book chapter

Targeting social safety nets using proxy means tests: Evidence from Egypt’s Takaful and Karama program

by Sikandra Kurdi,
Clemens Breisinger,
Hagar ElDidi,
Hoda El-Enbaby,
Daniel Gilligan and
Naureen Karachiwalla
Publisher(s): international food policy research institute (ifpri)
Open Access | CC BY-NC-ND-4.0
Citation
Kurdi, Sikandra; Breisinger, Clemens; ElDidi, Hagar; El-Enbaby, Hoda; Gilligan, Daniel; and Karachiwalla, Naureen. 2018. Targeting social safety nets using proxy means tests: Evidence from Egypt’s Takaful and Karama program. In Boosting growth to end hunger by 2025: The role of social protection, eds. Fleur Stephanie Wouterse and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse. Chapter 10, Pp. 135-153. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896295988_10

Chapter 10 uses Egypt as a case study to examine the effectiveness of proxy means test (PMT) targeting. Targeting effectiveness is defined in terms of the ability of the program to enroll beneficiaries from the lowest two quintiles of the expenditure distribution. The authors also consider the social costs of implementing PMT in a context where administrative capacity to explain the targeting mechanism to the public is imperfect.