Kibrom Abay

Armed conflict, community-based cash transfers, and social cohesion: Evidence from a randomized intervention in Ethiopia

Estimating multidimensional development resilience

Existing measures of resilience are typically based on a single well-being indicator. This is problematic in contexts where households face deprivations across multiple dimensions. We develop a multidimensional resilience measure, integrating probabilistic moment-based resilience measurement approaches with multidimensional poverty measurement methods. Applying these to household panel data from Ethiopia, we show that univariate and multidimensional resilience measures based on expenditure-based poverty, dietary diversity, and livestock asset holdings can yield varied inferences on the ranking of households as well as potential impact of development interventions. Univariate resilience measures constructed using consumption expenditure, dietary diversity and livestock asset holdings show distinct temporal and spatial distributional patterns. But while univariate measures are weakly correlated with one another and with different well-being metrics, multivariate measures exhibit much stronger rank correlations. When we contrast univariate measures of resilience to multidimensional measures of resilience, we find that the latter vary less over the study period; multidimensional resilience measures seem to capture more “persistent or structural” vulnerability and associated capacity of households. We also demonstrate the differences in these univariate and multivariate measures, including the potential of the composite multidimensional resilience measures for supporting targeting processes.

Incentives, administrative capture and preference aggregation in community-based targeting

Community-based targeting (CBT), which leverages community leaders to identify eligible beneficiaries, is widely used in social protection programs and development interventions, especially in data-scarce settings. Yet, little is known about how these leaders respond to opportunities for potential resource leakages and elite capture, and whether such behavior is moderated by budget constraints or the level of discretion given to leaders. Similarly, how community leaders involved in CBT aggregate individual preferences into collective decisions remains understudied. We conduct a cluster-randomized experiment in 180 Ethiopian villages to study the effects of incentive structures and discretion on administrative capture—defined as funds retained under the disguise of covering “administrative” costs. Local leaders were tasked with allocating real or hypothetical transfer budgets, with discretion to retain up to 10 percent as “administrative costs”. To uncover decision-making and preference aggregation within CBT committees, we elicited these decisions (proposals to retain a portion of the budget) individually as well as collectively. We find that financial incentives significantly increase administrative (elite) capture, and that capture increases with budget size. Group decisions yield higher appropriation than individual proposals, suggesting implicit collusion rather than prosocial restraint in group-based decisions. Moreover, when real stakes are at play, group outcomes are disproportionately shaped by extreme (outlier) preferences, whereas in hypothetical settings without actual transfers, popular preferences dominate. These findings highlight behavioral mechanisms underlying collective decision-making and administrative capture in CBT, which can inform the design of more accountable CBT systems.