Currently, 80% of the world’s people rely on just three agricultural commodities as primary food staples: Maize, rice, and wheat. Production of these staple foods is concentrated in a small number of countries and regions, often called “breadbaskets.” At the same time, the incidence of climate-driven droughts, storms, floods, and related shocks is on the rise, creating large-scale threats to agricultural production in these areas. Recent research suggests that climate change will increase both the volatility of agricultural output and correlations across regions.

If crisis hits more than one breadbasket region at the same time, the scale of economic disruption can be significant. What dangers do such multiple breadbasket failures (MBBFs) present to global food security?

In a new IFPRI Discussion Paper, we review the evidence on MBBF risks and report the results of a modeling exercise on their potential impacts on global food markets and food security. Shocks that hit lower-income breadbasket regions have particularly pronounced impacts on populations, both in affected countries and in other LMICs.

Past breadbasket shocks and effects

Output shocks in breadbasket countries have historically been correlated with, and contributed to, large global output shocks.

The 1982-83 El Niño event saw maize yields in Southern Africa fall by over 70% between 1981 and 1983. Severe droughts in 1983 caused United States maize yields to fall by close to 30% while global yields dropped by 11%. More recently, in 2022 several breadbasket regions experienced crises: Half of the European continent was affected by drought, resulting in below-average grain yields; the U.S. suffered major agricultural losses from droughts, forcing some farmers to sell livestock to make up for losses from crop failures; Pakistan endured devastating floods, causing a plummeting rice harvest; and finally, India—the world’s biggest rice exporter—experienced extreme temperatures and drought, reducing rice output. The 2022 crises were exacerbated by geopolitical events—notably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which substantially pushed up global food prices, increasing food insecurity risks.

MBBFs can affect food insecurity through two main channels. The first is by reducing the output of poor farmers who depend on food production for income. Thus, supplies fall and farmers lose necessary income. The second is through higher food prices, which reduce real income and the ability of poor net food buyers to purchase enough to meet their needs.

One key question is whether it matters where breadbasket failures occur. Will the impact on food security be the same if the output shock is centered in rich or poor countries?

Estimating global food security impacts of MBBFs

To answer this question, we compare the global ramifications of two hypothetical multiple breadbasket failures caused by extreme climate events in low- and middle-income and high-income regions. The first examines extreme weather shocks in Southern and Eastern Africa and South Asia. The second analyzes the impacts of MBBFs concentrated in North America and Europe. For illustrative purposes, we considered crop yield declines in the affected regions of 25% for all crops. We estimate the ex-ante ramifications of such a scenario using IFPRI’s global MIRAGRODEP model, which is well-suited to assess the transmission of agricultural productivity shocks through local and global market channels and implications for household incomes and food security.

Food security impacts of MBBFs in high-income countries differ from those in developing countries

Our findings show that MBBFs can lead to substantial increases in global food insecurity and poverty regardless of the affected regions’ income levels. Yet, these shocks are dramatically more serious if they occur in developing countries where many people are vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity.

An MBBF causing a 25% loss in yields in Eastern and Southern Africa and South Asia would cause an estimated 2 percentage point increase in the global prevalence of undernourishment (compared with the baseline), impacting 160 million more people (see Figure 1). In the affected regions, food insecurity could increase between 4 and 10 percentage points, as farm households are hurt by lower output and incomes, and other vulnerable households by sharply rising food prices.

Figure 1

In the high-income countries in Europe and North America, however, outcomes are quite different. Simultaneous production shocks may actually lead—on average—to higher farm incomes in those regions, as rising producer prices compensate for lost production. The impacts on poverty (measured against international poverty lines) and food insecurity in these countries would be only slight, as relatively few households are at risk of such conditions.

The effects on LMICs in this scenario are mixed. Overall, an MBBF causing a 25% productivity loss in North America and Europe would cause a bigger fall in global real incomes (by about 1%) and a larger increase in world food prices (by 10%-14%) in the year of the shock than one in Eastern and Southern Africa and South Asia (in which case global income would fall by about 0.5% and world food prices would rise by around 6%). The differential impact is a result of the high-income regions’ large weight in the global economy and in international trade. However, the impact on global food security and poverty of an MBBF in HICs would be much more muted than one in the low-income regions, since in that scenario farmers in LMICs would see their incomes rise with higher food prices while not suffering crop damages.

Nonetheless, despite the benefit to farmers, such a crisis originating in high-income regions would hurt low-income households in LMICs, as higher food prices would affect their ability to buy enough food. In particular, countries in Eastern and Southern Africa would suffer mild but tangible increases in the prevalence of undernourishment, affecting 25 million people in this scenario.

Food systems can rebound rapidly, but lasting damage may remain

Impacts of a drought or other climate-driven disaster often extend beyond a temporary decline in agricultural production to include sustained reductions in output from losses of physical and human capital. These losses are perhaps most obvious with livestock grazing systems; many animals may die during droughts. Droughts, floods, and fires may also destroy physical and natural capital such as water management infrastructure, buildings, fruit trees, and standing timber.

Such capital losses exacerbate the impacts on food insecurity (Figure 2), especially when associated with MBBFs in developing-country regions—increasing the prevalence of undernourishment by 1.5 percentage points in the affected LMICs, 0.7 percentage points in all LMICs, and 0.6 percentage points globally.

Figure 2

Yet, as long as damages to agricultural land and capital are not permanent,  agricultural production could gradually rebound in subsequent years, incentivized by the higher food prices.

Overall, however, our results suggest MBBFs pose a growing risk to global food security, especially for people in LMICs—a challenge that will require both innovative policy responses and resources to address.  

Will Martin and Rob Vos are Senior Research Fellows with IFPRI’s Markets, Trade, and Institutions (MTI) Unit; Reza Nia is an MTI Senior Research Analyst. This post is based on research that is not yet peer-reviewed. Opinions are the authors’.

This work was supported by the CGIAR Science Programs on Policy Innovations and Better Diets and Nutrition.

Reference:
Martin, Will; Nia, Reza; and Vos, Rob. 2025. Global food security impacts of extreme weather events and occurrence of breadbasket failures. IFPRI Discussion Paper 2360. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/176642