journal article

Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem

by M. Mehrab Bakhtiar,
Raymond Guiteras,
James Levinsohn and
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
Citation
Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab; Guiteras, Raymond; Levinsohn, James; and Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq. 2023. Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem. Journal of Development Economics 162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103072

Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person’s sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5–12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2–6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments.