The objective of this report is to present results from the midline survey conducted as part of the IMPEL evaluation of SPIR-II, a randomized controlled trial launched in 2022.
Why is there high variability—both across countries and across different food staples—in the adoption and implementation of large-scale food fortification (LSFF)?
In this paper, we explore the current levels and participation of crop commercialization by Rwandan smallholder farmers.
This paper explores the broad spectrum of commercial engagement by Rwandan farmers by grouping farmers according to characteristics of the head of household, the degree of commercialization of their farms, size of livestock holdings and other fact
Somalia is among the most impoverished nations globally, grappling with severe poverty, persistent armed conflicts, and recurrent droughts and floods, leading to a humanitarian crisis marked by substantial internal displacement.
Increased commercialization of smallholder farmers is a major emphasis of Rwanda’s PSTA4 and will continue with PSTA5, as well as other policy documents related to agriculture.
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world, and severe poverty, ongoing armed conflict, and recurring droughts and floodings have created a humanitarian crisis characterized by a high level of internal displacement.
In this paper we present analysis on the recent historical trend in agriculture in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region, along with analysis of recent historical trends in temperature and precipitation.
Malawi has been at the center of the debate on agricultural input subsidies in Africa ever since it significantly expanded its fertilizer subsidy program about two decades ago.
The El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) weather event of 2015/16 caused severe drought conditions in northern and central Ethiopia affecting the welfare of millions of farmers in late 2015 and early 2016.
COVID-19 risks rolling back many of the efforts and global successes recorded in reducing poverty and food insecurity.
The optimal design of informal contracts in agricultural value chains depends on when farmers prefer to be paid for their output.