic Forum (NEF) program begun in 1993.

<sup>2</sup>According to Klasen (1997) these were 30 percent of working age South Africans; 53 percent in the poorest 20 percent of households.

Public works are widely used throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America for poverty alleviation, social insurance, infrastructure development at various levels of labor intensity, or most commonly, all three objectives (Subbarao et al. 1996; Subbarao 1997; Deolalikar 1995; von Braun, Teklu, and Webb 1992; von Braun 1995). South Africa's programs share these objectives but add those of *sustainable* job creation, institutional capacity building, and community empowerment. The South African programs are unusual in that they envisioned long-term poverty alleviation—rather than a short-term horizon most often held by public works and other safety-net programs—by attempting to generate skills that enhanced people's ability to secure employment after the project has ended. The emphasis on community participation was part of this long-term horizon, the intention of which was to develop community skills in organization and management to enable communities to access new development resources and engage broader political processes.

Because community participation was central to many aspects of the new government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), our study of public works in the Western Cape province provides one window onto the broad developmental changes and challenges faced by South Africa since its transition to democracy in 1994. At the same time, although aspects of the South Africa experience are unique to its political economy and to the application of a participatory approach to public works programs, this experience has revealed insights, dilemmas, and possibilities relevant to the wider context of participatory or "community-driven" development projects, which have become an increasingly important part of the development landscape.

The extent to which labor-intensive public works programs achieve their objectives depends on institutions at several levels, and how these institutions perform in the context of the information they have access to,

the incentives they face, and the changes required by new program objectives and a new political dispensation. Based on a study of seven public works programs in Western Cape province, this report thus looks at key institutions, their role-players and their relationships in the implementation of public works projects. The primary emphasis is on people in communities and community-based project steering committees (PSCs).

This report examines the intended and actual responsibilities of community-based committees; the advantages and disadvantages of community participation in different aspects of project selection, design, and management; outcomes of community participation on project performance; and the factors that have constrained the ability of community-based committees to play the role envisioned for them in policy documents. Key to understanding these constraints is the relationship of community organizations to other project-level actors in government and the private sector, and the changes in professional identity, institutional practices, and local politics necessary if communities are to receive the type of opportunities envisioned. The research also looks at outcomes, exploring how participation can be an efficient means to achieving the programs' other material objectives. It revealed tensions and trade-offs of different levels and types of participation. Participation does not have to be all or nothing, and good program design choices adapt to different desires, capacities and objectives. Where there are trade-offs between the achievement of different program objectives, these must be weighed in light of nationally and locally defined priorities.

The rest of the report is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides a background to the research, discussing several inter-related aspects: some key ideas that infuse much of the international literature on participation in development, the political and economic context in South Africa that explains how community-based public works got on the policy agenda, and a de-

scriptive overview of the seven national public works programs that are included in the research. It also provides the political and economic context in Western Cape province, which helps to explain the course of implementation of the public works programs. Chapter 3 describes the research design and methods used in the quantitative and qualitative research. Chapter 4 focuses on one of the core objectives of our work: to assess whether community participation affects project performance. To do so, we first set out a conceptual model to capture some of the analytics of participation. We use this to help frame an econometric analysis of project outcomes. Chapter 5 then introduces eight case studies, which examine closely what community participation actually looks like in practice, and help to explain the results in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 first considers certain key quantitative variables in the case studies, including levels of participation and performance outcomes of concern in the quantitative analysis in order to show how

the case studies compare to the overall dataset. Qualitative data are then used to explain with depth the different forms that community participation took in these projects, and compare them to potential roles for inclusive community-wide forums and for representative community-based structures. We discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these different types of participation, from forms of communication to participation in project design and management, as well as when and why people might not want to participate. Continuing to use the case study data, Chapter 6 then analyzes the social, political, and institutional constraints on meaningful participation, including beliefs and practices of government and the private sector with regard to project management, specialization and efficiency, political conflict, and other issues. Chapter 7 draws some conclusions about the need for the reclarification or redefinition of program objectives and about what would need to take place in order to meet these objectives.

## CHAPTER 2

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# Participatory Development and the Origins of Community-Based Public Works in South Africa

This chapter begins with an overview of the meaning of “participatory development,” alternatively referred to in the literature as “community participation,” “community-driven development,” and other terms. It then explains the historical, political, and economic context in which community-based public works programs were conceived in South Africa, including the conditions that led to a call for public employment programs and, in particular, those controlled by communities. It also details the institutional context for the development of the seven programs included in the study, and describes each of these programs. Finally, it discusses the conditions in the Western Cape province of South Africa, where we conducted our research on public works programs.

Participatory development, where local people are engaged in some active way in development planning and implementation, has a long history and a respected place among development intellectuals, policymakers, and practitioners throughout the “first” and “third” worlds.<sup>3</sup> Participatory development, however, means very different things to different people: from “local people doing what planners wanted” (Guijt 1991) to the “education for participation” approach of Paulo Freire where “men and women will analyze and critically interpret their world and their problems, and will be able to acquire the skills necessary to respond to them in a cooperative and democratic way” (OEF 1986 in McDonald 1995). It can involve notions of individual empowerment as well as influencing wider processes of political change, and even redefining the term “development” itself.

Support for participation has instrumentalist, philosophical, and political underpinnings. The instrumentalist foundation involves a recognition that top-down, technocratic forms of development imposed on diverse local realities often result in failure; that local people best understand their own needs; and that involving local people can be cost-effective in terms of reduced capital costs and increased involvement in operation and maintenance. The philosophical-political foundation involves the belief that poor people should be empowered and should have more command over their lives (Chambers 1995); and that they should be empowered “to determine choices in life and to influence the direction of change” (Moser 1989, 1815).

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<sup>3</sup>For reviews of a wide range of philosophies and practices of participatory development, see Nelson and Wright (1995) and Scoones and Thompson (1994). For additional perspectives see Rahman (1993), Long and Villarreal (1993), and Rahnema (1992).

In order to see how ideas about participatory development made their way into South African development policy, becoming a centerpiece of public works programs, it is important to understand the historical political and economic conditions that characterized the country in the period leading up to and following the birth of the new government. In 1994, South Africa's vast black majority emerged from almost a century of racial oppression, segregation, and engineered poverty, codified for four decades as the system of apartheid. The long national political struggle for democracy, coupled with a period of exposure to democratic institutions both outside South Africa and inside the country through trade unions and civic associations, infused the new South African leadership (primarily in the African National Congress Alliance) and many of their constituencies with a broad democratic agenda—from “one-person one-vote” to control of local development projects by elected community-based organizations. A focus on democracy, participation, and citizen empowerment infuses the African National Congress's (ANC)—and soon after the first government's—Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP):

[T]his programme must become a people-driven process. Our people, with their aspirations and collective determination, are our most important resource. The RDP is focused on people's immediate needs and it relies, in turn, on their energies. Irrespective of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor, the people of South Africa must shape their own future. Development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing empowerment (RDP 1994, 5).

Sectoral social movements and community-based organizations, formed in opposition to apartheid, had a considerable history of participatory democracy in their decision-

making structures. These were seen in the RDP as an important asset. The government pledged that

[S]tructured consultation processes at all levels of government will be introduced to ensure participation in policy-making and planning, as well as project implementation. The empowerment of institutions of civil society is a fundamental aim of the Government's approach to building national consensus . . . To facilitate effective involvement, the Government will introduce programmes that will enhance the capacity of community organisations (RDP 1994, 41).

RDP forums, to be broadly representative, were to be formed in each community to contribute to developing planning and implementation.

At the same time, South Africa's history of political conflict, including extreme racial and class polarization, violent political strife, and brutality characterizing the state and spilling over into the citizenry, meant that any attempts at creating democratic institutions working toward a national consensus and common good, were important but elusive goals—not to be achieved easily or wholly. A national public works program distributing resources to reduce poverty while building capacity and promoting participation by local institutions would be no exception. These programs would involve the same range of political and economic actors (government, private sector companies, poor communities, trade unions, and others) who had struggled with each other under the old apartheid system and had just recently emerged from that system.

The National Public Works Programme (NPWP) was also conceived and operationalized in an institutional context defined by South Africa's unique political-economic history. A strong trade union movement (born largely in the 1970s and progressively gaining economic and later political power)

and liberal elements within the private sector in 1992 formed a negotiating forum to jointly formulate strategies for economic development. In 1993, a task team within the National Economic Forum (NEF) was formed to develop a proposal for a National Public Works Programme (NPWP).

The focus on public works can be understood within the context of the high poverty and unemployment rates inherited by the new government. Using October Household Survey (OHS) 1995 data and the broad definition of unemployment (the number of people aged 16–64 who are not working but would like to work and are either actively seeking work or are too discouraged to continue looking), the Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR) (May et al. 1998) generates an estimate of 30.3 percent for all adults. Klasen (1997) also uses this broad definition of unemployment for his analysis using the SALDRU 1993 data (PSLSD 1994). He estimated unemployment at 29.9 percent for the entire country.

Disaggregated by race, unemployment under the broad definition was estimated for “African” at 38.3 percent and for “Coloured” (the main racial group in the Western Cape province where our study took place) at 20 percent. Poverty and unemployment went hand in hand as they normally do, but in South Africa it is exacerbated by race:

apartheid has left the majority of the population in poverty, with little access to employment, education, health or other basic services. It enforced a spatially unsustainable residential pattern, leaving a majority of the poor in economically marginal areas of the country, dependent on transfers and whatever incomes they could eke out of the available resource base (Klasen 1997).

Klasen (1997) estimated a poverty rate of between 23.7 and 56.7 percent, depending on the poverty line used. May et al. (1998) used 1995 National Income and Expendi-

ture Survey data to derive a poverty rate of 49.9 percent, with a rate of 61 percent for Africans and 38.2 percent for the “Coloured” population.

Facing high unemployment and poverty levels and a newly elected democratic government pledged to alleviate these problems, a wide range of institutions called for government and the private sector to make job creation a central priority. Between 1994 and 1998, a number of institutions and policy documents called for public works programs as part of a strategy for employment creation. These included the NEF (NEF 1994a, 1994b), the RDP (RDP 1994), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Urban Foundation (Urban Foundation 1994), the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic policy (Ministry of Finance 1996), the Presidential Commission on the Labour Market (Department of Labour 1996); the Poverty and Inequality Report (May et al. 1998); and the Department of Labour’s Employment Strategy Framework (Department of Labour 1998).

The NEF team tasked with developing the NPWP had the mandate to develop a national program that would not be just temporary “make work” programs but, as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), they were to be participatory and result in sustainable poverty alleviation. The NPWP took its cues from the participatory development focus of the RDP, of which it was a part. One of the NPWP’s four objectives is to “build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs” (NEF 1994a). A flagship program of the NPWP was the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP):

The CBPWP (Community-Based Public Works Programme) believes that projects should have strong community participation. The community should control all processes leading to the ultimate establishment of the asset. This means that even before the process of

institution building occurs, the total community should have adequately and actively participated in all the aspects of the second phase i.e., project conception and prioritization. Further, this means that the community through its representative community structure, should make the decisions about what should be constructed, how it should be designed and constructed, who should work on the project, as well as the rates and system of employment (DPW 1996, 38).

Along the project cycle, community participation can take place at different stages. This cycle includes selecting project type; many aspects of project design, from choosing labor versus capital intensity to functionality for whom; project implementation, including hiring contractors; selecting, hiring, and supervising workers; supervision of construction; and maintenance and management of assets. Bringing community members into these roles would necessarily require skills training and capacity development. Each stage also involves the activation of a range of different material and political interests.

There are also different types of participation that can be employed at each of these stages. Paul (1987) distinguishes four types of participation: (1) information sharing; (2) consultation; (3) decisionmaking; and (4) initiating action. Moving from (1) to (4), communities tend to gain and exercise more power and control. The intention of the NPWP was that participation would ideally involve up to and including the fourth type but definitely the third. In practice, the type of participation varied greatly in the 101 projects in the Western Cape and among the projects in the case studies, with most involving (1) and (2), and some involving (3) or (4).

Nelson and Wright (1995) make another important distinction, between participation as a *means* and participation as an *end*. The first uses participation to accomplish the

aims of a project more efficiently or effectively; the second involves a community or group setting up a process to control its own development: "Both types imply very different power relationships between members of a community as well as between them and the state and agency institutions. Simply put, the extent of empowerment and involvement of the local population is more limited in the first approach than in the second."

In South African public works programs, the focus was strongly on participation as an *end*, as community capacity building was one of the main objectives. Participation was supposed to be maximized, and communities empowered, without a great deal of consideration given to the efficiency implications of this choice. However, as this report will show, participation can also be a *means* to an efficient outcome, and ultimately this has to be considered in the South African context, because good quality infrastructure at a reasonable cost is also a political and economic requisite. Although the two *can* be complementary in practice, our research revealed a potential tension. The challenge is to find practices that enable the maximization of both types of goals, but where there are trade-offs, policymakers and citizens should make these explicit within policy debates.

### **The Socioeconomic and Political Context in Western Cape Province**

Although community-driven development was an ANC priority at the national level, implementation had to be carried out at the provincial and local levels. It is thus equally essential to understand the economic and political context in the Western Cape province. Labor-intensive public works programs in the Western Cape are inserted into a set of government and civil society institutions at the provincial, regional, and local levels. In the period following the transition to democracy, these institutions were in a process of change, yet built upon inherited structures and racially defined relationships.

The Western Cape is characterized by economic and political conditions, as well as a politicized racial profile, that stands out from the rest of South Africa. In the late 1990s the province contained approximately 9.7 percent of the total South African population and was highly urbanized at 89 percent. The province is dominated by the Cape Metropolitan Region which contained nearly 70 percent of the population of whom 98 percent were classified as urban. The legacy of apartheid with the application of stringent influx control, coupled to the implementation of the colored labor preference policy, constrained the distribution of the African populace of whom the vast majority (over 76 percent) are contained within the metropolitan area. Western Cape is predominantly colored and white, with a substantial African minority, largely urban, with better than national average levels of per capita incomes and other indicators of well-being (with the notable exception of self-reported illnesses, which tend to be positively correlated with income and education levels) including access to health care and other infrastructure. On the average, Western Cape is among the most well-off of all the nine provinces in South Africa. Nevertheless, there is a substantial poverty problem as indicated by the relatively high levels of child stunting, the prevalence of tuberculosis where the rate of 703 per 100,000 is three times higher than the national rate, and an above the national average percent of housing from shacks. Some of the 42 districts in the province have extremely high levels of poverty (Adato et al. 1999).

The 1996 census reported 299,114 as unemployed in the province which gives a broad rate of 17.9 percent (the lowest in any of the nine provinces, but still high enough to generate concern and a call for a share of a national public works program). This estimate is very similar to those estimates generated by the October Household Survey series from 1994–1997 as well as with the

1993 PSLSD data and a number generated for the RDP in 1994 (Horner 1994).

Historically, social segregation in the province was not as intensely enforced in the Western Cape as it was elsewhere, and in the first part of the century, people of color had some limited rights. The National Party took power in 1948 in all districts outside the metropole, removing electoral rights of colored people, Africans, and Indians (Hellmann 1949; Horrell 1971). Various forms of limited representation for colored people throughout the sixties and seventies eventually meant some improvements in their material conditions, with the African population left behind. However, services for colored people remained particularly bad in the rural areas, where poverty was highest.

In 1980 the Nationalist Party Government devised its system of tricameral government which downgraded the second tier of government, provincial councils, to managerial rather than elected governmental organs, consolidating power at the center with an elaborate system of local authorities based on racially defined criteria (SAIRR 1985). It neglected, however, to provide many of these organs at the third tier of government with the necessary financial support to function efficiently and effectively. In 1986 the *Provincial Government Act* abolished the (white, elected) provincial councils, empowering the state president to appoint provincial administrators and executive committees. In the Cape, the state president confirmed the re-appointment of the previous (nationalist) administrator and included colored people in the five-man executive committee (SAIRR 1987).

Opposition to apartheid also swelled in the 1980s. In 1983 the newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF) drew strong support in those areas that were later demarcated as constituting the Province of the Western Cape. This broadly based movement was to play an influential part in the political life of the province in the 1980s until it was disbanded in August 1991 (SAIRR

1992). In 1994, as the ANC won 62.6 percent of votes nationally to the National Party's 20.4 percent and the Democratic Party's 1.7 percent, the newly demarcated Western Cape province remained the one province with National Party control (SAIRR 1995). In the election for the provincial legislature the NP won 55 percent of the 42 seats (23), the ANC 33 percent (14), and the Democratic Party (DP) three seats, with one seat each to smaller parties. The NP took seven of the seats on the provincial executive council including the premiership, with the ANC being allocated the other four seats, including the portfolios of health; economic affairs; environment and tourism; and road transport and public works (SAIRR 1995). This assignment of the public works portfolio to an ANC ministry was one important factor playing into political tensions that emerged in the operationalization of public works programs at the provincial and local levels. In 1997 the ANC lost control of this ministry when the party withdrew from the provincial executive committee.

Local government elections in Western Cape province scheduled for November 1995 were delayed in certain areas because of a National Party challenge to demarcation of boundaries in the metropole and rural areas. In those areas where voting occurred for 886 seats, the ANC secured 34.54 percent and the NP 32.96 percent while independents and ratepayers associations secured the bulk (27.2 percent) of the rest (SAIRR 1996). Deferred elections in the metropole and certain other areas were held on May 29, 1996. The final outcome of the election for the 1,446 local government seats in the province was: NP 43 percent; ANC 34.2 percent; independents and ratepayers 18.3 percent; with the DP securing 22 seats, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), 5; the PAC, 4; and the Freedom Front (FF), 3 (SAIRR 1997).

This picture of the Western Cape's political development helps to explain political tensions that would confound post-apartheid

development efforts, including community-based public works. Historical tensions between colored and African communities, based on greater economic and political benefits awarded the former, remained at the local level, while also helping to explain political support for the National Party, particularly in rural areas. Community-driven development was ANC national policy, but had to be implemented by largely NP officials at the provincial and local levels. Despite support of an ANC public works minister for the first three years, the implementation of these community-driven programs were largely the responsibility of NP administrators who did not generally share the ANC objectives. There was also a racial as well as political dimension to the relationships, tensions, biases, and incentives of these different actors—with most of the officials at the national level African, most of the officials at the provincial level white, and most officials at the local level white or colored. However, race and politics is highly correlated, with most African officials (at national, provincial, and local levels) members of the ANC, and most white officials (at provincial and local levels) members of the NP, and colored officials at the local level mainly NP affiliated. The effects of these relationships will be further explored in later chapters.

### **Public Works Programs in Western Cape Province**

Given the enormous need for basic infrastructure in poor communities and the new government's commitment to addressing this need, many infrastructure programs were initiated in and around 1994. In choosing which provincial programs to include in this research, we were guided by two criteria. First, we selected programs that had multiple objectives. This excluded programs that had a unitary or strong primary focus on infrastructure creation, with a relatively minor role given to employment creation and/or

community participation. We employed the distinction derived by I. T. Transport Ltd. (1997) from the international literature, which distinguishes between “Public Works Programmes” and “low-cost infrastructure programmes” that have different objectives. Low-cost infrastructure programs

seek to reduce the cost of infrastructure construction by using appropriate technology which includes a high labour content on grounds of technical feasibility and economic efficiency, with employment creation as a by-product. These programme [sic] are not strictly PWP as they start from a totally different basis. A PWP starts with a budget which may be more or less flexible, and a brief to create employment or alleviate poverty. It then looks for suitable projects (I. T. Transport Ltd. 1997).

However, the programs included in the study also constructed infrastructure or improved the environment in ways that were not simply “make-work” projects, but rather undertook the construction of assets or activities identified as high priority for the communities involved. They also provided job training, and were concerned with community participation, though to differing de-

grees. Seven programs met these criteria and are described below (some key variables for each program are found in the next chapter in Table 3.1).<sup>4</sup> As noted in the previous section, each of the public works programs conceived at the national level had a provincial level department and program responsible for program administration. Infrastructure development and job creation programs in Western Cape province were located primarily within the Department of Transport and Public Works, the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, and the Department of Housing.<sup>5</sup> The seven programs included in the study are described below.

### **The National Economic Forum Job Creation Programme**

Because it began prior to 1994, The NEF job creation program was conceived and implemented by institutions of civil society with participation of the old government. However, it was the first of the new generation of public works programs that began to take a broad development perspective, focussing on sustainability and multiple objectives of job creation, quality assets, skills training, and institutional capacity building.

<sup>4</sup>One of the seven programs we have included, Public Works Programme Transport, could be seen as a low-cost infrastructure program. We have decided to include it because, managed by the provincial Department of Public Works and Transport (DTPW), it was considered part of the same group of RDP programs that fell under the new Public Works Programme Directorate and thus followed parallel principles to the other programs we have included. These principles included increased labor-intensity, training, promotion of small, micro, and medium enterprises (SMMEs), and community participation. We also felt it was important to include because it was a program intended to experiment with integrating the PWP (the Western Cape version of the NPWP) principles into normal (line function) roads projects of DTPW (our primary institutional focus), and thus had far-reaching implications.

Several programs were excluded by our selection criteria because they fit the description of low-cost infrastructure programs. The Municipal Infrastructure Programme (water, sanitation, roads, refuse, electricity, and health facilities), the Integrated Service Land Projects (providing similar bulk service, as well as schools, police stations, and other community facilities); the Clinic Upgrading and Building Programme; and the Culture of Learning Programme (schools) were considered low-cost infrastructure programs rather than public works programs. Although job creation was stated as one objective of all these programs, it was not at the top of the list, formally or in practice, and thus labor-intensity was only encouraged and not required.

<sup>5</sup>The responsibility for the physical construction of assets for the Departments of Health (clinics and hospitals) and Education (schools) was also transferred to the Department of Transport and Public Works. Construction performed for these two departments did not meet the criteria used for inclusion in the research.

In August 1993, the NEF launched its job-creation program and identified the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) to monitor implementation of the projects. A number of regional economic forums had been established by local stakeholders (SAIRR 1994, 440–441), which in the Western Cape became the Western Cape Economic Development Forum (WCEDF), composed of representatives from the trade unions, civic organizations, and private sector. These regional forums were involved in appraising and approving applications for NEF funding for public works projects in their areas. Approved applications were submitted by the regions for final evaluation by the Accreditation Board for Labour-intensive Construction (ABLIC) appointed by the National Co-ordinating Committee (NCC) of the NEF.

### **The Community-Based Public Works Programme and the Community Employment Programme**

Part of the national government's NPWP, the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) aims at poverty alleviation through job creation, skills training, delivery of needed assets, and capacity building. It was seen as a critical safety net program for vulnerable groups during the transition period. The main target groups were the rural poor, youth, and disabled people. It also aimed at building the capacity of civil society to engage with development issues, giving opportunities for community-based organizations to manage development projects, and NGOs to manage delivery and provide training (DPW 1997, 8). The Community Employment Programme (CEP) is part of the CBPWP, administered by a large national NGO (the Independent Development Trust [IDT]).

### **The Clean and Green Programme (CAG)**

This program was funded by the national government as a "Presidential Lead Project"

and administered by the Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works. It was conceived to clean up the environment, improve the quality of life and tourism potential, and alleviate poverty through job creation, human resource development, and income generation strategies. The program had a provision for local authority matching to ensure compliance with the requirements of the RDP fund. For the sustainability of the project, institutions (particularly local authorities) were to make provisions for the recurrent cost associated with the provision of a sustainable service. The projects were also to include a concerted educational campaign to enhance a people-driven and sustainable process.

### **Pilot Project Programme**

Also part of the CBPWP, this program was initiated by the National Department of Public Works in conjunction with provincial departments of public works, and consisted of 12 projects spread across the nine provinces. The purpose of these projects was to "demonstrate to other government departments how reorientation of expenditure on infrastructure projects may be achieved." Information gained through these pilot projects was to be (1) disseminated to government departments at national, provincial, and local levels to further the re-orientation process; and (2) used to develop guidelines and provide technical information (CSIR 1997). Key features of the projects are labor-intensive designs, tender documentation, skills training, community participation and liaison, labor management systems, and task-based payment.

### **Public Works Programme Transport**

This was part of a fund allocated from the RDP fund to the National Department of Transport in July 1995 (DTPW 1996). This was divided up among the provinces, and administered by the provincial departments (in the Western Cape, the DTPW). These were managed by consultants, with participation of community committees.

### **The Working for Water Programme**

The Working for Water Programme (WWP) is a job creation and environmental program of the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF 1996, 3). A high profile program of the national government and perceived to be particularly successful, it has received very high levels of funding and expanded rapidly. DWAF calculated in 1998 that it had grown to 240 projects with over 42,000 workers nationally (DWAF 1998, 6).

The program involves cutting down “invading alien plants,” that is, nonindigenous species such as wattle, pine, and others that consume large quantities of water. The program thus has two main benefits: job creation, and increasing water availability for domestic and commercial use, significant to this water-poor country. Like the NPWP programs, the WWP includes skills training and education, support for SMMEs, and local institutional capacity building as part of its mandate. It also encourages secondary industries, and targets women, youth, and the disabled as beneficiaries. In the Western Cape, the program was called the Fynbos Water Conservation Programme and later the Fynbos Working for Water Programme (FWWP).

### **Program-Level Differences and Outcomes**

The differences between these programs—and the government departments responsible for conceiving and implementing them at

the national and provincial levels—would be expected to account for some of the differences in community participation found across the project dataset and case studies. The WCEDF would be expected to be highly participatory because it was undertaken prior to the establishment of legitimate government structures and was largely governed by civil society institutions. Community participation was an important criteria for project funding. In practice, however, as the first program of its kind trying to realize multiple objectives, it had many preoccupations and the operationalization of participation was less explicitly thought through and emphasized than in the CBPWP initiatives. The three programs falling under the CBPWP (CBPWP, CEP, and Pilot) would be expected to have the highest level of participation, particularly the CEP where the IDT required sole community control and did not involve local government. The Transport projects were not part of the NPWP and could be expected to be less participatory, as the national Department of Transport was less preoccupied by participation than the national DPW, and the provincial DTPW had more independent authority to implement these than they did the CBPWP. Finally, the FWWP had so many objectives that participation had greater competition than in the NPWP/CBPWP projects. This program variable is explored further in our analysis as we look at project-level outcomes.

## CHAPTER 3

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### Research Methods

Public works programs contain public works projects. As explained in Chapter 2, we selected seven programs for inclusion in the study. We then took a census of all projects within the programs. Table 3.1 presents each of the seven programs, the institution responsible for project administration, the number of Western Cape projects under each program, the number of these categorized as “rural,” and the types of infrastructure or environmental project activity included within each program.

#### Methods of Data Collection

A number of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used in this study.<sup>6</sup> Table 3.2 describes each of these methods, the level at which data were collected (project, district, local, provincial, and national), and the informants included in the research, from project workers to national policymakers.

#### Database of 101 Public Works Projects in Seven Programs

Using project documents and mail-in questionnaires with follow-up telephone calls and visits, quantitative and qualitative data were collected on approximately 45 variables for each project, within the categories as outlined in Table 3.3.

The data were collected in the following manner. Initially, all program level documents were identified for each of the seven programs (for example, monthly reports, final project close-out reports, project review summaries). However, these were new programs that had focused more on getting off the ground than monitoring. It was soon determined that many of these documents either: (1) contained data taken from project *applications* and did not reflect actual data collected during project implementation; (2) were incomplete, existing for some projects and not others, and/or containing certain pieces of data for some projects and not others; or (3) contained data that were of questionable origin or contradictory. Thus, in order to get *accurate* data, a project-level questionnaire was designed and administered to implementing agents for each project. Project records were mainly used to fill out the questionnaire wherever they existed, though some qualitative information categories (for example, identification of different agents) had to come directly through interviews with implementing agents, which we triangulated with other information wherever possible. In many cases, the implementing agent did not have records and visits had to be made to various

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<sup>6</sup>An earlier IFPRI research report by Kerr (2002) also combined quantitative and qualitative methods to look at effects of participatory development projects and different institutional arrangements.

**Table 3.1 Public works programs in Western Cape province included in the study**

Program	Administering institution	Number of projects	Number outside Cape Metro/Winelands (rural) <sup>a</sup>	Types of infrastructure
Clean and Green (CAG)	Provincial Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW)	10	1	Cleaning (2), greening, alien vegetation clearing (7), parking area
Community Based Public Works (CBPWP)	DTPW	18	10	Community center, roads, stormwater drainage, sanitation, water supply
Community Employment Programme (CBPWP/CEP)	Independent Development Trust (IDT)	22	21	Community center, roads, stormwater drainage, sanitation, school, creche, clinic, greening, roads and stormwater
Fynbos Water Conservation Project (FWCP) also known as the Fynbos Working for Water Project (FWWP)	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)/Cape Nature Conservation	14	11	Alien vegetation clearing
Pilot Projects (Pilot)	Department of Public Works/DTPW	2	0	Roads and stormwater
Transport Projects (Trans)	DTPW	6	4	Roads, roads and stormwater
National Economic Forum/Western Cape Economic Development Forum (WCEDF/NEF)	WCEDF/DBSA	29	19	Community center, roads, stormwater drainage, sanitation, water supply, cleanup, recreation grounds, roads and stormwater, multiple services, bridge

<sup>a</sup>In South Africa, there is no easy distinction between rural and urban, because so many localities have characteristics often associated with both. Previous government definitions of urban based on the existence of a local authority is not useful given the restructuring of local government in urban and rural areas. We thus instead use an (imperfect but useful) distinction between locations in or on the outskirts of Cape Town, Paarl and Stellenbosch (the Cape Metro/Winelands regions), and those elsewhere in the province.

program and project administrators or managers, consultants, contractors, and accountants who helped us to track down data through internal project paperwork. In the case of the Independent Development Trust

projects, however, the program managers would not allow the research team access to project facilitators, and so certain categories of information are missing for a number of these projects.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>The IDT was a large NGO with a large public sector funding base. Because it was not a public sector program we did not have direct access through our contacts in government, who became committed to the process and recognized the benefits of the research. The IDT in contrast appeared to take a defensive posture toward being the subject of research, and despite directives from their funders in the government to cooperate with the research, management decided midway through the research to refuse.

**Table 3.2 Description of data collection methods**

Information about the . . .	Source of information					
	Project records and documents	Project questionnaires	Worker questionnaires	Semi-structured interviews	Focus groups/PRA workshops	Household surveys from secondary sources
District						October household surveys and the 1991 census
Project	Various documents from 101 projects	Mail-in with telephone and visit follow-ups				
Local government officials				12 individual and two group interviews		
Community-based project steering committees, community-based organization (CBO) or other community-based key instruments				13 individual and nine group interviews		
Consultants, contractors, and emerging contractors				Eight individual and one group interviews		
Other project staff, supervisors, trailers						
Former project workers			193 questionnaires in seven projects		Eight workshops	
National and provincial policymakers, government program managers, and policy advisors				36 people interviewed		

### Project Case Studies

Eight<sup>8</sup> in-depth case studies were conducted in the second phase of the research. The projects were selected purposively so as to gener-

ate variation in type of institutional arrangement, rural/urban location, and infrastructure type. We selected a subset of candidate projects in numbers roughly proportional to the

<sup>8</sup>We actually captured events at a total of nine projects because the Kahayelitsha project comprised two separate construction projects. We describe it as one project because the governing structure, processes, community, and

**Table 3.3 Data collected at the project-level, 101 Western Cape public works projects**

Category of information	Type of data collected
Project location	Town, residence of workers, magisterial district, development region; rural/urban
Durations	Actual and projected; dates
Institutional arrangements	Administering institutions; applicants; implementing agents; community-based organization (CBO) roles; identity of consultants and contractors
Assets and activities	Primary activities and project components
Costs	Projected and actual; sources of funding (tiers of government and private)
Employment generated	Projected and actual work days, for men and women
Wages	Wage rates, initial and final, skilled and unskilled; comparative rural sector wage rates
Payment systems	Daily wage or task-based
Labor disputes	Existence or absence
Training	Costs; number of days; content; training institution
Small/medium enterprises	Existence or absence
Second-round effects	Existence or absence; types
Maintenance arrangements	Responsible institution
Comments	Any other points of interest

frequency of the values of the stratifying variables. From the subset of candidate projects we made a final project selection based on criteria such as geographical spread; formal roles of local government, CBOs, NGOs, and consultants;<sup>9</sup> existence of second-round effects;<sup>10</sup> existence of sub-

contractors; types of payment systems; and interest generated among policymakers. Table 3.4 presents a profile of each of the case studies selected, including their program, magisterial district, and type of asset or activity. It also includes some basic indicators for these projects, including employ-

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infrastructure were the same, though the timing and workers were different (the projects started on the same date, but one ran much longer in part due to a conflict-related delay).

<sup>9</sup>This was intended to capture different levels and types of participation. Although we selected on *de jure* rather than *de facto* participation, we ended up with *de facto* participation at the following levels: one case study each in the categories highest, very high, high, and no participation; two projects with medium participation (counting Khayletisha as two), and two medium-low participation. Table 5.1 indicates which projects fall into these categories.

<sup>10</sup>Second-round effects are indirect effects or “spin-offs” from the project, beyond their immediate transfer of income for workers. Examples include development of skills that could help workers secure future employment, a community hall that is used as a skills training workshop, or an enhanced ability of community members to manage development activities.

**Table 3.4 Summary profile of the eight in-depth case studies selected from the 101 projects**

Project	Program	District <sup>a</sup>	Asset generated	Worker days generated	Percent of workdays to women	Method of payment	Labor stoppage	Second-round effect reported <sup>d</sup>
Langa	CAG	Goodwood	Clean-up and greening	11,600	60	Wage	No	Yes
Khayelitsha <sup>b</sup> 4C	Pilot	Mitchells Plain	Roads and stormwater drainage	12,289	18	Task	Yes	Yes
Khayelitsha <sup>b</sup> 3A	Pilot	Mitchells Plain	Roads and stormwater drainage	29,462	5	Task	Yes	Yes
Lutzville	CBPWP	Vredendal	Community center	2,490	12	Wage	No	Yes
Thembaletu	Trans	George	Stormwater and roads	16,500	40	Wage	Yes	Yes
Clanwilliam	CBPWP	Clanwilliam	Stormwater drainage	2,981	10	Wage	Yes	Yes
Murraysburg	CBPWP	Murraysburg	Water reticulation	4,364	0	Wage	Yes	Yes
Kylemore <sup>c</sup>	FWWP	Stellenbosch	Removal of alien vegetation			Wage/task	Yes	No
Stellenbosch	FWWP	Stellenbosch	Removal of alien vegetation	47,285	44	Wage/task	Yes	Yes

<sup>a</sup>See Figure 3.1.

<sup>b</sup>The Khayelitsha Pilot projects were two separate contracts in two areas, with data kept separately, so for the purposes of our database they are treated separately. However, because they had the same consultants, contractors, and community steering committees, for the purposes of our case study they are treated as one.

<sup>c</sup>Worker day figures are not available for Kylemore because at the time the database was constructed, the Stellenbosch project included Kylemore (prior to our case studies it was split into a separate project with separate managers and committees).

<sup>c</sup>Note that the Fynbos Working for Water projects are ongoing, and thus do not have end dates. For data collection on these projects, we chose a 15-month period from initial start-up until the end of January 1997, when most of the other public works projects were complete.


<sup>d</sup>Second-round effects are indirect economic or social impacts of a project; for example, the building of a community center that is later used as a skills-training facility.

ment generated; employment for women; whether they paid daily wages or gave task-based payments; labor stoppages; and whether there were second-round effects. Figure 3.1 shows a corresponding map of

the magisterial districts where the case-study projects are located.

For seven<sup>11</sup> of the eight project case studies, a survey was conducted among former workers to determine their employment

<sup>11</sup>In the project at Kylemore, a post-project survey could not be conducted because most of the original project workers were still working on the project. The FWWP projects were different from the other programs in that they were ongoing, so workers at this newer project were still on their contract.

**Figure 3.1 Western Cape province: Magisterial districts of the case studies**

histories pre and post public works projects to determine if participation in the projects assisted them in improving their access to employment following the project. A survey of the impact of the projects on the poverty status of former workers was not undertaken due to resource constraints, though the nonexistence of baseline data would have limited the value of this exercise had it been undertaken. Given this stage in the development of public works programs in South Africa—the completion of a first round of programs and the start of planning expanded programs building on lessons from the first round—we believed it most productive to focus on program and project-level variables and issues to be resolved.

In designing and selecting the participants for the case studies and institutional study, a “stakeholder” approach was used. “Stakeholder” analysis is defined in several ways, all of which we considered in our iden-

tification and selection of interviewees and focus group participants. In program evaluation, stakeholders are defined as “people whose lives are affected by the programme and people whose decisions can affect the future of the programme” (Greene 1988). Selection should be informed by diversity and representativeness (Guba and Lincoln 1981), and in a utilization-focused approach, “stakeholders are people who have a stake—a vested interest—in evaluation findings . . . decision-makers and information users who have questions about a programme” (Patton 1986).

Using the conceptual framework we develop in more detail in the next chapter, we can identify the stakeholders as financiers, providers, and beneficiaries. Financiers were the national government officials, including policymakers and program managers, and to a lesser extent provincial government officials (in a dual role, mainly serving as a

provider). Providers compose the largest group of stakeholders. These included: community-based project steering committee (PSC) representatives; community-based organization representatives; local government councilors, municipality officials, and staff. There were also agents of providers: including consulting engineers and architects (sometimes crossing the line into being providers themselves), contractors, the community liaison officer (CLO, in a dual role—also serving as agent of beneficiaries), and supervisors. Beneficiaries included project workers, other community members, and subcontractors. Agents of beneficiaries included worker committees (sometimes in a dual role as providers, with their role limited to decisionmaking on labor issues), trade union representatives, and the CLO. Not all projects had the exact same role-players but all had variations of the above categories.

For each case study, these individuals were identified and in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted based on a structured interview guide. Interviews were conducted with either all of the members of a particular group (if there were between one to five people involved, such as the consultants or contractors), or where a particular role-player involved multiple people (for example, the PSC, local government), a selection of representatives were interviewed, based on several factors. For example, only local government officials identified as having been involved in the project in some capacity, directly or as an interested observer, were interviewed. In the case of PSCs, approximately 60–90 percent of the members were interviewed, depending on their availability.

Research workshops were held with former project workers, using a combination of focus groups and participatory appraisal (PRA) methods that use visual exercises to engage participants and stimulate their thinking. In selecting the former project workers to participate in the workshops, we invited all workers in the three projects that

had under 30 workers in total. In the five projects with over 100 workers, we used a stratified random sample from a list of all project workers, proportional to the number of men and women workers. Approximately 70 workers were selected per project to ensure that at least 30 showed up to the workshop (between 30 and 50 showed up). Although we held workshops on the weekend to minimize a bias toward those who were unemployed (that is, less successful in finding a job after the project), we are aware that in the three large urban projects it may have been disproportionately unemployed people who came to the workshops. This was because of the incentive of a small “transportation” fee and meal offered (in these urban areas many people would be unlikely to show up on a weekend without this incentive), and the fact that when people hear about a workshop related to the public works project, many come in the hope that it may lead to a job (regardless of the fact that the purpose of the workshop is explained in the invitation).

In selecting former project workers for the survey, we also used a random sample proportional to the number of men and women on the projects, but a different sample from that used for workshop invitations. For the projects with under 30 people, all workers were surveyed. For the projects with over 100, a sample of 30 percent was used. In addition, at the two projects using subcontractors, five subcontractors per project were also surveyed.

Finally, the study also included an analysis of the policy process surrounding these public works programs at the national and provincial levels, as well as political economy issues. This required key informant interviews with a wide range of national and provincial policymakers, program managers, policy advisors, and trade unions and NGO representatives. Altogether over 80 key informant interviews were carried out for the study (see Adato et al. 1999 for a full description of study methods and findings).

## CHAPTER 4

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### **The Impact of Participation on Project Outcomes: Evidence from the Full Sample**

**O**ur research is concerned with participation as both an end and a means, and we employ a particular analytical approach to studying the latter. Having set out the background for this study as well as the methods used to collect our data, we now turn to one of the core objectives of our work: to assess whether community participation affects project performance. To do so we first set out a conceptual model to capture some of the analytics of participation. We then use this model to help frame an econometric analysis of project outcomes.

We begin by identifying the actors, making links between community participation, social capital, and trust as well as noting the importance of defining precisely what is meant by community participation. We then set out a simple model that identifies the main trade-offs involved in how different modes of delivery vary in the costs of intervening and the design of objectives.

#### **Some Analytics of Participation: Financiers, Providers, and Beneficiaries**

Consider a world comprised of three groups: financiers, providers, and beneficiaries.<sup>12</sup> The primary role of the financier is to provide funds. Multilateral and bilateral donors, ministries of finance, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are all examples of financiers. As noted in Chapter 2, in the case of the Western Cape, the financiers for these public works programs were largely from national government. Given the discussion in Chapter 2, it is reasonable to assume that the financier is interested in reducing poverty but has only a limited budget to do so. The main role of providers is to implement interventions. Providers may be line ministries, autonomous government agencies, private firms, NGOs, or community-based organizations (CBO). Here, we are thinking of “communities” as being a group of individuals within a geographically defined area who collectively implement an intervention with financial backing from the financier. (The following chapters provide specific examples of these.) Beneficiaries comprise the communities, households, and individuals who are the intended recipients of program benefits, the poor. Note that the roles of these three groups are not always strictly delineated. Depending on context, financiers, providers, or beneficiaries may initiate, design,

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<sup>12</sup>A similar version of this model with a longer literature review appeared in earlier drafts of this report and in Hoddinott (2002).

and/or implement the intervention. Communities and beneficiaries can be co-financiers as well as beneficiaries of interventions.

Poverty alleviation projects typically have *multiple objectives* or outcomes valued by the actors involved in the intervention. In the Western Cape, objectives included job creation; the building and rehabilitation of infrastructure, or improvements to the natural environment; the provision of job training that would enable workers to find post-project employment; and capacity building of communities. Without loss of generality, we will develop our model on the basis of a project that is characterized by a pair of objectives  $(z_1, z_2)$ . For example, suppose that the anti-poverty intervention aims to reduce poverty in both the short and long term. In this context,  $z_1$  would be the level of current consumption of intended beneficiaries while  $z_2$  is the extent to which the program tries to create human capital and eliminate long-term poverty.

There is no reason to expect that all actors will have identical preferences over program objectives. In the case of public works, for example, actors may differ in the weights given to job creation and training. Given a pair of realized objectives, we denote the outcome that accrues to the poor as  $B(z_1, z_2)$ . We assume that  $B(\cdot, \cdot)$  is increasing in both arguments and that beneficiaries do not pay any of the costs of poverty reduction;  $z_1$  and  $z_2$  are measured so that more of both of them is considered to be a good thing.

Providers—in the case we will consider here, community-based organizations—and financiers—here government—have their own objectives in addition to caring about the poor. For the government this is

$$G(z_1, z_2) = \beta g(z_1, z) + (1 - \beta)B(z_1, z_2) \quad (1)$$

where  $g(\cdot, \cdot)$  represents any “private” benefit that the government receives from having the program designed in a particular way. For example, the government might wish to deliver benefits to particular ethnic groups. It could also represent differences in discount rates that imply different weighting of long- and short-term poverty alleviation benefits. The parameter  $\beta$  denotes the weight given to the government’s versus the poor’s payoff; where  $\beta = 0$ , the government and the poor have identical preferences. The community’s preferences is denoted by

$$R(z_1, z_2) = \alpha r(z_1, z) + (1 - \alpha)B(z_1, z_2), \quad (2)$$

where  $r(\cdot, \cdot)$  denotes the “private” payoff of the community organization and  $\alpha$  is the weight that it attaches to its own preference relative to that of the poor beneficiaries.

We now consider what would happen if the government managed the poverty reduction program, that is it is both financier and implementer. Any government expenditures not allocated to the project can be spent on some other valuable activity whose price is normalized at one. Thus, the government’s objective is to choose  $(z_1, z_2)$  to maximize  $G(z_1, z_2) - C(z_1, z_2)$ . Let the optimal values of this be,  $(z_1^G, z_2^G)$ . Thus, the benefit to the poor is  $B^G(z_1^G, z_2^G)$ . The community’s payoff is  $R(z_1^G, z_2^G)$ .

Alternatively, the government could contract provision to the community whose cost function is denoted by  $c(z_1, z_2)$ . We assume that the community enjoys an absolute advantage in production of both goals so that  $C(z_1, z_2) > c(z_1, z_2)$ . We also assume that

$$\frac{\partial c(z_1, z_2)}{\partial z_i} < \frac{\partial C(z_1, z_2)}{\partial z_i}$$

for all  $(z_1, z_2)$ ,  $i = (1, 2)$ .<sup>13</sup> Given this cost advantage, a Pareto improvement is, in

<sup>13</sup>Hoddinott (2002) provides a detailed set of examples showing the different ways in which communities have a cost advantage.

principle, possible from decentralizing the program to have some kind of community involvement. This is because  $c(z_1^G, z_2^G) < C(z_1^G, z_2^G)$ . Thus, the government could pay the community organization a transfer of  $t = c(z_1^G, z_2^G)$  to undertake the project on its behalf, thereby saving money. Note, however, that solution is not incentive compatible unless the government has some direct way of controlling the community organization's inclination to change the program's objectives *ex post*. This is because preferences over project objectives may differ if  $G(z_1, z_2) \neq R(z_1, z_2)$ . Define

$$\begin{aligned} & \{z_1^C(y), z_2^C(y)\} \\ & = \arg \max_{z_1 \geq 0, z_2 \geq 0} \{R(z_1, z_2) : C(z_1, z_2) = y\} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Thus, if it were given a transfer of  $c(z_1^G, z_2^G)$  to undertake the project, the community organization would be  $\{z_1(c(z_1^G, z_2^G)), z_2(c(z_1^G, z_2^G))\}$ . This would be the solution under community management if it were not possible for the government to write some kind of contract that restrained the community's behavior. Thus, we are assuming an extreme form of contractual incompleteness in the model, a reasonable assumption when the precise objectives of poverty alleviation programs are very hard to describe *ex ante*.

It is interesting to ask when the government would wish to decentralize management of poor support to the community organization. Let

$$y^G = \arg \max \{G(z_1^C(y), z_2^C(y)) - y\}, \quad (4)$$

as the optimal poverty alleviation budget to grant to a community given that the resource allocation decision will be made at the community level. Then the government will prefer to have a community organization manage a poverty alleviation project if

$$G(z_1^C(y^G), z_2^C(y^G)) - y^G > G(z_1^G, z_2^G) - C(z_1^G, z_2^G). \quad (5)$$

The left-hand side is the payoff of the government if it gives a budget of  $y^G$  to the community and the right-hand side is the payoff to the government under pure government provision. It is easy to see that the likelihood of community involvement is highest where (1) government and community preferences are more congruent and (2) the absolute cost advantage of the community (net of government's monitoring costs) is largest.

Such cost advantages could stem from multiple sources. There may be interventions where knowledge of local conditions is especially important and where the cost of the acquisition of such knowledge by outsiders is high. Second, community participation may reduce the likelihood of moral hazard or adverse selection problems. In the context of public works projects where a daily wage payment is made, involvement by the community in the hiring of labor may increase the likelihood that those most in need of work and/or are more likely to show up receive employment, and those less in need and/or with a propensity to shirk, are excluded. Third, communities may have abilities to lower costs that are not available to outsiders. For example, communities could encourage participants to accept lower wages than those officially sanctioned so as to generate savings that can be put toward other objectives such as training. However, it does not necessarily follow that *all* costs are lowered when beneficiaries have increased involvement in the design and implementation of interventions. Abraham and Platteau (2001, 11) document the importance placed on ensuring unanimity and consensus in self-help projects in a Nairobi slum, resulting in "considerable efforts and time spent in lengthy discussions at meetings and assemblies as well as in the protracted mediation procedures to settle interpersonal conflicts." Khwaja (2001) finds that community participation in what is described as "technical decisions"—such as project capacity—resulted in projects requiring

greater maintenance. If all costs are paid by an external financier and the budget constraints are not hard (that is, strict limits on costs are not imposed), communities may not have an incentive to control costs where they can capture additional resources that flow from the financier. Other providers may offer cost advantages in other areas. For example, liaising with a myriad number of communities will carry higher administrative costs to the financier than contracting with a single provider. A large NGO or private firm may be able to benefit from economies of scale, or superior management skills.

The community organization also has to be willing to undertake management of the project—it is not reasonable to assume that projects can be foisted on an unwilling organization. This requires that

$$R(z_1^C(y^G), z_2^C(y^G)) \geq R(z_1^G, z_2^G). \quad (6)$$

Now consider the well-being of the poor. Most of the discussion of poverty reduction tends to assume that the community organizations are more in tune with the preferences of the beneficiaries. If the community cares solely about the beneficiaries, then whenever community management is good for the poor, it will be chosen by the community. However, if there is an agency problem, in the sense that the well-being of the poor and the community organization are not fully in tune, there is no guarantee that this will be the case.

**Example:** Suppose that the only difference in preferences is which group to target resources on. Thus, let  $b(z_i)$  be utility of members of group  $i$  when the aim of the anti-poverty program is to get them to an income of  $z_i$ . We assume that  $b(z_i) = \log(z_i)$ . There are two groups and let  $\lambda$  be the share of type 1's in the population. The overall benefit indicator of the poor is  $\lambda b(z_1) - (1 - \lambda)\log(z_2)$ . The government and the community organization differ in the weight that they attach to the well-being of each group. Thus,

$$G(z_1, z_2) = \beta \log(z_1) + (1 - \beta)\log(z_2) \quad (7)$$

and

$$R(z_1, z_2) = \alpha \log(z_1) + (1 - \alpha)\log(z_2) \quad (8)$$

where  $\alpha \geq \lambda > \beta$ . This says that the government favors group 2 when it designs the program. We assume that there is a transaction cost  $c_i(C_i)$  for the community organization (government) to reach group  $i$ , and the initial (pre-transfer) income for group  $i$  is the same and fixed at  $y$ . Then the cost of achieving the objective is

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda z_1 + (1 - \lambda)z_2 - y + C_1\lambda + C_2(1 - \lambda) \\ & \equiv \lambda_1 z_1 + (1 - \lambda)z_2 + \Gamma \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

if the government manages the project and

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda z_1 + (1 - \lambda)z_2 - y - c_1\lambda_1 + c_2(1 - \lambda) \\ & \equiv \lambda_1 z_1 + (1 - \lambda)z_2 + \gamma \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

if the community organization does. It is now easy to check that

$$(z_1^G, z_2^G) = \left\{ \frac{\beta}{\lambda}, \frac{(1 - \beta)}{(1 - \lambda)} \right\}.$$

It is also easy to check that

$$\begin{aligned} & z_1^C(y), z_2^C(y) \\ & = \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{\lambda} (y - \gamma), \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{(1 - \lambda)} (y - \gamma) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

and that  $y^G = 1 + \gamma$ . So in this case, the unconstrained community optimum and the constrained optimum yield the same allocation. The community organization spends more on the group that it favors relatively to the government. The two conditions for community participation to be optimal are

$$\begin{aligned} & \beta \log\left(\frac{\alpha}{\lambda}\right) + (1 - \beta) \log\left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{(1 - \lambda)}\right) - 1 - \gamma \\ & > \beta \log\left(\frac{\beta}{\lambda}\right) + (1 - \beta) \log\left(\frac{1 - \beta}{(1 - \lambda)}\right) - 1 - \Gamma \end{aligned}$$

for the government and

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha \log\left(\frac{\alpha}{\gamma}\right) + (1 - \alpha) \log\left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{(1 - \lambda)}\right) \\ & > \alpha \log\left(\frac{\beta}{\lambda}\right) + (1 - \alpha) \log\left(\frac{1 - \beta}{(1 - \lambda)}\right). \end{aligned}$$

The latter is clearly satisfied. The former will be satisfied when  $\Gamma$  is much larger than  $\gamma$  and  $\alpha$  is closer to  $\beta$ . Whether the poor's benefit goes up or down depends upon whether

$$\begin{aligned} & \lambda \log\left(\frac{\alpha}{\lambda}\right) + (1 - \lambda) \log\left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{(1 - \lambda)}\right) \\ & > \lambda \log\left(\frac{\beta}{\lambda}\right) + (1 - \lambda) \log\left(\frac{1 - \beta}{(1 - \lambda)}\right). \end{aligned}$$

This will tend to be the case if  $\alpha$  is closer to  $\lambda$  than is  $\beta$ , that is, there is less of an agency problem with community organizations.

There are two additional issues that should be noted. In this three-entity context, participation in antipoverty interventions is a process whereby financiers enter into a contractual arrangement with beneficiaries who become involved in aspects of provision, and possibly finance. A feature that we will return to at several points is the fact that, as in all contractual relations, it is impossible to set out in advance all possible contingencies that will arise. In such circumstances, establishing who has decision-making power has a direct bearing on what is meant by community participation. Specifically, one can distinguish between formal (*de jure*) and real (*de facto*) authority. Formal authority is the right to decide; real authority is the effective control over decisions

(Aghion and Tirole 1997). The importance of this distinction lies in the possibility that in the absence of delegation of de facto decisionmaking power, potential beneficiaries may be reluctant to act because of concerns that they will be overruled subsequently. Alternatively, central authorities may subsequently renege on commitments and the threat of this generates a hold-up problem (providers are unwilling to act out of concern that decisions they make will be subsequently over-ruled).

A second issue is that this conceptual framework treats communities as homogeneous entities.<sup>14</sup> Yet as one of our key informants observed

There's very few community leaders in this country who will really let their communities work because they are also engulfed in this great bitterness of the past and they're always infighting about this opinion and that opinion. And that really tears communities apart because they never get down to saying that these are the issues that we need to work on. Because I mean after all you cannot work in conflict, you cannot work in difference of opinions especially if you take on projects. You have to work as a team to let that project work, be it to put a local clinic there or be it to build a couple of houses or water. You will always find the communities who are successful in South Africa are those communities who basically stick together as a unit. They might have their difference of opinion, but their difference of opinion have not

<sup>14</sup>Purely on theoretical grounds, this is dubious given Arrow's (1951) well-known impossibility theorem. Note too that financiers and other providers may not be homogeneous either. The donor acting as a financier might encompass a project leader who is interested in maximizing prestige; middle managers anxious to protect their budgets; and lower level functionaries interested in promotion. Further, each actor may be accountable to a number of constituencies. For example, an engineer within a government public works department who is responsible for providing drinking water to a locality may be answerable to four different groups. These could include her superiors within the bureaucracy, a professional organization that accredits and monitors her professional conduct, local politicians seeking to maximize the benefits flowing to their constituents, and the intended beneficiaries of the intervention.

driven them apart (interview, C. B., C.B. Associates).

Community participation requires that there must exist mechanisms for the discussion of common issues, for the resolution of differences in opinions, for the allocation of costs and benefits associated with group decisions, and for the efficient and effective monitoring of actions taken by a few on behalf of the many. In the next chapters, specific examples are provided of how this came about in the provision of public works in the Western Cape. Here we note that the efficacy of community participation may be a function of community characteristics such as the size of the group involved, the degree of inequality, and the outside options available to members (see Baland and Platteau (1997) and Dayton-Johnson (2000) for a discussion). To this can be added the social capital literature's emphasis on the importance of trust across individuals. Trust, built up by repeated interactions, can help problems of information asymmetries (differences in information held by different parties) to be solved thereby allowing self-enforcing agreements to be reached (Knack and Keefer 1997). Common to both the literature on collective action and social capital is the view that polarization inhibits the construction of relationships of trust. Easterly and Levine (1997, 1205–06) write, “polarized communities will be prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different groups and have difficulty agreeing on public goods like infrastructure . . . thereby impede agreement about the provision of public goods.”

Concerns regarding the determinants of effective community action raise two issues, one practical and the other analytical. The practical issue is that financiers may be unwilling, or unable, to assess the ability of communities to engage in collective action, nor may they be willing in practice to invest

heavily in the development of such capacity in the context of a particular development project.<sup>15</sup> Financiers may decide instead that communities should self-select into participatory projects, perhaps signaling their seriousness by making an up-front contribution of money or other resources. Indeed, such actions are often seen as the hallmark of many successful rural development projects (Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna 1998). This may mean that better organized, less fractionalized communities may benefit disproportionately from increased emphasis on participation. The analytical issue is that if one accepts the notion that successful community interventions are those in which communities self-select into the projects, this self-selection needs to be taken into account. It might be the case that localities in which community participation thrives are those in which project outcomes are more likely to be favorable in any case.

To summarize, our conceptual framework identifies three actors: financiers, providers, and beneficiaries. These multiple actors may have divergent preferences that lead them to attach different weights to the multiple objectives found in most anti-poverty interventions. One benefit of beneficiary participation lies in the prospect of reducing the cost of providing antipoverty interventions. In essence, these are benefits that are derived from improved implementation. This is likely to occur where knowledge of local conditions is especially important, where moral hazard or adverse selection concerns play a role, where verification of actions is needed. Further, communities may have ways of lowering costs that are not available to outsiders. A further set of benefits lie in terms of improved design. Beneficiary participation offers the potential for the selection of project objectives that more closely reflect the preferences of the population that they are designed to serve.

<sup>15</sup>See Parker and Skytta (2000) for a discussion of this issue in the context of water provision in rural Mali.

However, realization of these benefits is contingent on two characteristics. The first is the ability of communities to engage in collective actions. In fractionalized communities where trust is weak (perhaps because of little prior history of collective action or a history of political conflict such as in the South African case), there is a risk that community participation may result in the capture of benefits by local elites to the detriment of the poor, or that conflict may stall progress. The second characteristic is the importance of delegating decisionmaking authority. Failing to do so—allowing *de jure* but not *de facto* participation—may result in beneficiaries being reluctant to act because of concerns that they will be subsequently overruled.

### Data Overview

Table 4.1 provides some descriptive statistics. Different types of public works activities—the construction of buildings and roads and bridges and removing alien vegetation and garbage—will have differences in requirements for materials and for specialist inputs such as engineering design. Accordingly, Table 4.1 groups the assets being constructed as part of these programs into three broad categories: community buildings such as centers, schools, and clinics; basic infrastructure activities such as roads, storm sewers, sanitation sewers, and water reticulation; and other activities such as the removal of alien vegetation and general “cleaning and greening.”

The average project operated for about nine months, with 20 percent being completed in less than four months and 33 percent operating for one year or longer. Only one project operated for more than two years.<sup>16</sup> While projects typically went over-budget, it was only in the case of the construction of community buildings that these cost-overruns were significantly high.

Materials-intensive projects such as the construction of community buildings devote a lower share of their budgets to labor and create fewer jobs. Infrastructure development and community building projects typically employed fewer women than other public works projects.

As noted above, assessing the impact of community participation and project outcomes requires a precise definition of what is meant by these concepts. In particular, it is important to distinguish between *de jure* authority, in the sense of “whose name is on the contract,” and *de facto* authority, in the sense of “who actually is responsible for planning and implementing the project.” Our measure of *de facto* authority is informed by Paul’s (1987) continuum of participation from information sharing to consultation to decisionmaking to the initiation of action as applied to qualitative information collected from project managers and administrators as well as other relevant parties. Projects were divided into four categories: (1) the community based organization (CBO) is solely responsible for all aspects of the project, including design, overseeing the contractors, setting wages, selecting workers, controlling the bank accounts, and so on (32 percent of projects); (2) the CBO, together with another implementing actor, jointly participates in decisionmaking over some or all aspects of the project, including design, overseeing the contractors, setting wages, selecting workers, controlling bank accounts, and so on (23 percent of all projects); (3) the CBO assists in selecting workers, mediates disputes, and liaises with the community but is not a decision maker; (31 percent of projects); and (4) cases where the community has little or no involvement in the project (15 percent of projects).

Our data are also rich in information on project outcomes. These can be divided into

<sup>16</sup>The exception is the projects in the FWWP, which were continuous. We took a fixed period, from project start to the end of the period of quantitative research (a 12- to 15-month period) for the purpose of data collection.

**Table 4.1 Project characteristics**

Project characteristics	Constructs community buildings	Constructs basic infrastructure	Other projects	All projects
Duration (days)	334	236	329	294
Project cost ('000s rands) <sup>a</sup>	1,084	1,458	1,322	1,299
Ratio: Cost overruns to planned project costs	30.6	11.3	11.4	18.7
Percent projects over budget	65.6	61.5	66.7	64.3
Project budget share spent on labor	30.7	34.8	70.4	43.3
Ratio: Project wage to local unskilled wage	71.1	81.3	85.0	79.0
Number of person years of work created	33.7	27.1	141.8	60.8
Number of person years of training undertaken	3.8	1.8	5.9	3.6
Percent jobs taken up by women	13.9	20.1	40.2	23.7
Sample size	32	39	27	98

<sup>a</sup>Almost all projects (with the exception of four) were completed between early 1995 and the end of 1997. The exchange rate was R3.5 = \$1.00 in January 1995; R4.8 = \$1.00 in December 1997.

several categories. First, we would like to know if community participation enhanced the attainment of program objectives to create employment and training opportunities. Three outcomes capture this: the share of the project budget allocated to labor; the log of the number of days of work created; and the log of the number of training days undertaken. Second, we would like to know who in the community captures these benefits and this is measured in two ways: via the ratio of the daily project wage to the local unskilled wage (consistent with the literature on self-targeting of public works, a lower ratio is indicative of improved targeting toward the poor); and the percentage of employment that goes to women. Lastly, we have information on the cost-effectiveness of community participation. This includes cost overruns (computed as the ratio of cost overruns to projected costs as submitted in the project proposal) relative to projected costs, the log cost in rands of creating one day of employment (calculated by dividing

the number of days of employment generated by the project by its total cost); and the cost to the government of transferring one rand to the poor. This variable is the reciprocal of the benefit stream generated by the project divided by the government expenditure on it. The benefit stream consists of transfer benefits to workers net of what they would have earned in the project's absence plus non-transfer benefits captured by the poor.<sup>17</sup> A low value indicates that the project is cost-efficient in delivering resources to the poor.

Table 4.2 provides mean values of these project outcomes, disaggregated by varying degrees of community participation.<sup>18</sup> The top panel classifies projects as to whether or not there is any participation. Community participation appears to be associated with an increased share of project budgets being allocated to labor, and with greater amounts of job creation and training. However, these differences are not statistically significant. Community participation is associated with

<sup>17</sup>There are numerous details associated with calculating this figure, including estimating the size of leakages to the nonpoor, the probability of obtaining work in the absence of the project, worker's wages on the project, workers' wages in the absence of the project, the probability of finding non-project work while working on the project, and the level of nontransfer benefits. These are documented in Haddad and Adato (2002/03).

<sup>18</sup>Median values are broadly similar to mean values except for actual costs and number of training days.

**Table 4.2 Mean project performance by degree of community participation**

	Attaining program objectives			Distribution of benefits		Cost-effectiveness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Degree of community participation	Mean project budget share spent on labor	Mean log number of days of work created	Mean log number of training days	Mean ratio: Project wage to the local unskilled wages	Mean percentage employment to women	Mean ratio: Cost overruns to planned project costs	Mean log cost of creating one day of work	Mean cost of transferring one rand to a poor person
No participation	0.37	7.94	5.49	0.85	8.25	13.4	5.12	11.10
Any participation	0.44	8.45	5.94	0.78	25.94	19.2	4.41	7.19
F test on differences in means	0.76	1.25	0.76	0.90	5.80**	0.17	8.75**	3.93**
No participation	0.37	7.94	5.49	0.85	8.25	13.4	5.12	11.10
Community advises but does not decide	0.52	9.61	6.63	0.82	33.84	4.9	4.32	6.47
Community is joint decisionmaker	0.45	7.69	5.09	0.85	21.31	2.1	4.51	8.15
Community is sole decisionmaker	0.35	7.90	5.82	0.70	21.93	41.0	4.40	6.92
F test on differences in means	3.03**	14.25**	5.01**	2.59*	3.78**	4.71**	3.31**	1.70

Note: \* significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level.

improved targeting to the poor, as proxied by the ratio of project wages to local unskilled wages as well as a markedly increased share of employment going to women. While projects with at least some degree of community participation have relatively higher cost overruns, this difference is not statistically significant and projects with community participation appear to have lower costs of creating work and transferring resources to the poor.

The bottom panel of Table 4.2 assesses whether the extent of community participation affects project performance. While the F statistic indicates that we can reject the null that mean outcomes are equal across differing degrees of participation, the pattern of these differences is not uniform. For example, job creation and training appear to be highest in projects where the community has an advisory or liaison role but no decisionmaking authority whereas project wages are relatively lowest where the community has sole decisionmaking authority. Projects with the highest cost overruns, relative to projected budget are those where communities have sole decisionmaking power, next highest where there is no community participation, and lowest where there is joint decisionmaking. That all said, there are a number of reasons why we might not want to put too much weight on these findings. First, they do not account for other factors—for example, project characteristics such as size and type of asset created—that might also affect these outcomes. Second, they do not take into account two issues alluded to in our conceptual framework: the processes by which projects were situated in particular localities (also referred to as endogenous program placement [Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986 and Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1993]) and the possible endogeneity of community participation.

Project performance may also be affected by locality characteristics. For example, labor costs might be higher in areas with high local wages and low levels of unemployment. To account for this, we will draw

on data that describe the 34 districts in which the projects are located. These are taken from the 1995 October Household Survey (OHS), conducted by the Government of South Africa's Central Statistics Service. The OHS collected detailed household data on jobs, wages, and employment status; education and demographic data; information on aspects of living standards such as housing quality and access to infrastructure (water, electricity, telephones, transport, and health facilities); and crime and safety. In our multivariate analysis, these household level data are aggregated into district means.

## Results

### Estimation Issues

An estimable model that captures the relationship between community participation and project performance can be written as

$$I_{ij} = \beta \cdot CP_{ij} + \gamma' \cdot \mathbf{P}_{ij} + \eta' \cdot \mathbf{L}_i + e_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where:  $I_{ij}$  is the performance indicator of project  $j$  located in locality  $i$ ;  $CP_{ij}$  captures the extent of community participation in the project;  $\mathbf{P}_{ij}$  is a vector of other project characteristics;  $\mathbf{L}_i$  is a vector of locality characteristics;  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\eta$  are parameters to be estimated;  $e_{ij}$  is an error term; and vectors are written in bold.

As noted above, there are two potential problems associated with attempting to obtain consistent estimates of  $\beta$ . First, as noted earlier, governments *choose* to contract with community-based organizations and these organizations *choose* to accept these contracts. Factors that affect this choice could also affect project performance. This implies that  $E(CP_{ij} \cdot e_{ij}) \neq 0$  and therefore that estimates of  $\beta$  are biased and inconsistent. Second, government may choose to locate projects on the basis of locality characteristics, for example citing infrastructure projects in places with poor infrastructure. This implies that  $E(\mathbf{P}_{ij} \cdot e_{ij}) \neq 0$  and that estimates of both  $\gamma$  and  $\beta$  are biased and inconsistent.

One way of addressing these problems is to think of participation as an endogenous “treatment.” That is, we estimate equation (1) as a treatment effects model using Heckman’s (1979) two-step consistent estimator. This takes the following form:

$$I_{ij} = \beta \cdot CP_{ij} + \gamma' \cdot P_{ij} + \eta' \cdot L_i + e_{ij}$$

where  $CP_{ij}$ , the endogenous dummy variable is assumed to reflect an unobservable latent variable  $CP_{ij}^*$  which itself is determined by:

$$CP_{ij}^* = \tau \cdot w_{ij} + v_{ij}$$

where  $w_{ij}$  are covariates that affect participation,  $\tau$  are their associated parameters,  $v_{ij}$  is a disturbance term and the relationship between  $CP_{ij}$  and  $CP_{ij}^*$  is given by:

$$CP_{ij} = 1, \text{ if } CP_{ij}^* > 0 \\ = 0, \text{ otherwise}$$

and where  $e_{ij}$  and  $v_{ij}$  are bivariate normal. Amongst others, Maddala (1983, 120–22) shows that consistent estimates of  $\beta$  can be obtained by first estimating the determinants of treatment (here, community participation). From this probit, the hazard ( $\lambda$ ) or inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated and then inserted as an additional regressor. This gives us:

$$I_{ij} = \beta \cdot CP_{ij} + \gamma' \cdot P_{ij} + \eta' \cdot L_i \\ + \omega \lambda_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad (2)$$

Estimating (2) requires that we identify covariates (instruments) that plausibly affect participation but do not directly affect project outcomes. We use two such covariates as instruments for participation.

The first draws on insights found in Easterly and Levine (1997), Mauro (1995), and Knack and Keefer (1997). Easterly and Levine’s note that “an assortment of political economy models suggest that polarized communities will be prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different groups and have difficulty agreeing on public goods like infra-

structure . . . ethnic diversity may increase polarization and thereby impede agreement about the provision of public goods (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1205–06). Additionally, where groups have a history of limited interaction—something certainly true of race relations in South Africa—one would expect that levels of trust across groups (which are built up by repeated interactions) would be lower. As Knack and Keefer (1997) emphasize, trust can be thought to help solve problems of information asymmetries thereby “allowing self-enforcing agreements to be reached.”

This suggests that racial fractionalization would be a natural determinant of the likelihood of community participation. Specifically, we construct an index of ethnic fractionalization that takes the form:  $1 - \sum_{i=1}^I (n_i / N)^2$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, I$ ; where  $n_i$  is the number of people in the  $i$ th group,  $N$  is the total population, and  $I$  is the number of groups. By construction, it can range in value from 0, complete homogeneity—to 1, complete heterogeneity. We use the OHS data at the district level on the percentage of individuals from different racial groups (White, Colored, African, Asian) to construct the index. These data were collected prior to the implementation of these programs so there should not be any reverse causation from project implementation to racial fractionalization.

The second covariate follows from the observation found in the literature on community-based development that stresses that past experience with collective action enhances the capacity of people to take on new participatory projects. One covariate that captures this is the share of the vote that the African National Congress (ANC, the leading political party in the struggle for majority rule) received in local elections held in November 1995 and March 1996—elections that occurred prior to the implementation of these projects. The political struggle for majority rule in South Africa had a strong “grassroots” community-level participatory component and communities where this was

**Table 4.3 Probit estimates of the determinants of de facto participation**

Variable	Dependent variable equals one where community, de facto, participates in project decisionmaking
Log projected duration of project (days)	-1.601 (4.63)**
Project constructs community buildings	-3.934 (4.17)**
Project constructs basic infrastructure	-3.191 (6.04)**
Log average wage in district	6.624 (3.86)**
District unemployment rate	0.386 (3.86)**
District poverty (P0) rate	-5.366 (1.92)*
Percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe	-0.348 (1.47)
<i>ANC voting share in local council election</i>	4.302 (1.53)
	(Significant at the 12% level)
<i>Index of racial fractionalization</i>	-47.03 (2.73)**
Constant	47.26 (4.01)**
Chi squared on joint significance of instruments	7.61** (Significant at the 2% level)

Notes: Covariates that serve as instruments for participation are in italics. Absolute values of  $z$  statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands included but not reported. Sample size is 98.

most marked were communities that supported the ANC. As such, these communities may be able to engage in a different form of collective action.<sup>19</sup> Further, there were elections held for approximately 136 local councils; and it appears that for at least one-third of our sample, our unit of analysis, “the community” maps directly onto a local election. For the remainder, the “local council” refers to a geographical entity larger than “the community” but smaller than a district.

To see whether these characteristics affect the likelihood of de facto community participation, we estimated a probit where

the dependent variable equals 1 if there is any community participation (that is, cases where the community is the sole decisionmaker, joint decisionmaker, or plays an advisory role), zero otherwise. These results are reported in Table 4.3. Racial fractionalization and ANC voting share in local elections have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of participation at the 1 percent and 12 percent confidence levels, respectively. A chi squared test does not accept the null hypothesis that these three correlates of participation are jointly zero at the 2 percent confidence level. The sign on racial fractionalization is negative, consistent with the

<sup>19</sup>While other political parties such as Pan African Congress (PAC) were involved in these political efforts, they received little electoral support in the local elections.

**Table 4.4 Reduced form determinants of project performance**

Variable	Attaining program objectives			Distribution of benefits		Cost-effectiveness		
	Project budget share spent on labor	Log number of days of work created	Log number of training days	Ratio: Project wage to the local unskilled wages	Percentage employment to women	Ratio: Cost overruns to planned project costs	Log cost of creating one day of work	Cost of transferring one rand to a poor person
ANC vote share	0.172 (1.05)	0.475 (0.65)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.060 (0.15)	-16.15 (0.91)	-0.152 (0.26)	-0.562 (1.32)	-5.45 (0.45)
Racial fractionalization	0.180 (0.67)	-1.105 (0.72)	-1.176 (0.88)	0.303 (1.13)	56.48 (0.97)	-1.323 (1.92)*	-0.392 (0.51)	-12.99 (1.63)
F test on joint significance of racial fractionalization and vote share	1.22	0.31	0.87	0.69	0.64	2.52	0.93	1.37

Notes: Additional variables included but not reported are log projected project duration, type of infrastructure built, district mean wages, unemployment, poverty (P0) rate, percent households feeling safe or very safe, and location dummies. Absolute values of  $t$  statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Sample size is 98.

hypothesis that increased diversity makes the provision of public goods more problematic. The sign on ANC voting share is positive.

In addition to showing that these covariates are correlated with participation, we also need to demonstrate that they are uncorrelated with project performance. We do so in two ways.

First, we estimate reduced form determinants of the eight project outcomes we have been considering. In these regressions, we *exclude* community participation, *include* the “instruments” racial fractionalization and ANC vote share, and test to see if these covariates are individually and jointly significant. These results are reported in Table 4.4. Neither covariate has a statistically significant effect on these project outcomes. Second, we construct a “pseudo-Hausman” test. We estimate a linear probability model with de facto community participation as the de-

pendent variable and use the same covariates as in Table 4.4 as regressors. We recover the residuals and include these in a linear regression where the dependent variables are the measures of project performance listed in Table 4.5 and the regressors are (exogenous) de facto community participation as well as project and locality characteristics.<sup>20</sup> In only one case, cost overruns, is an instrument statistically significant at the 15 percent level or better and so we drop this measure from the remainder of our analysis. Collectively, we conclude from Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 that our instruments are correlated with participation but uncorrelated with the remaining seven performance measures.

In addition to addressing the concern of endogenous participation above, we noted that endogenous project placement is also a potential concern. However, there are several reasons why it is unlikely to be problematic for our work here.

<sup>20</sup>We also constructed the over-identification test as set out in Wooldridge (2002, 123) but did not obtain results any different from those described here.

**Table 4.5 Parameter estimates for the first stage residual in the determinants of project performance**

Variable	Attaining program objectives		Distribution of benefits		Cost-effectiveness			
	Project budget share spent on labor	Log number of days of work created	Log number of training days	Ratio: Project wage to the local unskilled wages	Percentage employment to women	Ratio: Cost overruns to planned project costs	Log cost of creating one day of work	Cost of transferring one rand to a poor person
Residual	0.109 (0.29)	-0.471 (0.35)	-0.389 (0.29)	0.194 (0.72)	74.21 (1.40)	-1.132 (1.16)	-0.258 (0.24)	-11.11 (0.98)

Notes: Additional variables included but not reported are de facto community participation, log projected project duration, type of infrastructure built, district mean wages, unemployment, poverty (P0) rate, percent households feeling safe or very safe, and location dummies. Absolute values of *t* statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Sample size is 98.

First although each program had its own stated set of location criteria,<sup>21</sup> none of the programs explicitly state that they use socio-economic data to determine which areas should be prioritized and only two programs (encompassing 7 percent of our sample) mentioned infrastructure needs as a targeting requirement. Second, no locality received funding for more than one project within a program but programs paid no attention to what other development project funding the locality received. Third, in separate work, Adato and Haddad (2002) systematically examine the relationship between locality and project selection, and characteristics of the districts in which these projects are sited. They find no evidence of any systematic relationship between these. All these observations suggest that projects were allocated to localities in a somewhat unsystematic fashion and that, therefore, concerns regarding nonrandom placement of interventions in selected communities are not warranted here.

### Estimation Strategy

Given the discussion above, we adopt the following estimation strategy. We will estimate the determinants of seven different measures of project performance: the share of the proj-

ect budget allocated to labor; the log of the number of days of work created; the log of the number of training days undertaken; the ratio of the daily project wage to the local unskilled wage; the percentage of employment that goes to women; the log cost in rands of creating one day of employment; and the cost to the government of transferring one rand to the poor.

We control for project characteristics that might affect these measures: projected duration and type of asset being created (construction of community buildings, construction of basic infrastructure). We will control for locality characteristics that might have an independent effect on project outcomes: log mean local wages for comparable semiskilled work; the local unemployment rate; the locality's poverty rate; and the percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe. Lastly, we include regional dummy variables (regions are geographical entities smaller than a province but larger than a district) to capture regional fixed effects. With these covariates, we will estimate models (1) and (2).

### Basic Results

Estimates of (1) and (2) are reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. We have grouped

<sup>21</sup>See Adato and Haddad (2002).

**Table 4.6 The impact of participation on attainment of project performance**

Variable	Project budget share spent on labor		Log number of days of work created		Log number of training days	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
De facto participation	0.069 (2.19)**	0.160 (1.71)*	0.702 (1.13)	1.180 (2.53)**	0.625 (0.76)	1.251 (1.85)*
Project characteristics						
Log planned duration	-0.029 (0.74)	-0.023 (0.74)	1.450 (8.15)**	1.535 (10.10)**	1.239 (5.11)**	1.295 (6.09)**
Constructs community buildings	-0.425 (7.48)**	-0.422 (8.63)**	-0.277 (0.62)	-0.265 (1.08)	0.457 (1.65)	0.512 (1.51)
Constructs basic infrastructure	-0.382 (6.58)**	-0.381 (7.68)**	-0.429 (1.64)	-0.410 (1.66)*	-0.425 (2.37)**	-0.392 (1.15)
Locality characteristics						
Unemployment rate	0.002 (0.36)	0.001 (0.20)	-0.026 (1.14)	-0.029 (1.07)	-0.029 (0.77)	-0.036 (0.97)
Log average wages	-0.176 (2.15)**	-0.179 (1.77)*	-0.761 (1.99)*	-0.775 (1.54)	1.289 (1.61)	1.279 (1.89)*
District poverty (P0) rate	-0.463 (2.86)**	-0.448 (1.93)*	-1.744 (1.61)	-1.660 (1.43)	2.933 (1.26)	2.893 (1.75)*
Percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe	-0.002 (1.16)	-0.001 (0.44)	-0.044 (3.44)**	-0.038 (3.00)**	-0.023 (2.00)*	-0.018 (1.14)
Inverse Mill's Ratio		-0.089 (1.33)		-0.470 (1.42)		-0.558 (1.21)
Chi squared statistic, all regressors		112.63**		189.58**		92.51**
R2	0.508		0.649			

Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a "treatments" regression with community participation treated as endogenous. Absolute values of  $t$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of  $z$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors are robust to cluster effects at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported. Sample size is 98 for budget share and days work created, 86 for days training created.

these tables according to type of performance measure being considered. Table 4.6 looks at the impact of participation on the attainment of project objectives. Table 4.7 looks at the measure of the distribution of project benefits and Table 4.8 examines aspects of cost-effectiveness.

Treating participation as exogenous, participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the project budget share spent on labor and the log number of training days undertaken. Treating participation as endogenous, participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the project budget share spent on labor, the log number of days of work created and the log num-

ber of training days undertaken. It increases the percentage of employment that goes to women and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local unskilled wages. It reduces the cost of creating employment and reduces the cost of transferring income to the poor.

### Robustness Checks and Additional Results

A concern we had in developing these results was that our measure of community participation was picking up the impact of some other locality characteristic. For this reason, in preliminary work we added a wide range of locality characteristics to these spec-

**Table 4.7 The impact of participation on the distribution of project benefits**

Variable	Ratio: Project wage to the local unskilled wages		Percentage employment to women	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
De facto participation	-0.131 (1.45)	-0.209 (2.19)**	14.42 (2.29)**	17.79 (1.69)*
Project characteristics				
Log planned duration	-0.011 (0.20)	-0.017 (0.56)	3.894 (1.42)	4.144 (1.21)
Constructs community buildings	-0.149 (5.69)**	-0.151 (3.01)**	-24.895 (9.07)**	-24.808 (4.51)**
Constructs basic infrastructure	-0.037 (0.75)	-0.041 (0.80)	-20.319 (5.79)**	-20.185 (3.63)**
Locality characteristics				
Unemployment rate	-0.001 (0.17)	-0.0004 (0.07)	-0.868 (1.36)	-0.890 (1.48)
Log average wages	-0.602 (9.80)**	-0.599 (5.81)**	-2.131 (0.17)	-2.227 (0.20)
District poverty (P0) rate	-0.383 (2.59)**	-0.398 (1.67)*	-3.900 (0.08)	-3.308 (0.13)
Percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe	-0.005 (2.32)**	-0.006 (2.36)**	-0.402 (3.77)**	-0.364 (1.27)
Inverse Mill's Ratio		0.077 (1.12)		-3.323 (0.43)
Chi squared statistic, all regressors		80.96**	58.64**	
R2	0.415		0.330	

Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a "treatments" regression with community participation treated as endogenous. Absolute values of  $t$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of  $z$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors are robust to cluster effects at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported. Sample size is 98.

ifications. These characteristics included: average household size; proportion of female headed households; the percent of individuals that have completed standard 5 and standard 10 of schooling (standard 10 is the equivalent of completing high school); mean per capita incomes; the standard deviation of per capita incomes; the standard deviation of male and female wages; quality of infrastructure; the proportion of households who report that they are unable to feed their children; the district rate of unemployment; the district rate of long-term (greater than one year) unemployment; proportion of adults by occupational class; housing

quality (size, building materials, sanitation); levels of home ownership; access to water, electricity, telephones, transport, and health facilities; and reported levels of crime. None of these variables had explanatory power, thus they are not used in the results reported. We experimented with different controls for project location; again doing so had no meaningful impact on the results reported here. Finally, we included a set of dummy variables that reflected our subjective assessment of the quality of the project level data we had obtained. These had no statistical significance and their inclusion does not substantively alter our results.

**Table 4.8 The impact of participation on project cost-effectiveness**

Variable	Log cost of creating one day of work		Cost of transferring one rand to a poor person	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
De facto participation	-0.438 (1.43)	-0.909 (2.78)**	-3.841 (1.56)	-8.045 (2.66)**
Project characteristics				
Log planned duration	0.117 (1.52)	0.082 (0.77)	-0.210 (0.16)	-0.522 (0.53)
Constructs community buildings	0.714 (3.13)**	0.702 (4.10)**	3.380 (2.79)**	3.272 (2.06)**
Constructs basic infrastructure	0.927 (6.27)**	0.908 (5.24)**	3.165 (3.93)**	3.000 (1.87)*
Locality characteristics				
Unemployment rate	0.026 (1.74)*	0.030 (1.58)	-0.418 (1.74)	-0.390 (2.24)**
Log average wages	0.806 (1.96)*	0.819 (2.32)**	0.267 (0.09)	0.386 (0.12)
District poverty (P0) rate	1.037 (1.12)	0.955 (1.18)	-1.418 (0.55)	-2.155 (0.29)
Percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe	0.017 (3.91)**	0.011 (1.28)	0.004 (0.11)	-0.043 (0.53)
Inverse Mill's Ratio		0.464 (2.10)**		4.141 (2.00)**
Chi squared statistic, all regressors		93.58**		42.34**
R2	0.455		0.224	

Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a “treatments” regression with community participation treated as endogenous. Absolute values of  $t$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of  $z$  statistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors are robust to cluster effects at the magisterial district level. \* Significant at the 10 percent level; \*\* significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported. Sample size is 98.

We experimented with the inclusion of other variables that we believed might affect community participation. These included measures of economic stratification (such as the standard deviation of earnings; levels of unemployment; percentage of individuals in different occupations; levels and severity of poverty); political fractionalization, derived in the same manner as the index of ethnic fractionalization and drawing on information on the shares of votes obtained by different political parties and measures of community access to infrastructure (such as distance to various facilities; access to telephones); and other measures of political ac-

tivity, such as voter turnout and the identity of the party that controlled the local council. None of these variables had explanatory power in the regressions used to predict the probability of participation and hence their exclusion does not affect our results.

## Conclusion

This chapter has examined the relationship between different types of community participation and the performance of public works projects. We develop some simple analytics that are used to motivate the empirical analysis of the impact of participation on the effi-

cacy of public works interventions in the Western Cape. The empirical implications of our model are straightforward: (1) we should expect to see an empirical difference between programs that are community managed and those that are purely government run; (2) there is no direct link between the cost of delivering benefits in a program and whether a program is community run. We could easily find community managed programs that have more or less cost per unit in equilibrium because of changes in objectives. Formally testing these implications is, however, challenging. For a reasonably large number of interventions, we need information about the extent of community participation, the level of benefits to the community, the distribution of benefits within the community, and indicators of cost effectiveness. Further, such data, while necessary, are not sufficient. Project performance might also be affected by locality characteristics and so we need addi-

tional data that can control for these. Lastly, the fact that in our model financiers *choose* to work with community-based organizations implies that we cannot necessarily assume that community participation is exogenous and so our data must also be rich enough to take this potential endogeneity into account.

We find that de facto participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the project budget share spent on labor, the log number of days of work created, and the log number of training days undertaken. It increases the percentage of employment that goes to women and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local unskilled wages. It reduces the cost of creating employment and reduces the cost of transferring income to the poor. The magnitudes of these impacts are sizeable. These findings are robust to a variety of model specifications and the inclusion of other covariates.

## CHAPTER 5

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### Community Participation in the Western Cape Projects

**W**hile the econometric work in the previous chapter shows the effects that community participation had on a range of project outcomes, it does not tell us *why* such effects were found. To get inside the “black box” of community participation, this chapter uses the case study analysis to examine the forms of community participation in the eight case study projects, both intended and actual, and discusses their implications—the benefits and consequences of different levels and types of participation.

#### The Case Study Projects

This section provides an overview of the eight project-level case studies. These case studies involved in-depth investigations of the institutional arrangements, actors involved, and processes that occurred in the course of planning and implementation of each project. Although extensive qualitative data collection is what distinguishes the case studies from the rest of the public works dataset, as a subset of the 101 projects quantitative data were also collected.

Table 5.1 provides quantitative characteristics and performance of each of the eight projects, comparing this performance to the average for the different asset categories. As noted in Chapter 3, the case studies were selected to be roughly proportional to the full dataset with respect to institutional arrangements, rural/urban location, and infrastructure type. Both the selection on institutional arrangements and the secondary level of selection that considered in more detail the role of government, NGOs, CBOs, and consultants were intended to capture variation in *de jure* and *de facto* participation.

With respect to *de facto* participation outcomes, there were three case studies with very high to high levels of participation (Lutzville—the highest, Thembalethu, and Clanwilliam); two cases of medium-level participation (Khayelitsha and Langa);<sup>22</sup> two cases of medium-low participation (Stellenbosch and Kylemore); and one case of no participation (Murraysburg). Table 5.2 shows this case study stratification compared to that of the total project database, indicating a roughly reasonable reflection of the different categories, with the category of no participation under-represented. However, it is important to point out again that the case studies are not intended to be statistically representative of the full dataset, but rather to capture variation that provides insights into a range of issues and conditions, taking a close look at the processes behind each of these outcomes.

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<sup>22</sup>As explained in Chapter 3, the Khayelitsha project was actually two projects and thus we actually studied three cases of medium-level participation.

**Table 5.1 Quantitative indicators for the eight case study projects**

Project name	Project activity	Form of community participation	Duration (days)	Attainment of project performance			Distribution of project benefits		Project cost-effectiveness	
				Project budget share spent on labor (percent)	Person years of work created	Number of person years of training undertaken	Ratio: Project wage to local unskilled wages	Percentage employment to women	Log cost of creating one day of work	Cost of transferring one rand to a poor person
Lutzville	Community center (CBPWP)	Highest	120	24	11.1	0.7	1.00	11.6	4.73	12.2
All projects constructing community centers			339	30.2	34.7	3.8	0.71	14.4	4.57	8.5
Khayelitsha 4C	Roads and stormwater drainage (Pilot)	Medium	330	14.3	54.6	3.9	0.54	18.0	5.27	6.7
Khayelitsha 3A	Roads and stormwater drainage (Pilot)	Medium	520	11.9	130.9	5.1	0.54	4.9	5.49	7.5
Thembaletu	Stormwater and roads (Trans)	Very high	390	28.2	73.3	4.2	1.26	40.0	5.91	8.0
Clanwilliam	Stormwater drainage (CBPWP)	High	180	20.1	13.2	0.5	0.71	10.1	5.11	8.2
Murraysburg	Water reticulation (CBPWP)	None	240	17.3	19.4	0	1.04	0	5.31	7.9
All basic infrastructure (road, storm sewers, sanitation sewers, and water reticulation)			236	34.8	27.1	1.9	0.81	20.1	4.75	8.5
Langa	Clean and green (CAG)	Medium	330	52.9	51.6	44.3	0.42	60.0	3.80	3.7
Stellenbosch <sup>a</sup>	Remove alien vegetation (FWCP)	Medium	390	92.2	210.1	2.2	0.69	43.9	3.61	2.5
Other projects (removal of alien vegetation and general cleaning and greening)			329	70.4	141.7	5.9	0.85	40.2	4.00	5.2

<sup>a</sup>Data are not available for Kylemore because at the time the database was constructed, the Stellenbosch project included Kylemore (prior to our case studies it was split into a separate project with separate managers and committees).

**Table 5.2 Comparison of de facto participation in the case study and full project database**

De facto participation	Case studies (no.)	Case studies (percent of total)	All projects (percent of total)
Highest-high	3	37.5	44.44
Medium-low	3	37.5	24.24
None	1	12.5	31.31

With respect to the main performance variables considered in Chapter 4, the Lutzville project with the highest level of de facto participation performed close to the average for all projects in its class of infrastructure (community halls) with respect to labor intensity (budget share spent on labor), employment for women, and efficiency in creating work and transferring income to the poor. The Thembaletu project, with a very high level of participation, performed close to the average in its class of infrastructure (roads, storm sewers, and water reticulation) with respect to labor intensity, and efficiency in creating work and transferring income to the poor. However, it performed at twice the average participation in giving employment to women. The Clanwilliam project with a high level of participation performed far below the average with respect to labor intensity<sup>23</sup> and employment of women, but at the average for efficiency in creating work and transferring income to the poor. The Khayelitsha project with a medium level of de facto participation performed far below average with respect to labor intensity; at the average for employing women in one of the two projects (the one completed on time) but far below in the other project; and at the average for efficiency in creating work and transferring income to the poor. Langa, the other project with medium level participation, performed below average (for “cleaning and greening” projects) in labor intensity; above average in employing

women; and at around average in efficiency in creating work and transferring income to the poor. The Stellenbosch/Kylemore projects performed above average in labor intensity; at average in employing women and efficiency in creating work; but somewhat below average in transferring income to the poor. Although there were some variations from the average (some of which is explained in the following two chapters), on the whole these project outcomes are reasonably reflective of outcomes across the wider database.

### **What Community Participation Looks Like**

Funds for public works projects were allocated to government or nongovernment providers representing a geographic entity, usually a local level political and administrative unit (under the system in place at the time the program was initiated). Program financiers in the central government required the participation of a community-based organization. In the South African context this meant a civic association, RDP Forum, or project committee composed of community members. These were nongovernmental, though Project Steering Committees (PSCs) were sometimes composed of both local government officials and other community members. These CBOs were supposed to be representative of the broader community. In most (though not all) cases they were elected

<sup>23</sup>One of the stakeholders commented that the engineers on the project did not present any options for labor-intensive construction.

bodies. Community participation in the public works projects then had two main dimensions: (1) participation of the community at large through mass meetings involving consultation or decisionmaking; and (2) participation of representative members of the community in a CBO, often in the form of a PSC. (PSC is used here to represent all types of community-based project committees/organizations, which varied in structure and name between programs and projects).

While roles given to the community at large or to a CBO/PSC were sometimes clearly differentiated, the meaning of the term “community” is often blurred. When program stakeholders refer to “the community” they are sometimes referring to community residents in general, sometimes to the PSC, other times imprecisely to both. “Community” is a problematic term in several respects. Bozzoli (1987) problematizes community in the South African context, placing it within its apartheid history. “Community” was long used to signal race by the apartheid government, but also became part of the discourse of resistance movements. “Community” signals inclusion and solidarity, but is simultaneously exclusionary. Reference to “the community” can obscure divisions of race, class, gender, political affiliation, and other differences. As Lund (no date, referring to Bozzoli 1987) points out, community is not a static variable: “actually existing residential areas will at different times, and in the face of different threats, and under certain conditions, organize collectively, with a real sense of community, but always excluding some groups and including others.” The question of who in the community is represented or excluded by a PSC or local government is discussed in Chapter 6.

All the role-players in the eight projects studied, including financiers, providers (in

government, the private sector, NGOs, and community groups), and beneficiaries agreed that community participation *in some form* is essential to the functioning of public works projects. In contrast to the past when the state engaged in top-down planning and implementation, the community was seen by all as an indispensable player, although there were vastly different perceptions of its appropriate roles—from the view that communities should be able to run projects on their own and that even where this might lead to financial disaster this is still an important learning experience (interview, former NGO staff, Langa project), to others who felt that participation does not have much place once construction is underway (interviews, contractor, construction firm on Khayelitsha project; official, DTPW). The reality of community participation in his experience was explained by the assistant city engineer for Khayelitsha (the implementing agent/provider for the Khayelitsha Pilot projects):

I believe that we have to involve the community. It’s the way that this community works . . . so one has to respect that and take cognizance of it and accommodate it. And if you don’t do it in any case, if you think it’s going to take longer because you’ve got to consult a committee, you’re making a big mistake. Because if they don’t want you to do it, you won’t do it—you won’t get the job going. They<sup>24</sup> will just come around and make a lot of trouble. And if I were them I’d most probably do it myself, as well. You know, I’m sitting in a shack down there, and there might be a job opportunity here, and no-one consults me or my representative. We have to walk the extra mile, we have to

<sup>24</sup>Interpretations of “they” is a frequent theme in this research. The idea of African, colored, and white communities as “different” or “other”—views based on historical racial relationships, lack of familiarity and understanding, and stereotyped discourse—shaped responses to these programs, responses to the “other,” and their receptiveness to participation of the “other.” This point is elaborated, with examples, in Chapter 6.

go there, and get them on board. And we do that, or we try to do that, in any case . . . it works generally. People<sup>25</sup> tend to see the whole community participation process I think also in the wrong light. They feel these guys are interfering in the process and they don't know anything about it. Yes, they don't know anything about it—but they want to know about it (interview, engineer, Lingulethu West City Council).

The tradition of participation in urban communities—not just in civic organizations but also groups involved with service delivery—can be traced through the history of activism and community consultation through civic organizations that became an important feature of the urban landscape in the mid-1980s. The organizations often engaged in both antiapartheid activism and service delivery in communities where the state was not delivering services (Seekings 1988; Lodge 1991). However, expectations of community consultation are not confined to urban environments. In the small mostly Afrikaaner and “coloured” town of Lutzville in the rural northwest corner of the province, the town clerk explained that community participation even at the design stage is “very important because if the community is not satisfied with the design and you spend R3 million, it won't be a satisfactory building. That, one must clearly understand.” (interview acting town clerk, Lutzville).

Although there is increasing recognition of the importance or at least the inevitability of participation, in practice pro-

viders in Western Cape provincial and local governments continued to view infrastructure delivery as a matter of technical expertise and were slow to hand over real responsibility to community members. The findings of our database of 101 projects show that although all programs had an emphasis on community participation in program design, CBOs ran approximately 30 percent of the projects.<sup>26</sup>

### **Types of Participation from the Case Studies**

Through the case studies, we identified a number of areas as actual and potential areas in which projects did or can benefit from community participation—from infrastructure selection to project design and management. Table 5.3 shows how each project actually performed in relation to types of participation that could potentially have involved the community as a whole<sup>27</sup>—where the wider community/beneficiaries (not just a PSC) take on some aspects of the provider role. The gray boxes indicate that participation did take place in this area. The checkered boxes indicate that there were mixed responses, with either significant differences of opinion or a circumstance not possible to simplify with a positive or negative answer. The white boxes indicate that participation did not take place. The FWWP projects have “n.a.” in some categories where the design of the program made the question not applicable. Lutzville had the greatest degree of broad community/beneficiary involvement, with the community as a whole involved in selecting the asset; electing a CBO/provider;

<sup>25</sup>“People” here refers to other white professionals in government and the private sector. The informant speaking is also a member of this group, reflecting critically on these relationships.

<sup>26</sup>A national evaluation commissioned by DPW of the CBPWP ranked Western Cape among the three lowest performing provinces (out of the nine) in terms of participation, using primarily the criteria involvement in choice of project, planning, financial decisionmaking, and knowledge of maintenance (Everatt et al. 1997). The CASE evaluation sampled only three projects from the province and thus is not representative. However, it does appear to be consistent with the findings from our dataset.

<sup>27</sup>This of course does not imply that virtually everyone in the community participates, but that a community forum enabling broad participation took place. There will always be people who either do not want or are not able to participate for a variety of reasons. This issue of choosing not to participate is taken up later in this chapter.

**Table 5.3 Types of participation where broad community involvement occurred**

Level of participation	Lutzville	Langa	Khayelitsha	Thembalethu	Clanwilliam	Murraysburg	Kylemore	Stellenbosch
Community helped select asset							n.a.	n.a.
Community felt asset a good choice							n.a.	n.a.
Had an elected PSC or CBO involved								
Community selected workers								
Community contributed to project design							n.a.	n.a.
Adequate communication with community during project								
Community had sense of ownership								

Notes: PSC indicates Project Steering Committee; CBO, community-based organization; n.a. indicates that, due to program design, the question was not applicable.

□ Broad community participation did not occur.

▒ Broad community participation occurred.

■ Results were mixed, with either significant differences of opinion or complex circumstances not able to be characterized as simply positive or negative.

receiving adequate communication from providers; and reporting a sense of project and asset ownership. Murraysburg had the lowest degree of broad community participation, where the wider community agreed after the fact that the asset was a good choice, but no further communication took place between providers and beneficiaries.

**Selection of Infrastructure**

As suggested earlier, community participation can potentially secure a better distribution of benefits. Broad community/beneficiary involvement in the selection of infrastructure has three main advantages: (a) assets are chosen that are in line with community priorities, (b) access to those assets can be more equitable, and (c) greater

awareness of the cost trade-offs of different choices is generated among the community.

The NPWP states that communities should be involved with choosing the type of asset on which to spend public works funds. It also recognizes that governments (in the role of financier or provider) have additional or different considerations to the needs of communities/beneficiaries in prioritizing projects, and if priorities conflict, “the needs of the community must be reconciled with government planning” (DPW 1994, 10). In four of the 18 CBPWP projects, community facilitators contracted by DTPW<sup>28</sup> found that local government had chosen projects that were not the highest priority for the community, and following a process of consultation, the project type

<sup>28</sup>In the framework of Chapter 4, community facilitators were agents of the financiers, helping to assure that providers more closely represented their priorities, in this case greater community participation.

was changed (interview, C. B. Associates).<sup>29</sup> Community involvement can also help correct for bias that local government may have with respect to one constituency. However, a better outcome could also be achieved if a community decisionmaking process is facilitated by local government. Local government may have information that communities are unaware of; for example, plans may be underway or funding already allocated to certain kinds of infrastructure, making another type of asset a better choice, or there may be environmental or health implications associated with one type of asset compared with another. Of 101 projects in the Western Cape, 22 were community halls. It is not possible to know whether these were really the highest infrastructure need of the communities that requested them. Adato and Haddad (2002) show how consultant engineers, many of whom favored building community halls, positioned themselves to get access to project contracts. Access to good information is an important factor in facilitating successful community participation.

Choices of infrastructure have equity implications often reflecting power relationships in the communities. A decision to build the stormwater system in Clanwilliam meant that the “coloured” community of Cedarville received the benefits, rather than the African community of “Khayelitsha 2,” the new squatter area for which an alternative project was initially planned for ablution blocks<sup>30</sup> until it was later changed. The ablution block project was abandoned because people were not living on the sites yet, because this could have been funded by housing subsidies, and because “the community” decided the higher priority was the storm water project (interview, C. B. Associates). It may be that the ablution block project would not have been a good choice

(when these were eventually built people did not move to the site). However, this case cautions against seeing “the community” as one entity, as residents of Khayelitsha 2 and Cedarville had different interests. The former may not want to use their housing subsidies for a project otherwise paid for, may have had other ideas for infrastructure they wanted, and did not benefit from the choice of the stormwater project. Community participation can embody and exacerbate inequities depending on who participates, and is thus not a guaranteed protection against one part of the community capturing the benefits.

One role of provincial department facilitators (as agents for financiers or providers) can be to monitor this process to increase its inclusiveness. An inclusive participation process for choosing the type of asset to be built can minimize the possibility of having the benefits captured by a less poor part of the community, or at least bring these choices out into the open. This can also help to minimize conflict later on: in Khayelitsha, the decision by the municipality to build roads in one part of the section and not another (meaning also that jobs were not created there), later led to the disruption of the project. Bringing community leaders into a decisionmaking process, where the facts of limited funds and difficult choices are discussed, could avoid this kind of problem—“could” rather than “would,” because the need for resources in poor communities can overpower negotiated agreements (as in the case of workers who agree to a wage rate and then strike afterwards).

### **Understanding Cost Implications**

Community involvement in the choice of infrastructure also means people will be aware that choices also involve costs. In Murrays-

<sup>29</sup>Note that all programs had varying boundaries around the type of project that could be chosen, with FWFP the most limited, the CAG limited to environmental clean-up, and the Pilot and Transport projects limited to roads. The most flexible were the infrastructure projects of the CBPWP, CEP, and WCEDF.

<sup>30</sup>Ablution blocks are normally buildings with toilets and running water, sometimes sinks and baths or showers.

burg, project workers (from the community) said they were having difficulty paying the new water bills that came with household taps (installed by the project) instead of communal taps. As one of the Murraysburg local councillors explained it, there was inadequate communication on the need to pay for water: “The only thing they went for is to get more water, but they didn’t realize that they had to pay more for the water” (interview). Although some responses indicated that people would prefer the taps but needed to understand the costs, one comment at the workshop was that

there are people who are looking back to the old street taps because now the big accounts are coming to them even with lawyers letters. And there are people who are saying: “why should I pay for water that comes from God?” and all these types of things. When the taps were installed people were happy but now that they see what they have to pay for it they are not longer so happy (project worker, Murraysburg workshop).

As Table 5.3 indicates, lack of participation does not mean that the community *disagrees* with the choice. In four of the six cases, the PSC and workers felt that the asset was a good choice (though not necessarily the best) and in the remaining two no dissatisfaction was found. The two FWWP projects were by definition alien vegetation clearing and thus did not involve any project choice.<sup>31</sup> However, in both Kylemore and Stellenbosch, workers did express that they were not consulted on the type of project and that basic infrastructure and housing were higher community needs. Although alien vegetation clearing does increase water resources, this does not directly affect the workers’ communities, so it is not surprising

that they would see infrastructure as a higher priority. However, they are not considering the scale of job creation, and it is very possible that with this information, they might choose alien vegetation clearing. This again implies the importance of good information (for example, on relative job creation and skill development potential of different infrastructure choices) communicated by providers to beneficiaries if the latter are to participate in selecting between asset types.

Under the re-aligned CBPWP that DPW introduced in 1998, community-based steering committees have co-responsibility for project identification, along with local government. Unlike project management and other implementation issues, this is an area where the PSC can facilitate the participation of the wider community.

### Community Representation

The main way that the community participates in projects is through a project steering committee (PSC), the mechanism through which the community becomes the provider. Thus the degree to which the committee is representative of the broader community becomes an important proxy for community participation in an ongoing capacity. In five of the eight cases, projects had steering committees that were elected by the community—either pre-existing community organizations such as street committees or RDP forums, or project steering committees formed for this project but chosen through these existing structures. More fragmented communities may result in less representative steering committees, particularly where mechanisms do not exist to resolve conflicts. This was clearly the case in Thembaletu. The legitimacy of Thembaletu’s committee, where community members had been appointed from among the leadership of the controversial Thembaletu Development

<sup>31</sup>The program only involves one type of project and takes place far outside of communities where the relevant species are found. The equity issues arise only in determining where to locate the project in terms of which communities will obtain employment.

Trust, was disputed and this is reflected in the many conflicts that arose in the course of the project, with the committee sometimes at the center of the conflict rather than mediating.

Where communities are politically highly fragmented, like in Thembalethu, Clanwilliam, and Murraysburg, it is particularly important that project committees are elected. As a key role player from the Clanwilliam municipality put it, “what is very important is the committee is representative of all the role players. In that way, half of the problem is solved. If this process is not in order there is problems” (interview).

### **Community Input into Project Design**

This falls into stage 2 and 3 of Paul’s (1987) categorization of types of participation. In South Africa, this was a highly contested area with regard to the benefits of community input/decisionmaking. Project design involves many—though not solely—technical decisions: in a road project, for example, it would include the type of road built; the materials and machines used; the shape and size of the road and other features; the type of training. Two CBPWP directors in the province, one with extensive experience facilitating community participation, said that communities tend not to be that interested in project design, generally preferring to leave that to those with technical training. Using participatory research methods in the study workshops, project workers listed all tasks in their project and then chose the role players they thought should be responsible

for those tasks. Out of seven workshops, in only one did workers mention project design as a task in the project (much less something that workers or the PSC should be responsible for). It is important to note that these were project workers/community members; PSC members would have been more likely to mention design.

At the same time, participation does involve opportunity costs, and it is possible that communities will opt out of participating in a given area. Participation takes time and interest, and not everyone will prioritize this use of their time or have this interest.<sup>32</sup> In several of the case studies, individuals on the PSC tended to be those who were on other committees and played other leadership roles in the community—those individuals for whom participation in development or political processes was a priority. These individuals also tended to be more educated and skilled, and thus more likely to have access to employment and alternative uses for their time—contradicting the opportunity cost argument. Nevertheless, the fact that many people do not come to meetings or volunteer to join the PSC implies an opportunity cost, financial or otherwise. In cases where PSC members are remunerated for their time—some projects recognized the cost of participation—there is of course more interest in joining—presenting greater opportunities for conflict over these positions. But in these South African communities with very high unemployment and few resources to access, the opportunity costs of participation are relatively low<sup>33</sup> and the interest in monitoring the use of resources

<sup>32</sup>Writing on the issue of infrastructure maintenance, Ostrom, Shroeder, and Wynne (1990) discuss opportunity costs in terms of the investment of resource inputs, particularly time and labor, that must be exceeded by the perceived benefits.

<sup>33</sup>In industrialized countries with high employment and more abundant resources, there is less interest in participating, and the chances of getting a mass turnout to a meeting about a road project is low. The city engineer for the Khayelitsha project observed this in commenting on the strong interest in participation and large meeting turnouts in Khayelitsha and the contrast with his own white, middle class community: “It’s not the way that we work. I mean if [my town of] Somerset West wants to build a park [next] to my house, I believe they know what they’re doing and they’re doing it the right way, and they’ve planned it properly—so I don’t worry about it too much” (interview, engineer, Lingeletu West Development Council).

is high—this is evidenced by the large turnouts to mass meetings.

Taking into account varied levels of interest, there are several reasons for getting community input during the project design phase. It is likely that as people become familiar with the implications of design choices they would be more interested in participating for these reasons:<sup>34</sup>

1. *Problems can be resolved early avoiding disruption later.* Involvement up front means that if there are problems raised that need to be resolved, this occurs before the project is underway and changes become more costly. A community unhappy with how they see a project progressing may disrupt it mid-stream, as they did in the Khayelitsha project.
2. *Design aspects may be more appropriate to community needs and preferences.* Beneficiaries can express design preferences, for example, with respect to allocation of space in community buildings. In Lutzville, the committee helped to decide on the design of a creche, kitchen, and meeting hall. In Langa, the community decided where they wanted to start with the greening, choosing the entrance to Langa to create a good first impression, and to not favor one part of the community over another. However, this choice did not benefit the poorest part of the community, as would an alternative idea to build a small park near the hostels.
3. *Local knowledge can enhance safety, convenience, and efficiency.* Community members can contribute ideas that make a design better (for example, safer) for the community. In Thembaletu, residents wanted speed bumps and taxi pull-offs, pointing out that the absence of these features created safety hazards for children and adults (given
4. *Access to relevant inside information about the community can be provided.* In Khayelitsha, the community raised the point that a brick road would be vandalized by people taking bricks out of the road for use as building materials. This was a point engineers had not realized on their own. In this case the choice involved a trade-off in labor use as a brick road would have created more jobs. Still the community chose paving.
5. *Community priorities can be reflected and trade-offs understood.* People can make decisions involving benefits and trade-offs that affect their communities. The consultants at Thembaletu called a mass meeting where they asked what type of road they should build. The community chose bricks instead of paving, because more jobs would be created. It also would mean that brick making skills would be left in the community, enabling new job opportunities in the housing construction industry. The Regional Services Council and taxi drivers argued against using bricks, and the consulting engineers told the community that a brick road would be 35 percent more expensive but would create more jobs. The community chose more jobs (interview, consultant engineer, Thembaletu project). The ability to participate in these kinds of decisions in an informed way depends on the range of choices presented—which will be shaped by technical, economic, and

<sup>34</sup>Participation in design choices can occur through the PSC or through a mass meeting where the PSC solicits suggestions, as occurred at Thembaletu.

political considerations and interests—and the kind of education that is built into the process. Explaining how he has seen the process work in many community projects in the past, one DTPW official suggested that communities could benefit more than they currently do if they did participate in design issues:

The supply of materials, they're not too concerned about that. . . . And to me that's perhaps a shortcoming because in any building construction work . . . money generally goes for materials. And if you look at the 60% of it—and the change in those things—that is where you actually create more work . . . Let's just say a brick [from the factory] costs you 50 cents and a brick made on site costs you 55 cents—it may cost you more, you get less bricks, you get less building for it, but 80% of that 55 cents can be money earned by those participating in brick-making whereas the entire 50 cents really goes out of the community. And you know those kind of understandings cannot be seen easy because that decision is long before the bricks arrive. . . . People must be made aware of where the resources are, how those resources can be changed (interview).

Some kinds of projects or infrastructure are more conducive to community input into the design than others. In the two FWWP projects, there is little room for community participation in project design, as the alien vegetation removal is standardized. Water reticulation projects do not lend themselves to as many choices as a road or a community hall, although there are some. In Clanwilliam, no design options were discussed with communities or the PSC, although there is a wide variation in the labor intensity of different drainage and pipe laying designs (interview, official, DPW). This again points to the importance of good informa-

tion if communities are to make informed choices for or against design options that involve trading off job creation for other benefits.

The Murraysburg and Khayelitsha cases serve to illustrate where community participation in design has to be approached carefully. In both cases, community members expressed their desire for design inputs in the form of extensions to the project that were not within the budget. If this occurs, technical consultants or local authorities can clarify the limits, and if a design change is financially infeasible, it will not be done. However, a discussion around the issue can enable communities to decide whether they are willing to trade off one kind of benefit for another, and leaves people with a better understanding of why a choice has been made. This educational process is beneficial to the community, and to the project by reducing the chance of disgruntlement and protest later (as occurred in Khayelitsha and Thembalethu).

One option raised by engineers was the use of standardized designs, to save costs and ensure that certain criteria are met with regards to quality, labor intensity, and cost. If this route is taken, communities can still have input through including community representatives in forums where design options are discussed. Context-specific changes would need to fit local needs.

### **Communication and Community Education**

Another way in which beneficiaries can be seen to participate is through periodic communication from and with providers (Paul's [1987] first stage of participation). In the case studies (and most of the other projects in the seven programs), once the project is underway, mass meetings are no longer held to receive community input, except under unusual circumstances that significantly and directly affect beneficiaries—for example, an unforeseen need to remove shacks. Instead, community participation takes place from

that point on through the PSC—the community organization becomes the provider, alone or in partnership with local government and/or the private sector. In the research workshops with former project workers, when they refer to involving “the community,” they generally were referring to CBOs such as street committees, SANCO, and PSCs.

Despite Paul’s (1987) designation of information sharing as a first stage of participation, it is also arguably not participation if there are no mechanisms for participants to influence actions. Nevertheless, the case study projects revealed ways in which periodic reports given to beneficiaries were important—on progress of the project, relevant announcements such as upcoming shack removals or safety hazards, and financial reports. In Thembaletu, workers said they would have liked an early meeting with the consultants to discuss wages, amount of funds to contractors, type of work tasks, and contracts, and that there needs to be lines of communication so there is no breakdown in understanding between community and contractor (Thembaletu Workshop). In Khayelitsha and Thembaletu, workers and PSC members expressed dissatisfaction over the absence of financial reporting from the managing engineers. Aware that a large sum of money has been given by the government for their benefit, they want to know how it is being used. Sudden infusions of project money can breed distrust, and people may assume that someone is benefiting unduly if they do not know how funds are being spent. A simple financial report given at intervals can help communities feel more involved and confident. If periodic reports are not given, the provider can at a minimum present a final report. As the head of SANCO in Thembaletu explained it,

you must know what the professional consultant engineer is getting, what the quantity surveyor is getting, what the architect is getting you see. You must know that at least most of the money goes back to the community. If there’s any money perhaps left, it can also start to do another project you see. That’s a thing that should happen because [otherwise] we’ll never know. Because it can perhaps be that . . . you’ve got a problem with the project. [Or] perhaps the project did go smooth and you never had any problems (interview).

In Thembaletu, community members and the engineers alike commented on the problem of communication breakdowns. The engineers/providers did not explain to the community why the budget increased by R2 million. There is no evidence that those funds were not spent legitimately on the project, but beneficiaries were bound to be suspicious when no explanation was offered. The fact that no final report was given left longstanding bad feelings in the community toward the consultants and the provincial government.<sup>35</sup> This makes it harder for outsiders to subsequently work with this community.

Communication with beneficiaries is not just important for its intrinsic democratic value, but it also has financial implications. Greater participation can help to foster a sense of ownership, valuable not only for the social benefits of instilled pride, but also helping to prevent theft, vandalism, work stoppages, and other conflicts. Of the eight case study projects, a sense of community ownership was exhibited to some extent at Khayelitsha, Thembaletu, Clanwilliam, and Lutzville. While communication helps to promote ownership, ownership appears

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<sup>35</sup>The consultants and a DTPW official did come awhile after the project finished to try to report on the finances in response to a request, but were unable to report because of changing memberships of organizations and disputes in the community about which was the appropriate group to report to.

to be more closely related to higher levels of participation. Lutzville, for example, had the highest levels of participation and people said that the community “put their whole heart and soul in it” because of a sense that it is “our hall” (interview, PSC head). Aside from instilling pride, a sense of local ownership has instrumental benefits such as increasing cooperation, improving maintenance, and reducing vandalism.

In the Langa environmental project involving township clean-up and greening, workers were supposed to be the link with the wider community through their Street Committees, but such participation did not really take place as envisioned. The NGO provider did not have sufficient time to run the project and carry out the kind of links with the community, primarily around environmental education, it had hoped for. One of the project coordinators felt this was a lost opportunity, because

six months later the dirt was right back there again. And that just showed we didn’t address the core, we didn’t talk to the people who were leaving the garbage there in the first place. And that takes time and time take money (interview, Tsoga representative).

In Khayelitsha, a good community consultation process occurred through the RDP forums in the early stage of the project, but later distrust became extremely high due mainly to conflict around the task system and other labor-management issues, and a poor working relationship between the PSC and the contractor. Now, according to the PSC, “in a recent community meeting the people said that [this contractor] was never going to be taken for any jobs in their community as it has caused problems and has left the community in conflict” (interview, PSC).

Murraysburg had no community participation and no community steering committee. One councilor commented that such projects should do more to empower communities by bringing them through the steps of a development project, explaining the types of decisions involved and considerations involved in making them. At the research workshops with former project workers, they were taken through an exercise of this type, asked to identify who played which roles on the project and debate who they felt should play these roles in the future. The level of interest, energy, and heated arguments generated through these workshop exercises revealed their value as a learning process. The benefits may extend beyond this, making projects run more smoothly if workers and community members better understand the rationale for decisions around wages, why some people should get jobs before others, or why certain role-players and not others hold certain types of decision-making power. The conceptual issues they introduce and the opportunity for debating them could be introduced through pre-project workshops (rather than as an evaluative tool, as we used them).

### **The Role of the Project Steering Committees**

While most of the issues discussed above pertain to forms of participation for communities at large or for smaller representative groups such as PSCs or CBOs, these smaller groups are the focal point of most participation, particularly those forms that involve capacity building and the assumption of most provider roles. This arrangement assumes that this small group is indeed representative of the beneficiaries—in the vast majority of cases this group was elected—and on this basis it is brought into the role of (partial) provider.<sup>36</sup> It is important to stress,

<sup>36</sup>The fact that the PSC has been elected does not necessarily guarantee that it will always act in the interest of the community, however. Problems that occur where it is not are discussed in Chapter 6.

**Table 5.4 Responsibilities of role-players in case-study projects**

Responsibility	Lutzville	Langa	Khayelitsha	Thembalethu	Clanwilliam	Murraysburg	Kylemore	Stellenbosch
Implementing agent		NGO	LG	With consultants		LG	CNC	CNC
Selecting project		NGO	LG	Consultants	LG	LG	CNC	CNC
Selecting contractor		n.a.	LG	Consultants	LG	LG	n.a.	n.a.
Selecting workers						Consultant/ contractor	Project manager	CNC
Community liaison/ conflict resolution						LG		
Represents workers/ conflict resolution								
Overseeing contractor		n.a.	LG, consultants	Consultants		Consultant	n.a.	n.a.
Managing finances		NGO	LG, consultants	Consultants	LG	LG	Project manager	Project manager
Maintenance		LG	LG	LG	LG	LG	n.a.	n.a.

Notes: LG indicates local government; NGO, nongovernmental organization; CNC, Cape Nature Conservation (the implementing agent for the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry); n.a. indicates that, due to program design, the question was not applicable.

□ Responsibility held by another agent, as indicated.

■ Responsibility held by the Project Steering Committee.

in referring back to the model in Chapter 4, that the PSC rarely takes on the full role of provider, but rather is in this role partially, along with other role-players such as local government, consultants, and contractors.

In the 101 Western Cape projects studied, the PSCs' roles varied widely, from Paul's (1987) lowest to highest levels of participation. Since in these South African programs participation was an end as well as a means, the nature of participation in these projects is important. The analysis in Chapter 4 considered whether communities were joint or sole decisionmakers, advisors but not decisionmakers, or had no participation. The case studies further disaggregate these roles, looking more closely at what community-based organizations actually did or did not do in the projects, and the effects of these roles.

Table 5.4 shows the responsibilities held by PSCs in the eight case studies, indicated

by grey shading. The responsibilities of the other role players are also indicated.

The pattern that emerges from these studies is that, with the exception of Lutzville, community-based PSCs were not involved with technical managerial tasks. Instead, their roles have been primarily related to labor and community liaison responsibilities, including worker selection, communication, and conflict resolution. This is where their skills are strongest and they are most confident. It is also the area that they tend to perceive as having the most direct impact on the community. As one of the DTPW PWP directors observed:

When it comes to the physical construction work, that is when people want to participate, for the basic need that—a job is needed and they would like to ensure that people that they

know within the community, let's say a welder for burglar bars to a door, they want to make sure that it's done by the local guy and not by somebody outside. And in doing that they ignore the process of competition amongst various service providers . . . it takes the burden of another mouth or few mouths to feed off the general community, because that's what's happening in communities . . . they help each other . . . So their concern is what's going to happen to the money, where's the money going to? (interview).

Our research workshop findings support this view. When asked who they thought should select the workers, former project workers in five of the eight projects designated only community members (PSC or the "community") for this role, and in the other three projects this task was to be shared by the community and contractor or foreman. This is also how professionals in the case studies viewed appropriate roles for the PSC. The committee is seen mainly in the role of community liaison: it is important for enabling access to work in communities; for communicating with the community about relocation, safety, and other issues with direct impact on inhabitants of the area; and for mediating conflict within the community; between the community and contractor; and between the project workers and the contractor. These are roles that are obviously of benefit to the contractors, while involvement in technical management issues is less desirable to them.

As seen in Table 5.4, in five of the case study projects community committees (and sometimes the community as a whole) were involved in the worker selection process. This lets elected community members on the committee deal with the contentious equity issues that arise in choosing who gets jobs and who does not, in communities where there are far fewer jobs than people who need them, where whole families are unemployed and many people have not

worked for a very long time. There is the potential for patronage, though this did not arise as an issue in the case studies. It is important to note, however, that some representatives from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) object to this role for community members, because these union leaders believe this arrangement drives divisions into communities by making community members into employers (objections were even greater to participation in decisions regarding firing; see Adato and Haddad 2002). This is one of the dilemmas posed by the dual identity of community members as providers and beneficiaries.

Adato and Haddad (2002) discuss how PSC involvement in selecting workers permits considerations that do not usually enter into targeting processes for antipoverty programs—for example, the criterion of being "active community members" (who have dedicated time to meetings, activities, and organizations) was used in the Langa and Khayelitsha projects—and also introduces local perceptions of poverty and the most needy. These criteria do not necessarily result in the best targeting of the poor, and may have other disadvantages in terms of elite capture or underemployment of women if women have less opportunity to participate in community activities due to time constraints or social biases. But using local criteria can also improve upon a self-targeting process by choosing those the community feels are most needy or deserving from among those who will accept the low wage (that is, in theory the poorest of the poor), where demand for the jobs is higher than those available—almost always the case in South Africa (Adato and Haddad 2002).

The quantitative data in Chapter 4 found that *de facto* participation increased the amount of employment days for women; however, infrastructure development and community building projects typically employed fewer women than other public works projects. The case study research helped to interpret these findings. First, we found a number of biases against employing women,

one of the main ones being the perception that construction was not women's work. Several of our case studies showed quite a bit of bias against hiring women. The Lutzville project, with the highest levels of community participation, employed only three women on the community hall project—as cleaners. However, biases were held in different cases by community members, local government, and contractors, so community participation does not necessarily affect this, and the quantitative results suggest that community run projects perform better in this area. Our research found that the main factor influencing women's employment was the emphasis given on targeting women at the program level, though this was still not sufficient—these directives were followed more closely in some programs than others (Adato et al. 1999). With respect to committee participation, several of the case studies had women members but they were considerably underrepresented compared to men.

Lutzville was the one case study where the project was entirely community-run: there were weekly community-wide meetings, and a community-based PSC managed the project with no local government in-

volvement. The DTPW provided some assistance with facilitation, and the PSC managed the contractor. The main feature of Lutzville West that stands out among the other case study projects was its high degree of social capital<sup>37</sup>—it was a small town with tightly knit social networks and little apparent political conflict (inter-party or intra-party), and strongly influenced by its church committee and its community, church, and project leader (all the same person).<sup>38</sup> These factors seem to explain why there was no reported conflict on the project (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of the significance of conflict), and that community participation was effective. There were no labor disputes, time or cost overruns, or theft, and negligible vandalism.

Although beneficiaries and most private sector and government providers gave the highest value to the worker-selection/community liaison functions of the community-based provider, there are benefits to be derived from community participation in other areas. Evidence from the case studies reveals that given the opportunity and skills to participate in other areas, community members are interested in doing so.

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<sup>37</sup>Isham (2002) finds that social cohesion positively affects participation and project outcomes.

<sup>38</sup>Certainly the leadership of this individual was important to the smooth running of the project. However, we do not attribute participation outcomes primarily to "leadership" as the case study projects had widely variable leadership that does not appear to be very correlated with participation outcomes.

## CHAPTER 6

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### **Social, Political, and Institutional Challenges to Participation**

In this chapter we use the case study material to describe and analyze the extent and nature of the social, political, and institutional challenges posed to participatory development, as well as consequences of increasing or limiting participation. In particular we focus on the project steering committee (PSC), negotiating with other agents that either support or challenge their role as (partial) provider.

Table 6.1 describes eight reasons that were found to explain why PSCs were not able to play more substantive roles in the case study projects.

#### **The Views of Professionals on Efficiency and Technical Specialization**

The first three factors in Table 6.1 share a common underlying theme, related to the tension between participation and professional views on technical specialization.<sup>39</sup> In four of the eight projects, participation was limited by the consultant's, contractor's, or local government's belief that committees did not have the technical ability to assume greater responsibility. Government and private sector project managers are accustomed to planning and managing projects on their own, and are concerned primarily with bringing projects in at high quality and within budget. These role-players do not have incentives for sharing the provider role with community members or their representatives. The perception of most is that community participation will increase time and costs, and reduce quality. In terms of financial and professional rewards, their perceived incentives mitigate against participation. The exception to this is when failure to share this role would disrupt the construction process, but the effect of this absence is not apparent until after the project is underway. In the competitive process of tendering, there is no incentive for allowing generous costs for training community-based committees and allowing them to make mistakes. Contracts have fixed prices and the contractor bears the cost overruns if they occur. There were no new incentives developed in these programs to encourage a new way of working.

The main incentive for local government and private sector providers to share their role with communities is that central government financiers required this before awarding public works funds. This was specified in all the programs studied. With the IDT CBPWP, the central government/financiers required CBOs to be the sole formal implement agent/provider, and

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<sup>39</sup>The impact of these views and professional discourses more broadly on institutional transformation in the context of these public works programs is analyzed in more detail in Adato (2000).

**Table 6.1 Factors limiting the roles of the project steering committees (PSCs), case-study projects**

Factors limiting PSC roles	Lutzville	Langa	Khayelitsha	Thembaletu	Clanwilliam	Murraysburg	Kylemore	Stellenbosch
Consultant/govt. views on efficiency and technical specialization								
Community empowerment not prioritized								
Lack of technical capacity within committee; no training								
Local politics and conflict								
Local govt. seen as legitimate representative								
PSC commitment reduced over time								
Lack of clarity as to what function should be								

Note: Shading indicates the presence of factors limiting the roles of the PSCs.

this was a powerful factor explaining why there was de facto participation in these projects. With respect to the other six programs, where there could be joint providers, financiers did not give very specific criteria with respect to the nature of community participation and the type of training given to support it, nor were directives for participation monitored. Specifying these criteria and monitoring their implementation are necessary because once professional providers obtained funds, the incentives to promote participation, particularly higher levels of participation, were removed. Communities may, of course, also decide to limit their own participation to specific areas due to opportunity costs or their own perceptions of where their abilities to contribute lie.

A central issue, reflecting long-standing debates on democracy, is whether community members have the qualifications to carry out the specialized, requisite responsibilities. In these projects, the questions revolved around whether PSC members had the skills to carry out planning, book-keeping, purchasing, and managing transport, personnel, and other tasks. Actual levels of education and skills varied across the projects, with higher capacity at Clanwilliam, Murraysburg (in the CBO that was excluded), Lutzville, Kylemore, and Stellenbosch, and less in Khayelitsha and Thembaletu.<sup>40</sup> However, no formal or on-the-job training was provided to build these skills. At Khayelitsha, computer courses were offered on the weekends, but not well

<sup>40</sup>There were too many different people involved in the Street Committees at Langa to make a judgment.

attended.<sup>41</sup> Special weekend training workshops were designed for the PSC, but were only given when the project was close to completion.

The objectives of central government financiers to promote community participation and empowerment—that community members should develop new skills and gain management experience—was not shared by many professional providers on the projects. Where participation was appreciated, it was with a different vision. For example, when asked if the PSC assisted the project in any way, the contractor at Khayelitsha responded:

Right at the beginning of the contract there were a lot of houses that were built in the road reserve and we got hold of the Project Steering Committee and said listen we can't build a road unless the people move out and relocate, and there they did a fair amount of work. Because their job wouldn't go on unless they did that. So they did their job there but up to a point, then the job would just naturally run inward [toward the contractor]. And yes we called them for problems, but it was more just to do the administrative part of it because . . . they didn't really add value to the contract. I don't think. You need them for the community sake . . . the thing runs it's like a big vicious wheel, it just runs by itself. Then the Project Steering Committee, they can't really change the direction that this whole thing is running (interview).

The contractor was also critical of the PSC, questioning their commitment to the project, their failure to really learn and com-

municate the principles of labor-intensive construction, their dwindling attendance at meetings, and their failure to show up for computer training classes. The vast gulf between perceptions of the contractor and the PSC at Khayelitsha is illustrated in the contrast between the contractor's comments above, and those of PSC members, who expressed that the contractor "never wanted to give people a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the project and the process" and later that the "contractor is clearly taking some part of our responsibilities away." This was in fact one explanation why their enthusiasm for the project waned and why some members left the committee (interview, Khayelitsha PSC). Their perspective on appropriate roles for the committee also contrasts with that of the contractor:

We should have been part of monitoring the overall aspects of the project—things like ordering, buying the materials and tools . . . even the CLOs [Community Liaison Officers] were never involved in such operations. We do not even know as the PSC how much was allocated to this project—we do not know how much was actually expected in this project, also if there is any over-spending . . . all these are the decisions that were taken in the forums where the officials meet without us . . . I don't think even our local councilors were part of such meetings (interview, Khayelitsha PSC).

This influenced the committee's view not only of the contractor, but also the committee's opinion of provincial government, which was the department responsible for the project (though central government

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<sup>41</sup>We do not know the reasons, because the PSC did not mention these classes, and after the contractor did, we were not able to re-contact the PSC to inquire. It would be worthwhile to understand why, given the committee's expressed desire for more managerial inclusion: whether it was insufficient interest, quality of the classes, time or logistical constraints, or other factors.

was the primary financier; as explained in Chapter 2, the funds passed through the province). One member remarked that “the politicians/leadership usually say that they govern according to the needs and views of the people, but it is them who turn around and not implement their own policies about communities taking part in deciding what it feels is good for them” (interview, Khayelitsha PSC). This is a case where financiers share interests with beneficiaries but professional providers did not—at least with respect to the empowerment goal. The interest in building a good quality road was shared among all parties.

Similar divides between the perspectives of community committee members and professionals were revealed at Thembalethu. In this case committee members, including two who were also employed as office workers, were not trained in using the computers or bookkeeping, and were not involved in financial issues nor kept informed on substantive issues. One of the partner consultants explained the divide that needs to be bridged in the following terms:

You see we consultants are used to the conventional way of working. We design, there’s a contractor that is responsible, they are the communities or the beneficiaries—they know nothing about what is happening to the funds . . . They are just asked to work and get salaries at the end of the day and leave. Now this situation is a new situation that needs both parties, communities and the consultants, to make a joint effort to educate each other about the new process because the whole process is new to us. The whole process is new also to the community because they were not involved before. They were not participating, so they want to participate. At the same time we consultants, we’re not used to communities getting involved in the administration of the project. . . . [We’re] not used to accountability and the community wanted some account-

ability from us, especially with finance (interview, Manong Associates).

Asked whether he felt some of the questions the community members asked were valid ones, he replied:

Yes, absolutely. That’s why I said if I have to be given such a project again in the future I’d run it differently from the way we ran that one . . . In the beginning put the proper administration mechanism to train them, let them run with the whole thing. Make sure they keep the books, but at the same time the financial part of it we have a proper control of it, you see. They know what is happening with each and every cent, but at the same time their access to finance doesn’t become that busy because it’s difficult if you keep books, finance, you can draw money and all these things. There is a way of getting around these things you know. But I will make it a point that they know it’s transparent, they know themselves what is happening to the money, but they don’t keep the money (interview).

Community representatives were eventually removed from the project following a conflict where the contractor was held hostage over a dispute involving bonuses. This was a case with a very high degree of political conflict in the community (more detail is given below), and a wide gulf between the perspectives of the consultant engineers and community members on the PSC. The Lutzville case discussed in Chapter 5, on the other hand, shows that community-based organizations can play a productive role in managing projects without strife and with good performance outcomes.

There are two ways of responding to the problem that community committee members may not have technical skills to contribute to project management. The first is that they thus should not be involved in management in the interest of efficiency (as

suggested by some stakeholders in the case studies). An alternative approach is to see participatory development projects as opportunities to develop local capacities through training and oversight. In the case of South African public works projects, policymakers (with an implicit democratically expressed mandate from their constituents) made community participation an objective, an end as well as a means. If it remains so policymakers must live with the tensions inherent in the process and continue to explore creative methods to achieve multiple objectives. One such method, for example, is that suggested by the Thembaletu consultant in the quote above. The extent to which there is a tension between empowerment of communities and technical efficiency varies on a case by case basis. But policymakers need to make the prioritization of objectives clear to the professional and community-based providers, so each party knows what to expect and what is expected of them.

It is not only the private sector that has had difficulty adjusting to the idea of community participation. Local government was often the main alternative to the community-based provider, or the main partner in a shared arrangement. In Murraysburg the local government did not involve a CBO at all until the proxy financier (DTPW) threatened to withhold funds, and even then it continued to resist bringing in the CBO. In this case, the CBO had some leadership with a high standard of education and could have taken on management roles (they reported having managed a R700,000 project for the Department of Health). The local CBO explained the situation as follows:

In as far as the CBPWP is concerned it was made clear that the municipality had to involve a community organization and [we are] the only local community organization. [The municipality] informed [DTPW] that there is a community organization and so the department approached us. They came up

with a contract and we had to sign it and say whether we approved or not. We did not sign the contract because we disagreed on a few things. When we read through the contract we found that we . . . had to be involved from the start but we were only involved when the project was already in the middle. We found that they only wanted our signatures and they were doing the whole thing. . . . [For example] R74,000 was allocated for training. So we said we will not sign the contract unless they could prove that the R74,000 was spent for the right purpose. . . . We did not sign the contract because we wanted answers as to how the monies were spent and they could not come up with the answers . . . they really did not want to come out straight and say we still have the money or this money has been given. So we said how can we sign because we will be rubber-stamping something of which we have no knowledge (interview, Murraysburg CBO).

The organization attributed this to

the old idea that still persists that [the government] decides for the people and they just have to say thank you, and they don't ask questions. . . . The municipality is also seeing [the CBO] as a threat because if they are going to give [the CBO] more of a say they will not have the ability to do their own thing without the people having a say. . . . They still have that old attitude that we decide for you and at the end of the day you just accept (interview, Murraysburg CBO).

Local government officials on the other hand saw no reason to involve the CBO: "Even today I can not see that with [the CBO] involved, that anything could have run better than the way it was" (interview, local official).

The case studies also revealed how participation can also work well, and the benefits that come from this. In Lutzville, the Lutzville West Development Trust (a CBO) was the provider/PSC, with its leader the project manager. The PSC contracted an architect (again a partial provider) but managed the construction, labor force, and finances on its own, without any involvement of the municipality and with occasional advice from consultants. The community hall is of a high quality standard, and it came in within the budget (a small overrun was made up through interest). It was the first time the community had managed a project, and committee members said they are “still shaken up about this. [We] can’t believe that we did this.” Their confidence had increased, and they were “waiting anxiously for the next [project]” (interview, Lutzville PSC). There were expressions of similar feelings of accomplishment and new capacity (though mixed with more frustrations) from PSC members at Khayelitsha, Thembalethu, and Clanwilliam. These are described in the larger report upon which this research report is based (Adato et al. 1999).

### **Participation, Politics, and Conflict**

Community participation is also complicated by the introduction of local politics into projects, which often brings conflict and sometimes expensive delays. The politicization of projects means that a process that is intended to be inclusive and serve the interests of beneficiaries, often excludes some part of a community and serves the interests of some intended beneficiaries more than others. In some cases national level politics entered the projects, particularly when a project was known as an RDP project and community members who were not working on the proj-

ect felt a sense of ownership. In an incident in the Stellenbosch case study, workers had joined a national work stay-away, but then requested and were allowed to work on a weekend day to make up their wages. Other community members felt this ran contrary to the purpose of the strike and arrived at the project, insisting that the work be stopped.

More often, however, political conflict in projects reflected local and provincial-level politics. Political tensions are the reality of working in communities where resources are very scarce, where there are conflicts of interest, and where a history of conflict between communities and the state, and between workers and managers, re-emerges in new forms in development projects.<sup>42</sup> One long-time Western Cape activist, who became a specialist in community facilitation and worked in public works projects, described the Hout Bay CBPWP community hall project, where

they wanted to politicize each and every thing. After all, that is a community-based project. The process designed to let everybody get involved in it. At the end the workers did shady work, the standard was low, they didn’t listen to the foreman. Everything just went hay-wire . . . the whole idea was that the community was going to empower themselves. . . . And we had endless problems with them. We had money problems, that they wanted more money, they wanted to change the design. . . . I can give you a million examples . . . There is so much friction in some of these communities and everybody is afraid to talk about it. Everybody still believes that the struggle was a great unifier, but they don’t understand we’re not in the struggle anymore, we’re in reality now and people have difference

<sup>42</sup>See Adato (1996) for a discussion of the challenges of South Africans moving from “strategies of opposition” in the apartheid and transitional era to “strategies of development” in a post-apartheid political and economic context.

of opinions. . . . It's over resources, it's over power<sup>43</sup> (interview, C. B. Associates).

According to another consultant, there were many political groups involved and some of those that felt excluded ended up vandalizing the community hall. This is another reason to facilitate an inclusive process, although such facilitation was attempted in this case and does not always solve the problems.

Local politics affected projects in different ways in all eight cases studied, but had a particularly strong impact in four. Local politics involved conflict between political parties, between CBOs and local government, and among CBOs. The nature of the problem affecting the PSCs were mainly two: (1) Projects were used by political rivals to gain political advantage, where one group attempted to exclude another to avoid sharing the credit for infrastructure delivery. Once a group no longer perceived a political gain, it lost its incentive to support the project; (2) Local politics were carried inside the projects, causing disruptions which undermined the effectiveness of the PSC and the authority of its members. The case studies provide insight into these processes and their implications for community-based projects.

In Thembaletu, where community members were on a joint PSC with consultants and the contractor, political conflict reached a point where the consultants said they eventually found the need to exclude the committee in order to get the job done. One consultant said that the community committee members had their own agendas, were too influenced by local political struggles, changed their minds too often, and did not stick to agreements. In one incident, they called a strike that workers did not want, and in another participated in holding the

contractor hostage over the issue of bonuses. Thembaletu was a particularly difficult community to work in, with a highly fractious political environment, and many political groupings vying for influence (we identified five, there may have been more). The community committee members were appointed from a trust with links to a separate engineering firm, and not elected by the community. In this sense, it was a particularly complicated and atypical project, but nevertheless illustrates the type of problems that can be encountered in community-based projects.

Clanwilliam and Murraysburg were towns with a common political configuration in rural Western Cape, with National Party (NP) and African National Congress (ANC) members sitting together on a council controlled by the NP, and a community-based organization officially neutral but more sympathetic to the ANC. In Clanwilliam, when the RDP Forum took on a management role, local government pulled back, though in the end they were impressed: "everyone was sort of standing on the sidelines to see whether the thing would work out. Everyone wanted to see where a mistake was going to be made, but in the end they came to us and congratulated us" (interview, local official, PSC). The municipality resisted involving the RDP Forum in the administration of the project, until a greater role for the forum was negotiated with the assistance of provincial facilitators. Community members and local government officials, though they were not in a happy alliance, did both participate substantively in implementation and performed their tasks well.

In Murraysburg, in addition to the municipality seeing delivery as its own job, there was also a strained political relationship between itself and the local CBO, which resulted in the latter dropping out of the proj-

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<sup>43</sup>There were of course differences of opinion in the anti-apartheid movement as well. But this speaker's point is that the conflicts with authority and between political interests that became so familiar in the anti-apartheid era were being brought into projects, where beneficiaries of the projects would stand to lose.

ect altogether. The CBO's perception was that "some people in the municipality are paying too much attention to politics at the expense of the community" (interview, Murraysburg CBO). Referring to these two projects but also others in the province, one of the provincial facilitators observed that

We need to be able to de-politicize the projects and that is always a big problem in our country. How do you de-politicize anything? [A project is] a great political football in the ranks of a political party and also you know trying to score points on the opposition and that has also made it bloody difficult in some cases where National Party and ANC people have also fought (interview, C. B. Associates).

Both issues identified here—views on technical expertise and local politics—indicate the important role played by national government financiers and their provincial counterparts in setting and monitoring provisions for community participation. In all eight case study projects involvement of a CBO was a requirement. In Clanwilliam, where local government did not want to involve RDP forum members in monitoring of the funds, the provincial DTPW made a difference:

Here it was again the issue of whether [community] people could be trusted and whether [we] had the experience. They have a very low opinion of us. For this to change we just had to put our foot down and with the help of [facilitation consultants hired by DTPW] we gave them the option that either you give us a say in the administration of the funds or we will find a way to administer the funds ourselves. The municipality wanted to administer the

funds and only they will have full say in this, but this was then sorted out (interview, Clanwilliam PSC).

DTPW was less successful in Murraysburg. There, the CBO made the point that it was the provincial department's role to make sure the requirements for community participation were met: "unfortunately for us the people who are supplying the money are also negligent because they are not following up" (interview, Murraysburg CBO). DTPW tried to insist on involvement of the CBO by sending out its facilitators and withholding funds, but eventually turned the funds over after the municipality already spent the money and built the asset (using Housing Department funds that were earmarked for a different project and required reimbursement). Returning to the model in Chapter 4, these cases of politics and conflict illustrate where a provider or particular provider arrangement is not working in the best interest of beneficiaries. Instead, the financier more closely served these interests and intervened to do so.

The case studies also suggest that a community with a high degree of political fragmentation will introduce a higher degree of conflict to a project, whereas a politically homogenous community will see a smoother participatory process. In some cases this political conflict took on a racial as well as political dimension; in others the conflict was inter-party or intra-party. In Clanwilliam and Murraysburg, political tensions between the ANC and NP led to competition and conflict. Lutzville West on the other hand was a politically and racially homogenous, tight knit community with a large stock of social capital at the outset, and little if any conflict. This project had one of the highest levels of participation among the 101 projects and was efficiently managed and reasonably labor intensive.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup>As noted in Chapter 5, in comparison to other community hall projects, Lutzville performed better than the average in efficiency in transferring money to the poor, and just below average with respect to labor intensity.

These conditions cannot easily be influenced by an external intervention, though mediation or authority given to a legitimate, downwardly accountable local government might be able to soften or reduce the impact of pre-existing conflicts or distrust.

However, fractionalization and conflict do not necessarily prevent participation—it may even increase it where rivals seek influence (this may have positive or negative impacts on the project). In Clanwilliam there was eventually a high degree of participation; in Murraysburg there was none. There was also a high level of conflict (intra-party rather than inter-party) in the Thembaletu and Khayelitsha projects, but a high and medium level (respectively) of participation. However, the outcomes of conflict might be otherwise problematic, as they were in the case studies, as well as the Hout Bay project described above.

### **Participation and Project Completion Time**

There is a generalized belief that participation increases the time of project implementation. In five of our eight case study projects, at least some informants commented that community participation adds time to projects. This is usually true up front—decisions made by community members or committees about project design, hiring, and other issues are likely to take longer than those made by government officials or consultants, because of the time required for community members to understand the issues, and the pressure for consensus. It is also likely that politics and conflict will cause delays. In the Khayelitsha and Thembaletu projects, cost overruns were high, in part attributed to community conflict. Different conclusions were drawn from these experiences. The lesson one official in the provincial government came away with was that community participation was too expensive and there should be less of it. Similarly, the contractor at Thembaletu felt that com-

munity participation takes too long, and that from his standpoint conventional contracts are easier to manage.

Yet while increased time would normally be associated with higher costs, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 found higher de facto participation to be more cost-effective. The case study research provides some insight into why this might be the case. One part of this explanation revealed in the case studies is that participation early on avoids costly conflict and delays later. In the Clanwilliam project, a key municipal official felt that the strike there could have been averted if there had been more community involvement in the project. Another DTPW program director warned that trying to avoid conflict or save time by sidelining community members is unlikely to succeed, since

If you don't have community participation you run a large risk of having your project blocked. To get a project done on time you must get acceptance of the project by community leadership, provide assurance that labor will come from community, but also agreement that some can come from outside. You may spend a bit more up front in getting this participation, but if you don't you may end up with project stopped or having to bring people from outside which costs more (interview).

In the case studies, we also found that the pressure to get projects off the ground quickly is at odds with the time needed to adequately discuss issues with community members and project workers before construction starts. This may increase the chances of a slipshod participation process that goes awry. In the CBPWP, delays in obtaining funds and other obstacles at the early stages meant that once projects began there was a rush to finish them within the remaining time allotted. Also, where consultants are the providers, there are usually high

capital costs and overheads, and set tender prices that cannot be adjusted upwards, leading to pressure to not extend the time frame. From an engineer's point of view, a logistics process has a "critical path" and there are incentives not to veer from this (interview, official, DTPW)—another reason to deal with problems early, before that path is embarked upon. From the beneficiaries point of view, however, there is no reason to rush—in fact, a longer project means more employment—and consensus is considered important. These competing incentives must be mediated, particularly during the construction phase (if workers slow down to extend the project, which does occur). In politics debates can continue indefinitely, and there does need to be a process for facilitating timely decisions, within a work plan.

There are also political decisions inherent in what type of participation to pursue. Under Paul's (1987) four types of participation, time can be expected to increase moving from type (1) to (4). Determining the relative priority of efficiency and empowerment objectives is a policy process. Politics, conflicts of interest, struggles over resources and drawn-out processes of consultation, consensus and even new consensus post-conflict are part of the landscape of community-driven development. Training, facilitation (by local government or others), and patience are all required. If community empowerment remains an objective, then all role-players must take the realization of this objective seriously through allocating the necessary training, time, and patience to see the process through. Our case studies and quantitative analysis indicate that there is not necessarily a trade-off between participation and efficiency.

### **Local Government and Representation**

One basis for resistance to participation on the part of some providers in local government and the private sector was the belief

that local government was the representative of "the community"—they did not see the need to involve a CBO. In Clanwilliam, one local councillor asked:

if [the CBO] got involved, what role did the Council have to play? Because we were chosen by the community. There was a clash of interest in my way of thinking. [The CBO] got involved on behalf of the community; we got involved because the community made their crosses behind our names. So why would the one do a better job than the other one? (interview).

The respective roles of local government and CBOs and the relationship between them is a salient issue in debates about decentralization and participation. Ribot (2001) persuasively argues that local associations (such as CBOs) do not necessarily represent the public nor are they systematically accountable, and that elected local government is a legitimate representative of local people. Different interest groups hold varying degrees of power, and representative governance levels the playing field. However, he also recognizes the less than ideal operationalization of decentralization to date. Among other problems: powers are usually placed with upwardly accountable agents or with private groups who are not systematically accountable at the local level; and there are many ways that local elite or political parties are able to capture the electoral process. Ribot also posits certain factors that influence how accountable local government might be; for example, the ways in which they are embedded in social relations in their communities and the level of civic dedication.

All of these points have considerable relevance to the South African experiment with community participation. There are many arguments why local government rather than CBOs should be the main provider in public works projects—democratic accountability;

access to resources, and capacity with respect to the complicated task of infrastructure delivery. Note that local government was part of the joint provider arrangement in the majority of the 101 projects. However, there are also several factors that weigh in favor of a strong role for CBOs in the South African context. First, most of these CBOs were elected. In the context of powerful discourses of democracy leading up to and following the transition to a democratic state (Adato 1996), it is less likely that a community committee with access to resources could simply be appointed. Second, when many of these programs started, a legitimate local government was not in place. But even when local elections did take place, the observation that local governments can end up being upwardly rather than downwardly accountable, controlled by elite or political parties had relevance in Western Cape province. In many of the communities where our research took place, local governments were embedded in social and political relations—in particular racial, class, and political configurations left over from apartheid—in a way that significantly reduced their downward accountability. Finally, in several of our case study communities, local authorities represented dual communities of different race and class, and were more directly accountable to a non-poor constituency. There is also the consideration of the RDP, that aimed to build the skills and capacities of local people through their direct involvement (not through representation) in development processes.

Nevertheless, in a more accountable framework, the arguments are still strong for elected local authorities to play the role of provider in public works projects. Ribot (2001) also makes a strong case for the important role that local associations can play in fostering accountability through monitoring, informing, and lobbying. Capacity for political action can be built this way (although the acquisition of certain skills is more questionable). The argument for local government responsibility won out in the

subsequent CBPWP in South Africa, where authority for implementation was placed with local government. As the country's democracy grows older, local government should become more accountable than it was in the immediate post-apartheid environment. Still, the history of civil society participation at the local level may still result in a significant role for CBOs, formally or informally.

### **Reduction of CBO Commitment**

In five of the seven case study projects where community-based committees were involved, the commitment of members to the job was reduced over the course of the project. In four of the projects, committee members explained that their interest diminished when their power was undermined. However, other stakeholders observed that committee members got busy and overextended, especially those with skills and commitment to many community activities. Their skills make them likely to have other jobs as well as other community engagements (a factor at Clanwilliam and Kylemore). Committee members, particularly women, may have problems attending meetings in the evening (although this was not raised by any committee members). If committee participation wanes or members drop out, implementing agents and consultants should try to learn why; what are the constraints they face in terms of time or foregone opportunities? What dissatisfaction might they have with the process? Compensation for serving on committees can also be considered. This involves risks, because it increases the chance that people will try to get on the committee for money rather than commitment to the project, and the likelihood of conflict as people vie for membership in the context of high unemployment. In Lutzville, the project was carried off successfully and with sustained commitment without any compensation. In Khayelitsha, attendance problems were solved by paying

members a stipend to attend meetings—probably a better option than paying a flat salary because the amount is small and the stakes lower. Also, if a PSC member is essentially an employee of the provider (including possibly itself), its independence as a worker representative is potentially compromised.

### **Lack of Clarity in the Role of the PSC**

Given the joint provider institutional arrangements of most of these public works programs, and the ambivalence of many project stakeholders about the role of CBOs in project management, there was a significant degree of confusion in many of the projects as to what the role of the PSC was supposed to be. For example, in Khayelitsha it emerged that the PSC's main *de facto* role was as community liaison and worker-management liaison, but this was also the role of the two elected Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), as well as a role occasionally and most effectively played by the local government.

The two Fynbos Working for Water case study projects provide particularly colorful examples of this problem. The national level financier, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) specified that all projects would have Facilitating Committees composed of local government, an RDP Forum, the Workers Committee, and sometimes other CBOs. However, in the two case study projects the composition of the committee was different. At Kylemore it was composed of assorted community members whom the project manager requested to join, skilled people who were active in community affairs. In Stellenbosch, it consisted of local councilors and initially RDP forum members. In both cases (1) the roles were not clearly defined; (2) there were conflicting perceptions of these roles by the committee members themselves and project management; and (3) their participation dwindled, in part because of (1) and (2) above. There

were also other reasons, for example, in Kylemore the members had too many other commitments.

DWAF envisioned the steering committee as assisting with “recruitment, appointments, promotions; disputes between the community and Fynbos Water Conservation Programme; discipline, facilitation of community tendering, and promoting social activities” (SALDRU/IFPRI project survey). Other functions were seen as “advising us on social questions in the community” and this and discipline were the committee roles seen as most useful by project implementers (interview, DWAF official). Steering committees were functioning to greater or lesser degrees across the FWWP projects, but in the two projects in our study, they were hardly functioning at all. The committees were more active in the early stages, but this had waned for the reasons cited here. In both cases, the committees did not want to be brought in only to deal with labor conflicts. They did not want to be seen by workers as just a disciplinary body (reported at Kylemore) and felt that they did not know enough about the project and working conditions to feel comfortable in that role (reported at Stellenbosch). In Kylemore, they also felt uncomfortable in a social worker role:

We can advise that the social worker must work there or the supervisor must try to do that or so on, but we cannot be physically involved and I think they thought that the steering committee could take a lot of their responsibility which is not working now. . . . So they should have thought about the things that are going to happen in the project and work out protocols, how we're going to handle some of these issues (interview, Facilitating Committee, Kylemore).

Increasingly, the committee felt that the manager, who tended to want to control most aspects of the project herself, saw the committee as an interloper, eventually excluding

it almost altogether. In Stellenbosch, the committee was even less clear about its role.

Let me tell you, we don't actual know what is the whole objective of the Steering Committee. If we don't have functions, so we don't know what's our function. We cannot tell you what people want from the steering committee (interview, Facilitating Committee, Stellenbosch).

Committee members felt that they should be monitoring the project and reporting back to the community, but were too uninvolved

to know what to report back. Subsequently, the committee played no role, and did not know why it was no longer called to meetings. There was a need to revisit and re-define the role of the steering committees in these projects, which DWAF did undertake. Given that the WWP was operating at an increasingly large scale, introducing many new economic and social development measures rapidly, it was particularly important that experimental institutional arrangements were monitored, so that otherwise good program ideas were not undermined by problems going undetected and unsolved.

## CHAPTER 7

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### Conclusions

For several decades, development theory and practice has increasingly called for greater participation of local people and community organizations in the initiation, design, and implementation of development initiatives that directly affect their communities. This call has philosophical, political, and instrumentalist underpinnings. There has been an increasing recognition that top-down, technocratic forms of development imposed on diverse local realities often result in failure; that local people best understand their own needs and what is likely to work and not work; that involving local people can be cost-effective in terms of reduced capital costs, and increased involvement in operation and maintenance, and thus greater sustainability; and finally, that poor people should have more power to direct the course of their own economic and social development.

These ideas have not been lost on South Africa. In fact, the last point infuses much South African development policy. In terms of different levels of participation—information sharing, consultation, decisionmaking, and initiating action—the NPWP aimed to achieve all of these. In fact, by making community capacity building one of its central objectives, the NPWP saw participation in part as an “end” in itself. But it can and, from a political economy perspective, must simultaneously be a “means” of efficient infrastructure delivery if it is to survive as a policy. Although the goals of participation as an end and as a means to other ends can be complementary, there are various tensions in this relationship.

The case studies pointed to ways in which participation, through wide community forums or through CBOs, added value to projects through enabling beneficiary communities to influence the choices of priority assets and by contributing to project design features that can increase safety and convenience, and affect the number of jobs created in the short and long term. Regular communication with communities can increase a sense of local ownership with various positive spin-offs such as more cooperation and better maintenance. Yet community participation also introduces politics, conflict, and lengthier decisionmaking processes, increasing the time required up front. On the other hand, forgoing participation can result in even more conflict and time required further down the line when time becomes more expensive.

The quantitative work demonstrates that even after accounting for the endogeneity of participation, *de facto* participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the project budget share spent on labor, the log number of days of work created, and the log number of training days undertaken. It increases the percentage of employment that goes to women and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local unskilled wages. It reduces the cost of creating employment and reduces the cost of transferring income to the poor. The magnitudes of these impacts are sizeable and they are robust to a variety of model specifications and the inclusion of other covariates.

Despite these benefits from participation, the qualitative research found a wide gap between ideas for community-driven projects embodied in national government policies and programs and the beliefs and practices of professional providers at the provincial and local levels, in government and the private sector. Although there is a voiced consensus on the importance of community participation, there is profound ambivalence about it, as well as widely different ideas about what it means and where it is appropriate.

Community-based PSCs were involved in some way in almost all projects but their roles tended to be limited to community and worker liaison functions. These liaison functions are important to the community and useful for contractors, but far more limited than the vision of the NPWP, where the community “through its representative community structure, should make the decisions about what should be constructed, how it should be designed and constructed, who should work on the project, as well as the rates and system of employment (DPW 1996, 38). In many projects, consultants or local government excluded PSCs from participation in management tasks because of professional views about efficiency and specialization, and a lack of identification with the program objectives of capacity building and empowerment. PSC members in some projects did not have sufficient skills, and were not trained. There were other problems that limited participation too: local politics, dwindling commitment of PSC members, and unclear role assignments.

There are two ways of responding to these findings. One is to substantially reduce the role of communities, providing opportunities for communication and in some

areas consultation. Local government, if it is legitimate and downwardly accountable to poor constituents/public works beneficiaries, could be the sole provider. Alternatively, government could increase its commitment to improving structures and processes for community participation for the value that it adds. In the same way that Ribot (2001, 342) suggests that the “‘democratic’ decentralization experiment has not yet happened,” it can be argued that the community participation experiment, in the way envisioned by the RDP and NPWP, has hardly occurred. Certainly the first phase of community-based public works programs involved severe growing pains, and subsequent participatory programs have still not solved all these problems.

Community participation in its pure forms envisioned by the government in 1994 may not necessarily be the most appropriate path under newer political structures and relationships. Participation does not have to be all or nothing, and its best forms are likely to vary under different circumstances.<sup>45</sup> There are a range of modalities for capturing local preferences and through which to achieve accountability, transparency, capacity building, and local empowerment, while delivering quality infrastructure needed by the poor. Debates about prioritization of objectives and how to achieve them must take place among policymakers and their constituencies, and then decisions reflected in program design. If participation and local empowerment remain important objectives—and it is likely that they will if differently conceived—policymakers and program designers must explore creatively institutional arrangements and methods for increasing skills and capacities. This might include a primary role

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<sup>45</sup>Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) argue that the quest for “one solution” is the problem. While they mainly point to the problems with uniform imported technocratic and bureaucratic systems, they suggest that calls for participation and empowerment be regarded with analytical complexity as well, advocating for local solutions to local problems. They also note that tensions between the interests and incentives of all involved can be seen as an opportunity to enhance creative solutions.

for legitimate downwardly accountable local authorities (as has been the intention for new community-based public works programs). But new policy proposals alone are unlikely to bring about significant change. This would require that all important stakeholders be brought into the process, common ground found, and a commitment generated to carry out and monitor agreements. This would also require providing the time and training necessary to operationalize agreed roles.

The Lutzville community hall project where a CBO managed all aspects of a highly successful project—meeting cost, quality, training, and capacity building objectives—

is an example of the feasibility of capable community-based project management. On the other hand, not all communities will have the social and political conditions of Lutzville West, so the road will not always be so smooth. Nevertheless, politics, conflicts of interest, struggles over resources, and processes of consultation and consensus-building are part of the landscape of community-based development. If participatory development remains part of South Africa's development agenda, then all role-players must take the realization of this objective seriously through providing the necessary resources, creativity, and patience to see the process through.

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